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ABSTRACT 
By their nature, special operations forces (SOF) are central to policy in a world- 
order dominated by low-intensity conflicts. Therefore, the proper use of SOF is 
essential. Based on published doctrine and decision making theory, this thesis 
develops a theory that defines misuse and provides a systematic framework for 
analyzing the use of SOF. Misuse occurs at the decision point. We have quantified 
the decision process and determined that misuse occurs when SOF are used while 
GPF have an absolute and comparative advantage, or, misuse occurs when SOF are 
not used while they have both an absolute and comparative advantage over GPF. The 
concepts of absolute and comparative advantage are crucial to our theory of the 
misuse of SOF. Absolute advantage is achieved if the expected value of conducting 
a specific mission outweighs the expected cost. Assuming that both forces have an 
absolute advantage, the force with the greatest expected value-to-expected cost ratio 
is said to have the comparative advantage. Absolute and comparative advantage are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper use and allow us to delineate 
specific types of errors. Through the use of four case studies, illustrative of four types 
of error, this thesis demonstrates a systematic method of considering the proper 
employment of SOF. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
An analytical definition of the misuse of SOF does not exist. Misuse is both a 
difficult problem to define and a problem that must be avoided. The post-cold war world has 
produced hundreds of relatively minor conflicts, or "operations other than war." These 
conflicts present decision makers with numerous options that are less cut and dried than the 
options in previous conflicts. In those conflicts, the lines between democracy-and- 
communism, good-and-evil, and black-and-white were clearly defined. In today's conflictual 
environment, there seems to be a threshold of media exposure and numbers of casualties that 
drives American foreign policy and the subsequent use of military force. Sixty-six civilians 
killed by mortar fire in the Markale market in Sarajevo appeared to breach the "entrance 
threshold" for U.S. decision makers. Eighteen dead U.S. servicemen on the streets of 
Mogadishu, meanwhile, appeared to violate the "exit threshold" for U.S. decision makers. 
In an environment full of uncertainty, both international and domestic political ramifications, 
and intense media scrutiny, the proper use of SOF is essential. Misuse results in either a 
failed mission or an inordinate price for success. This thesis develops a theory of misuse and 
provides a systematic method of addressing, analyzing, and avoiding this problem. 
Our theory is based on published doctrine and decision making theory and is directed 
to SOF. The elements of probability, political and military value, and political and military 
cost leap from the doctrine. Our theory demonstrates a method of considering these elements 
and assigning probabilities and resulting pay-offs to the decision tree. The decision tree 
allows us to quantify, in an abstract way, the decision to use or not to use SOF instead of 
GPF. Assuming that something must be done by either SOF or GPF, it is our belief that 
misuse occurs at the decision point because decision makers lack understanding of SOF 
limitations and capabilities. We have quantified this decision process and determined that 
misuse occurs when SOF are used while GPF have an absolute and comparative advantage, 
or, misuse occurs when SOF are not used while they have both an absolute and comparative 
advantage over GPF. The concepts of absolute and comparative advantage are crucial to 
our theory of the misuse of SOF. 
If the expected value of SOF conducting a specific mission is greater than the 
expected cost of SOF conducting the mission, then SOF have an absolute advantage. This 
same ratio of expected value-to-expected cost is calculated for GPF, and assuming that both 
forces have an absolute advantage, used to compare the two forces. The force with the 
greatest expected value-to-expected cost ratio is said to have the comparative advantage. 
Absolute and comparative advantage are the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper 
use and allow us to delineate specific types of errors. Errors of commission and errors of 
omission are derived from our definition of misuse. Simple errors involve mistakes of 
comparative advantage while complex errors involve both absolute and comparative 
advantage mistakes. These four types of errors were the focus of our case studies. 
The case studies were chosen to represent four commonly believed cases of misuse 
that illustrate the four different types of errors. The tragic SEAL mission at Paitilla airport 
during,Operation JUST CAUSE is commonly referred to as a misuse of SOF because "it 
wasn't a SEAL op," implying a simple error of commission. This was the only case study 
of misuse that we found to be a proper use of SOF. Merrill's Marauders, one of the 
forefathers of today's Rangers, are commonly believed to have been misused as line infantry 
against Japanese Divisions, implying a complex error of commission. We found this to be 
true. Errors of omission are more difficult to apply to a case study, as the argument is 
necessarily counterfactual. Both the Mayaguez incident and Operation URGENT FURY 
received intense criticism for the lack of accurate intelligence provided to the ground forces, 
and have spurred some SOF advocates to question the non-application of SOF. These cases, 
based on their environment of context, were believed to represent simple and complex errors 
of omission respectively. Both case studies, however, resulted as simple errors of omission. 
Every mission is launched with a decision maker calculating the expected value and 
the expected cost. It may be an intuitive, ad hoc determination made in the back of his mind 
or part of a staff briefing that includes the probability of success and the expected casualties. 
Regardless of what it is called, it is a process that weighs expected value and expected cost. 
This thesis provides a systematic theoretical framework that defines the variables that should 
be taken into consideration in such a process and highlights their inter-relationships. If we 
agree that expected value and expected cost exist, and we accept the framework established 
in this thesis as a starting point, then we can begin to have a meaningful disagreement about 
the misuse of SOF. To date, there is no agreed upon systematic way of approaching the 
problem. 
What is the cost of misuse? Two costs are paid, and neither is acceptable. First, 
misuse may result in a failed mission. Either SOF were used and failed, or they were not 
used and the mission failed. Failed missions carry with them limited to zero political and 
military value, as well as the subsequent political and military costs. These values and costs 
have increased in the post-cold war world and the United States cannot afford to conduct 
operations that do not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper use. Proper 
use may not equal mission success, but it certainly creates a conducive environment. 
Second, misuse may result in paying an inordinate price for success. This causes an overall 
political and military inefficiency that may teach decision makers the wrong lessons and may 
result in more inefficiency down the road, fostering a continual cycle of paying a high price 
for success. An interesting and counter-intuitive point illuminated by this thesis is that 
mission failure does not necessarily signal misuse. Conversely, mission success does not 
imply the proper use of SOF. Just because "it worked the last time" does not mean it will 
work again. 
To avoid misuse, decision makers must think in terms of absolute and comparative 
advantage. The factors affecting the probability of success for each phase must be 
considered, as well as the value and cost associated with each branch of the decision tree. 
The expected value and expected cost must be calculated and the absolute and comparative 
advantage established. These are the necessary and sufficient conditions to avoid the misuse 
of SOF. 
xii 
I. THE MISUSE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about the misuse of special operations forces (SOF). Much is written 
about military failures and even more about special operations failures. Whether the authors 
of this literature are targeting high-ranking political and military leaders; advocating 
sweeping, military-wide changes; or attempting to expiate military failure; the raid on 
sontay1 and the mishap at Desert OneZ invariably sneak into the analysis. Critics have tended 
to focus on the political and military ramifications of failure and have neglected to scrutinize 
the decision to employ or not to employ SOF in the first place.3 This thesis is not about 
success or failure of special operations, per se, but the misuse of SOF. 
Two problems have historically led to the misuse of SOF: a lack of institutional 
control and a lack of understanding. The formal institutionalization of SOF in 1986 has 
1 The raid on Sontay (Operation Kingpin) was launched on 20 November 1970 
to rescue prisoners of war suspected of being held at Sontay, North Vietnam. The rescue 
force reached the objective, however, the prisoners had been moved sometime earlier. The 
mission was a tactical success, but a strategic failure. 
The mishap at Desert One occurred on 25 April 1980 during Operation RICE 
BOWL. A rescue force was being sent to rescue American hostages being held by a 
contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards at the American Embassy in Tehran. The 
mission was aborted and eight American servicemen died in an accident at Desert One as the 
force was trying to begin exfiltration. 
3 For axioms and theories on military failure see the following: Eliot A. Cohen 
and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990); James F. Dunigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, Getting It Right: American 
Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond, (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, Inc., 1993); Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American 
Military Doesn't Win, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985); The Holloway Commission, 
Rescue Mission Report, August 1980; Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special 
Operations as an Instrument of US Foreirjn Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 
greatly alleviated the first p r~blem.~  However, despite doctrinal and procedural changes, the 
second problem continues. Misuse results in both the inefficient application of available 
forces and, in some cases, the learning of the wrong lessons. John M. Collins summarized 
the primacy of the efficient use of SOF best when he wrote in his report to Congress: 
Plans presently call for the smallest US military establishment since the 
Korean War ended 40 years ago. Deep force reductions are in progress. It 
may be difficult to maintain the remainder at present high standards, because 
planned results from austere defense budgets could prove overly optimistic 
unless a major crisis reverses current trends ... The Department of Defense 
(DoD) more than ever needs to extract maximum value from every d01lar.~ 
Perhaps most important are the wrong lessons decision makers may learn from tactical . 
successes achieved while misusing SOF. 
The success of a mission tends to prompt praise from the media and "high-fives" 
among decision makers, while preventing close scrutiny of the decision making process. 
Regardless of tactical success, misuse may occur. James Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia 
have termed this counter-intuitive concept the "insidious Victory Disease." They elucidate 
the problem of learning the wrong lessons from military success when they write: 
It worked so well the last time, let's do it again next time. When a nation is 
defeated, it generally looks for a different way to fight the next war. The old 
ways obviously didn't work and new techniques are not only sought out but 
practiced vigorously. The winners have a different attitude, best summed up 
as 'Don't mess with something that works.' Actually, this attitude was once 
sound advice. But in the last two centuries, new technologies have arrived 
at an ever-increasing rate and winners and losers have had to adapt to change 
4 In 1986 the Cohen-Nunn Amendment created an Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) and the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
5 John M. Collins, Special Operations Forces: An Assessment 1986- 1993, 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 30, 1993), p. 1, emphasis added. 
quickly, or else. The Victory Disease tends to make winners blind to these 
needed  change^.^ 
Misuse of SOF, regardless of tactical success, is a costly endeavor for a defense 
establishment facing austere conditions in the near future. A better understanding of SOF 
is still needed. 
This thesis develops a theory of the misuse of SOF. The theory describes the 
variables associated with determining the expected value and expected cost of employing 
both SOF and general purpose forces (GPF) for a specific mission. We demonstrate that 
through the use of our decision framework, leaders can effectively determine whether or not 
SOF or GPF hold an absolute andlor a comparative advantage. Absolute advantage is 
defined as a condition that exists when the expected value of conducting a specific mission 
is greater than the expected cost. Once absolute advantage is established, the absolute 
advantages of SOF and GPF are compared to determine comparative advantage. Although 
holding an absolute and comparative advantage does not guarantee mission success, they 
establish the necessary and sufficient mission advantage conditions for proper use of SOF 
and GPF. This thesis provides both an analytical definition of misuse and a systematic 
framework for considering the variables associated with expected value and expected cost. 
If we can determine the variables associated with expected value and expected cost, we can 
begin to consider how and why SOF are misused. Through the use of four case studies, 
representing four different types of errors and four commonly perceived misuses, we show 
how the theory can be applied to combat operations and assist in understanding the proper 
6 Dunigan, p. 30. 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
We begin by identifying the scope of our problem. This requires developing mission 
boundaries that are not well defined on the military operations contin~um.~ As Joint Pub 3- 
05 states: 
The five principal missions of SO [special operations] are UW 
[unconventional warfare], DA [direct action], SR [special reconnaissance], 
FID [foreign internal defense], and CT [counterterrorism]. While SOF 
provide unique, versatile, and flexible forces designed primarily to meet these 
missions, conventional forces may be required for support, depending upon 
mission circumstances. However, the inherent capabilities of SOF also make 
them suitable for employment in a range of collateral SO mission activities, 
such as HA [humanitarian assistance], counterdrug, and personnel recovery 
operations, among others. All of these missions can be conducted and are 
especially applicable in a coalition warfare environment, where SOF 
capabilities make them especially useful in this short term andlor limited 
scope operational arrangement of  force^.^ 
Unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and coutlterterror operations have limited 
competitive applicability to GPF.9 The collateral special operations missions such as: 
security assistance, humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism and other security activities, 
counterdrug, personnel recovery, and special activities, either also have limited applicability 
7 FM 100-5, O~erations, provides the range of military operations, classified 
as war (combatant) and operations other than war (either combatant or noncombatant), 
conducted in the states of environment of war, conflict, and peacetime. SOF conduct 
missions at each end of the spectrum with obviously limited applications in large scale 
combat operations (high end of the continuum), and almost exclusive application in 
counterterrorism operations (mid-range on the continuum). For this reason, no clear 
boundaries of responsibility can be derived from this continuum. 
8 Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 1993, p. 11-2. 
9 While USMC units, in particular, do conduct missions of this type, and some 
"conventional" operations such as the bombing of Libya in 1986 may be termed counterterror 
operations, we do not believe that there is significant competition and conflict between SOF 
to GPF, or are beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis focuses on direct action and 
special reconnaissance missions. 
Direct action and special reconnaissance missions require doctrine and skills that are 
similar between SOF and GPF." Direct action missions for SOF may include raids, 
ambushes, or direct assault; the emplacement of munitions and other devices; the conduct 
of standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; to provide terminal 
guidance for precision-guided munitions; and the conduct of independent sabotage." The 
principles applied by SOF in the conduct of these missions are a subset of the Army's nine 
principles of war.I2 Special reconnaissance missions complement national and theater 
intelligence collection assets and systems, providing an overlap in the broad sense. Joint Pub 
3-05 qualifies special reconnaissance as: 
obtaining specific, well-defined, and time sensitive information of strategic 
or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods 
where there are constraints of weather, terrain-masking, hostile 
countermeasures andlor other systems availability.13 
lo While this thesis focuses on comparative cases between SOF and GPF, our 
theory applies to ALL missions involving SOF, including missions on the "softer side" of 
SOF and other missions that are not comparative between SOF and GPF. The factors and 
variables affecting expected value and expected cost in missions other than DA and SR are 
different than those presented in this thesis. 
l1 Joint Pub 3-05, p. 11-5. 
l2 FM 100-5 lists the nine principles of war as: objective; offensive; mass; 
economy of force; maneuver; unity of command; security; surprise; and simplicity. Some 
of these are directly applicable to SOF and will be discussed in greater detail later. For a 
complete description of the principles of special operations, see CDR William H. McRaven, 
The Theory of Special Operations, M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California (June 1993), pp. 4-9. 
l3 Joint Pub 3-05, p. 11-7. 
l4 Ibid., p. IV-8. 
I 
By limiting the scope of this thesis, we are limiting the variables affecting the theory. 
Although we believe our Theory of the Misuse of SOF is applicable across the spectrum of 
special operations missions, and even within the SOF community, it was developed solely 
from the examination of direct action and special reconnaissance missions. All usage of the 
concept of misuse, henceforth, applies to these types of missions. Additionally, the misuse 
of GPF, while implicit to this theory, is beyond the explicit scope of this thesis. 
C. WHAT IS THE MISUSE OF SOF? 
1. Doctrinal Foundation 
The doctrinal foundation clearly exists to avoid the misuse of SOF. Joint Pub 3-05.3, 
Joint S~ecial  Operations Operational Procedures, advises how to avoid "misapplication of 
SOF" by applying the criteria of "appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability." The 
doctrine states that: 
Commanders should recognize the high value and the limited resources of 
SOF and ensure that the benefits of successful mission execution are 
measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the mission. 
Measurement of risk should take into account not only the potential for loss 
of SOF units, but the risk of adverse effects on U.S. diplomatic and political 
interests should the mission fail.14 
No clear definition of the misuse of SOF exists, yet, any special operator can give a "catch 
phrase" example of what they believe misuse is. An analytical definition of misuse is lacking 
within the SOF community, or anywhere else. The concepts mentioned above, and prevalent 
throughout published doctrine, are captured by our Theory of the Misuse of SOF and applied 
in a manner consistent with decision making theory. 
2. Misuse 
Utilizing existing doctrine, it is clear that misuse occurs at the point at which the 
decision to use, or not to use, SOF is made. We have developed a definition of the misuse 
of SOF through the application of doctrine and decision theory. Our definition is based on 
the assumption that some military action must be executed by either SOF or GPF. The 
definition is as follows: 
Misuse occurs when SOF are used while GPF have an absolute and comparative 
advantage, or, 
Misuse occurs when SOF are not used while they have an absolute and 
comparative advantage over GPF. 
The concepts of absolute and comparative advantage are crucial to the Theory of the Misuse 
of SOF and are grounded in the literature of decision making and decision analysis. Absolute 
advantage for both SOF and GPF is represented by the proposition: 
( 1 ) If for a given f m  type > 1, then that force type has an Absolute Advantage. EC 
EV refers to the expected value and EC the expected cost of carrying out a specific mission 
by any given force type. We assume that EV and EC are measured in the same units. If the 
expected cost outweighs the expected value of a specific mission then that force does not 
have an absolute advantage. This constitutes a misuse of that force. 
As we demonstrate later, expected value and expected cost are based, in part, on 
subjective probabilities and resulting payoffs assessed by experts in the field. Subjectivity 
is something that we cannot escape when discussing decision making in an uncertain 
environment and military operations are conducted in a most uncertain environment. 
Absolute advantage is calculated first for both SOF and GPF. Assuming both forces have 
absolute advantages, these are used to determine comparative advantage. Obviously, if only 
one force has an absolute advantage, it also ips0 facto, has a comparative advantage. 
Comparative advantage is simply a comparison of SOF and GPF absolute advantages, and 
is represented by the equation: 
( 2 )  - =  EC 'OF Cornpara t i ve  A d v a n t a g e  
EV 
If the result of Equation (2) is greater than one, SOF have the comparative advantage. 
If the result is less than one, GPF have the comparative advantage. Although it is unlikely, 
if the result of Equation (2) equals one, neither force has the comparative advantage. This 
relationship demonstrates which force has the higher benefits-to-cost ratio, and, therefore, 
which unit is the most cost effective package to task with a specific mission. 
We have already determined that the misuse of SOF occurs when they are used and 
do not hold an absolute and comparative advantage, or, SOF are not used in spite of holding 
an absolute and comparative advantage. Comparative advantage allows us to begin to 
identify possible types of errors. Two types emerge from our definition of misuse: errors of 
commission and errors of omission. Errors can be further defined by the degree to which the 
errors do or do not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of SOF, 
and the various possible combinations of absolute and comparative advantage (AA and CA 
respectively). The types of errors are presented in Table 1 below. 
The Table is directed to SOF and the conditions as they relate to SOF. Simple errors 
of commission occur when both SOF and GPF have an absolute advantage, SOF does not 
have a comparative advantage, but SOF is used. Complex errors of commission occur when 
GPF have both an absolute and comparative advantage, SOF do not have either, but SOF 
are still used. Simple errors of omission occur when both SOF and GPF have an absolute 
advantage, however, SOF have the comparative advantage but are not used. Complex errors 
of omission occur when SOF have both an absolute and comparative advantage while GPF 
have neither but SOF are not used. 
I Type of Error Simple 11 Complex I 
Table 1. Table of Misuse of SOF 
The absolute /comparative advantage graph, Figure 1, represents the theory in terms 
of expected value and expected cost. The x-axis represents the expected value-to-expected 
cost ratio of GPF. The y-axis represents the expected value-to-expected cost ratio of SOF. 
The absolute advantage threshold for both SOF and GPF is located where the expected 
value-to-expected cost ratio equals one for each force. Expected value-to-expected cost ratios 
that fall above the horizontal white line represent an absolute advantage for SOF while 
ratios that fall to the right of the vertical line represent an absolute advantage for GPF. The 
comparative advantage line is presented as a forty-five degree line where the expected value- 
to-expected cost ratios of both SOF and GPF are equal. Ratios above and to the left of the 
line represent a comparative advantage for SOF while ratios below and to the right of the 
line represent a comparative advantage for GPF. These three lines are not the guarantors of 
mission success, but represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper use of SOF 
and GPF. 
Figure 1. Absolute/Comparative Advantage Graph 
The areas identified by numbers in Figure 1 represent the ratios of SOF and GPF absolute 
advantages where the following types of errors, identified in Table 1, occur: 
1) Simple error of commission. 
2) Complex error of commission. 
3) Error beyond the scope of this thesis." 
4) Simple error of omission. 
5) Complex error of omission. 
If neither force has an absolute advantage, but one force is used, this could 
be considered a gross error of commission. This is represented by the area marked (3) in the 
Absolute/Comparative Advantage Graph, but is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In order to quantify expected value and expected cost to establish absolute and 
comparative advantage and the different types of errors that define the misuse of SOF, we 
have chosen a method of decision analysis known as the decision tree, The decision tree 
enables us to account for the diverse factors affecting the probability of success and the 
payoffs associated with various outcomes of a specific mission. The decision tree provides 
a method to evaluate past decisions, prompt discussion based on an analytical framework, 
and increase understanding of the proper use of SOF in order to alleviate the future misuse 
of SOF. 
D. THE DECISION TREE 
A decision tree provides a graphical representation of the decision making process 
and a method of quantifying and evaluating the expected results from various possible 
outcomes. Decision making, as David Anderson, Dennis Sweeney, and Thomas Williams 
depict the process, includes: defining the problem, identifying the alternatives, determining 
the criteria, evaluating the alternatives, and choosing an alternative.16 We assume that the 
first three decision making steps listed above are a given, and provide a method, with our 
theory, for completing the last two steps. Decision trees have been a standard instrument of 
decision analysis since the 1960 '~, '~  and provide a tool to establish the expected value and 
expected cost of using SOF or GPF for a specific mission. 
Influence diagrams provide a useful starting point for the development of a decision 
tree. Figure 2 shows the structure of the decision problem in the form of an influence 
diagram.'' 
16 David R. Anderson, Dennis J. Sweeney, and Thomas A. Williams, &I 
Introduction to Management Science: quantitative Approaches to Decision Making, (St. 
Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1991), p. 3. 
17 Kneale T. Marshall and Robert M. Oliver, Decision Makin? and Forecasting: 
With Em~hasis on Model Building and Policy Analysis, Draft Copy, 1994, p. 1 1. 
18 For a complete discussion of decision trees see Anderson (et al), pp. 597-649. 
For a complete discussion of decision trees and influence diagrams see Marshall and Oliver. 
Force Decision 
Figure 2. Influence Diagram for the use of SOF 
Decisions, in Figure 2, are represented by square nodes. In our model, (dl) represents 
the decision to use either SOF or GPF to conduct a specific mission. Circular nodes 
represent uncertain events that cannot be controlled by the decision maker. Our model 
breaks a specific mission into three phases representing the three uncertain events that we 
believe influence the resulting payoff but cannot be controlled by the decision maker or the 
operator. These three uncertain events include: deployment, insertion and infiltration (I); 
actions at the objective (A); and exfiltration, extraction, and redeployment (E). The results, 
or payoffs, of the decision process and each subsequent state of nature are represented by 
diamond nodes (r). The connectors, or arrows, are used to diagram a possible dependence 
between one element of the model and another. In this case, the result of a mission is said 
to depend on both the force decision directly and the force decision and its affect on the 
success of the insertion phase, success during actions at the objective, and the success of the 
extraction phase. These relationships are depicted in the influence diagram. 
Decision trees can be as simple or as complex as desired. In the interest of simplicity, 
we have included only one decision node and two possible results for each uncertain event 
in our model. The decision tree, like the influence diagram, shows the sequence of events 
in time from left to right. The decision tree in Figure 3 was developed from the influence 
diagram in Figure 2 and shows the same sequential ordering of events. The respective 
uncertain events and their two possible outcomes are shown dividing off of each node. 
We assume that each node results in an all or nothing event, success or failure, with 
the subsequent payoffs for each condition. Although this is unrealistic, for comparative 
purposes, this assumption serves to simplify an otherwise unwieldy problem. Decision 
theory usually considers one resulting payoff for a decision. Our theory, by contrast, 
considers four types of both value and cost to determine the overall expected value and 
expected cost. Therefore, our theory requires eight iterations. These calculations are each 
















Figure 3. Decision Tree for SOF Employment 
Expected value is a function of political and military value while expected cost is a 
function of political and military cost. The expected value, or cost, is calculated using the 
basic decision tree equations taken from Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams.lg Let: 
( 3 )  N = the  number o f  poss ible  outcomes o f  an uncertain event 
( 4  P ( s ) = the  probabi l i t y  tha t  outcome s occurs 
Since one and only one of the N uncertain events can occur in each phase, the associated 
probabilities must satisfy the following two conditions: 
( 5 )  P ( s j  ) 2 0 for  every  outcome s j  
The values for P (s,) are, in part, subjective, yet relative between SOF and GPF, and are 
based on several factors discussed in detail below. The expected value and expected cost, 
either political or military, of decision alternative di are defined as: 
l9 Anderson (et al), p. 603. 
( 9 )  Where P ( sjldi ) = Probability sj occurs, given decision di. 
In the example in Figure 3, there are ten conditional probability distributions, each of which 
has two outcomes, so N = 2. For each of these ten, s, = Success and s, = Failure. For each 
path leading away from the decision node, D, to a resulting payoff, r, there are several types 
of value and cost to be considered. The types of value and cost that we have identified 
include: international political value; domestic political value; military eflectiveness value; 
military target value; international political cost; domestic political cost; military 
opportunity cost; and military cost of casualties to both personnel and equipment. Each type 
of value and cost is calculated using the equations presented above. These different types 
of values and costs will be discussed in greater detail below, however, using Equations (7) 
and (8) for each type of value and cost provides the variables associated with the total 
expected value and the total expected cost. The overall expected value and expected cost are 
found by taking a weighted sum of the four expected values and costs as shown in the 
following equations: 
( O ) E V ~ ~ ~  or GPF = wlEV Inr2 Pol + ~ 2 ~ ~ D o r n  Pol + w 3 E V ~ m  15' + w4EV~gt  Val 
In these equations, wi, are included to allow unequal weighting of the factors that comprise 
the overall expected value and cost. 
The assumption that underlies these equations is that all values and costs are 
measured in the same units. As Marshall and Oliver note, the danger of this assumption is 
that: 
If the problem under consideration has performance attributes for which there 
are no obvious measurement units, one must not assume that the weights 
assigned to these attributes are dimensionless and hence can be normalized 
in any desired manner. For a model to be consistent it should have the same 
rules for combining attributes that cannot be measured directly as it does for 
those that can.20 
Multi-attribute problems of this type force the decision maker "to think carefully about the 
validity of linear trade-offs among the  attribute^."^' For simplicity in the remainder of this 
thesis, we assume that the attributes are weighted equally and set w, = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., 8.22 
The values for the different types of V (dl , s,) and C (dl , s,) are also, in part, 
subjective, but coded with a clear scale of political and military value and cost. Because of 
the model's subjective nature, it serves as a framework to approach decision making. It will 
be useful in defining the misuse of SOF, highlighting the variables that influence expected 
value and cost, and examining the proper and improper use of SOF. Given a mission, the 
decision maker determines the probabilities of each state of nature in each phase. Then the 
various values and costs are determined for each path leading away from the decision node 
to the resulting diamond nodes. For example, the decision maker must determine what the 
values and costs are if the insertion succeeds, the actions at the objective succeed, and the 
extraction fails. Similarly, each path is examined and coded for value and cost. Equations 
(7) and (8) allow the decision maker to calculate each type of expected value and expected 
cost, and Equations (10) and (1 1) are used to calculate the expected value and expected cost 
of using a particular force for a specific mission. Equations (1) and (2) then provide the 
20 Marshall and Oliver, p. 328. 
22 For a complete discussion of the following: decision sapling with two 
attributes; the added cost of conflict resolution; assessment of trade-offs through preferences; 
a hierarchical multi-attribute model; and multi-attribute utility, see Marshall and Oliver, pp. 
327-39 1. 
necessary and sufficient conditions for proper employment of either force. The variables 
affecting expected value and expected cost for a specific mission are discussed below. 
E. PRINCIPLES AFFECTING PROBABILITIES 
Joint Pub 3-05.5, the Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning 
Procedures manual, provides additional doctrinal foundation for the proper use of SOF. The 
manual "describes the special operations joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the 
targeting and mission planning process."23 The doctrine, no doubt, arose from the perception 
of misuse of SOF prior to the formal institutionalization of the community and is primarily 
focused on long range planning of theater strategies. Time sensitive missions and crisis 
response are mentioned and require a compression or truncation of the targeting and planning 
cycle, but involve the same phases and variables. The question of probability is constant 
throughout the doctrine. As the doctrine proceeds through the targeting and planning cycles, 
and the subsequent analyses and reporting requirements placed on SOF commanders, the 
following references to probability are made. In the SOF Feasibility Assessment (FA) the 
doctrine directs the commander to describe the "feasibility as a target," "feasibility of getting 
tolfrom the target area," and "probability of mission success."24 In the Initial Assessment, 
the commander is directed to determine the "probability of team insertion," the "probability 
of team resupply," the "probability of team extraction," and the "overall probability of 
mission success."25 In the SOF Plan of Execution, the commander is directed to provide the 
"probability of success assessment" for each course of action being ~ons idered ,~~  and in the 
Mission Support Plans the commander is directed to determine the "probability of mission 
23 Joint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targetin? and Mission Planning 
Procedures, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 August 1993, p. iv. 
24 Ibid., p. C- 1. 
25 Ibid., p. D-2. 
26 Ibid., p. G-2. 
success."27 Clearly, doctrine mandates that probabilities need to be determined, however, no 
analytical method for arriving at these probabilities is provided. Commanders determine 
probabilities based on their experience and judgement, providing probabilities that can be 
nothing more than subjective. 
Estimating the probabilities that allow us to calculate expected value and expected 
cost, as well as establish the typology of misuse, are a function of knowledge and judgement. 
This process can, by no means, be considered to be an exact science. As Marshall and Oliver 
explain: 
If one interprets such a probability as a measure on a scale where 1.0 means 
you are certain an event will occur and 0 means you are certain it will not, 
expected value [and expected cost are] simply a weighted average of possible 
results that reflect one's knowledge and judgement." 
Some have determined that probabilities are nothing more than "a matter of conjecture," 
citing the dynamic complexities involved in determining the probability of success and 
failure in military missions.29 In order to frame the problem in the most exacting manner 
possible and to establish a basis for "conjecture," we have identified probability as a function 
of several variables discussed in detail below. 
The variables affecting the probabilities of the three phases of a specific mission fall 
into two broad categories: the variables that positively affect the probability of success, and 
the variables that negatively affect the probability of success. Positive variables affecting 
probability are a function of friendly capabilities and limitations and the principles of special 
27 Ibid., p. H- 1. 
28 Marshall and Oliver, p. 28. 
29 The Holloway Commission, p. 57. The Commission wrote that in attempting 
"to precisely appraise the remaining part of the operation [Operation Rice Bowl, to rescue 
American hostages held in Iran] and to measure probability of success," required analysis of 
an extremely complex set of variables. They deferred the analysis because of the conjecture 
involved. 
operations. Negative variables affecting probability are a function of enemy capabilities and 
the inherent difficulties of the mission. Friendly capability variables include: the mission 
skill required and possessed by each unit, the mission proficiency of each unit, each unit's 
firepower and available supporting fire relative and applicable to the enemy, physical and 
material readiness, deployment availability and the ease of deployment of each unit, the 
degree to which each phase corresponds with unit doctrine, and the supportability of friendly 
forces in either a sustained engagement or sustained operations. The principles of special 
operations include: simplicity, security, rehearsals, surprise, speed, and purpose. They are 
grouped in this category because they positively affect the ability of chance to intervene 
negatively in the mission. 
Enemy capability and mission difficulty variables are said to negatively influence the 
success of each phase. Enemy capability variables include the enemy's various orders of 
battle (OOB), specifically: his force OOB, communications and electronic OOB, and 
weapons OOB. Mission dificculty is the final negatively influencing variable. If a positively 
influencing variable is said to be high, then the probability of success is high as well. 
Conversely, if a negatively influencing variable is said to be high, then the probability of 
success is correspondingly low. All of these variables are coded on a scale of 0- 100 for each 
phase of a mission and are a function of the factors discussed in detail below. 
Appendix A provides a probability worksheet for tabulating the value that decision 
makers assign to each of these variables in each phase of the mission. The worksheet is 
meant to be applied to the total force package with obvious implications. For example, SOF 
being inserted by helicopter do not require much proficiency to be transported in the back of 
the aircraft. The associated aircrew, by contrast, may require high proficiency to complete 
the mission. The applicable parts of the force package need to be examined to determine the 
coding on the probability worksheet. Additionally, one variable may far outweigh all other 
variables in determining the probability of success for each phase. For example, a unit with 
the highest capabilities may have a low probability of success during the insertion phase if 
there are no platforms available to insert them in a manner that corresponds with the unit 
doctrine. SOF can be marked with X's while the GPF are marked with 0's. The probability 
worksheet provides a basis for determining a general probability of success for a specific 
SOF or GPF unit. It also highlights the relative differences between both SOF and GPF, and 
the individual unit and each phase of the mission. The decision maker will be able to assign 
probabilities based on his knowledge and judgement and the relative differences between the 
units and the phases. While still a form of conjecture, the framework established by our 
theory allows decision makers to think about and discuss the merits of using one force over 
another. Although no GPF could have reasonably been tasked to conduct Operation RICE 
BOWL, the rescue of the hostages held at the American Embassy in Iran in 1980, we will use 
the SOF used in that mission to demonstrate the method of determining the probabilities for 
each phase. 
d 
The product of the first two probabilities provides the decision maker with the 
probability of "mission success." The product of all three probabilities determines the 
probability of executing the mission and recovering friendly forces. Because of the factors 
mentioned above and discussed in detail below, none of the probabilities will ever reach one, 
and consequently, the more phases of the mission there are, the lower the overall probability 
of success. If only the first two phases are considered as criteria for mission success, then 
the probability of success will be higher than if all three phases are considered. We are not 
advocating one way missions. We note this to highlight one possible advantage of unmanned 
and highly technical means available to conduct direct action and special reconnaissance 
missions in only two phases. In terms of probability alone, these means have a distinct 
advantage over SOF. Other factors such as the need for plausible denial, the availability of 
high tech means, a requirement for a precision assault in populated areas with no collateral 
damage, or a requirement for detailed and specific intelligence, to name a few, may require 
the use of SOF in spite of a comparative probability deficit. The discussion of variables 
affecting probability continues below with the variables that affect probability of success 
positively and negatively. 
1. Positive Affects on Probability 
Mission skill refers to all of the skills that will be required for a specific mission. 
Various skill types and levels are required for different missions and each unit has a different 
level of mission skill for each different type of mission. Furthermore, each mission has 
varying skills required to execute each phase of the mission, including the coordination 
between two different units assigned different aspects of a mission. For instance, the Special 
Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D) members involved in Operation RICE 
BOWL were required to havz limited skills until they reached their objective and for a 
portion of their exfiltration. The aircrews were required to have the highest mission skills 
during the infiltration and exfiltration portions of the mission. The mission skills required 
for a specific mission are determined by the decision maker and coded for each phase of the 
mission, on a scale of 0- 100, for each unit of the force package and their capabilities. An 
aggregate value for the total force is then entered on the probability worksheet. The mission 
skills required for SOF and GPF ground forces may be dissimilar due to doctrine and tactics, 
but are relative to the forces themselves and their level of skill. The mission statement will 
highlight .the importance of different methods of infiltration and execution and the 
differences in probability due to mission skills will become evident. Various reporting 
requirements, such as Status of Readiness and Training (SORTS), and unit commanders, 
provide a source of information to the decision maker regarding the skills possessed by each 
force. 
Mission proficiency speaks to the timing of training in certain mission skills and the 
level of proficiency maintained by the unit. The soldier that has successfully maintained 
qualification in specific mission essential skills is more likely to perform successfully on a 
mission requiring those skills than one who received one time training and has not 
maintained his skills. Shooting skills, fire and maneuver, demolitions, and command and 
control, to name a few, are important to SOF and GPF alike, and are all highly perishable 
skills that require regular proficiency training to maintain. The SORTS and unit 
commanders, once again, provide a source for decision makers to determine the level of 
mission proficiency of different units. The mission proficiency of a unit is determined, 
relative to the best case scenario of that unit, and coded between 0-100. The SFOD-D 
members had trained specifically in the skills required to rescue the hostages in Iran for more 
than four months and were completely proficient in the skills required to carry out the 
mission. The aircrews, on the other hand, had never completed a full dress rehearsal and 
were not completely proficient in all of the skills required of them. 
Firepower refers to the amount of firepower, both integral to the unit and from 
supporting arms, that the unit can bring to bear on the enemy, relative to the enemy. In other 
words, what is the disposition of firepower, bullet for bullet, pound for pound, caliber for 
caliber, relative to both the enemy and the target. The Fortress at Eben Emael provides an 
example of GPF having thefirepower, relative to the enemy, to reach the target and strike 
with bombers. However, in spite of effectively defeating the defenses and reaching the 
objective, air power alone did not possess sufficientfirepower, relative to the target, because 
the gun mounts were hardened against air attack.30 Thefirepower of the friendly forces is 
compared against likely enemy forces and the firepower they might encounter, additionally, 
friendly firepower required to accomplish the mission is examined. These values are coded 
between 0- 100 for both SOF and GPF. The SOF that conducted Operation RICE BOWL had 
morefirepower than any force they might have encountered prior to and during the rescue 
operation. Following the execution of the actual rescue and the possible reaction from 
Iranian forces, the rescue force had additional firepower on call to support their exfiltration 
and extraction. Published doctrine, the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual for both SOF 
and GPF, intelligence estimates, unit standard operating procedures, and the unit 
commanders provide a source for decision makers to determine how firepower may affect 
probability in each phase of a mission. 
Readiness, both physically and materially, does not refer to mission skill and 
proficiency as discussed above, and can provide an interesting trade-off between readiness 
and mission skill and proficiency, at the extremes. Readiness requires proper maintenance 
30 McRaven, p. 108. 
of both personnel and equipment. Much like a racing car that needs regular maintenance 
during the rigors of racing. In extremes the following may occur: kept in the pits too long 
readiness is maximized and skills and proficiency are wasted; kept on the track too long and 
skills and proficiency are maximized to the detriment of readiness. Additionally, as SOF are 
generally smaller in numbers than GPF, the loss of key personnel or leaders due to injury or 
sickness, may have a more drastic affect on SOF readiness. Single, planned operations, such 
as Operation RICE BOWL, are generally at the high end of the readiness continuum while 
missions conducted during war, or quick reaction contingencies, require closer scrutiny of 
readiness of forces. Post operations reports, situation reports, training schedules, SORTS, 
maintenance reports and schedules, and unit commanders can provide the decision maker 
with the information to determine readiness of a unit. 
Deployment availability refers to how quickly a unit can be ready to deploy for a 
mission and how easily the force can be deployed on the mission. Timing and logistics are 
the key elements of this variable and is obviously more important when applied to short term 
crisis response missions than to mission during war. Although this variable does not directly 
impact success of each phase of a mission, it plays an important role when considered in 
context with the mission statement. The political and military goals outlined by the mission 
statement may limit decision makers to the forces that can meet requirements for a timely 
response, low signature, and limited enemy reaction to movement of friendly forces. 
Conversely, political and military requirements may demand a timely response with a large 
signature and an anticipated enemy reaction. The small size of SOF generally gives them an 
advantage in this variable if the mission requires a timely, low signature military response 
to a crisis, but becomes more logistically dependent during times of war. Joint Pub 3-05.5 
indicates that "time-sensitivity can play an important part in categorizing a target and 
determining its appropriateness as a SO target."31 The doctrine continues by defining time- 
sensitive targets as requiring an immediate response, and providing an operationally small 
31 Joint Pub 3-05.5, p. IV- 1. 
- 
time window, and cautioning against declaring a mission feasible or infeasible based on 
time-sensitivity alone.32 Clearly, the SOF used for Operation RICE BOWL were able to 
quickly and easily deploy once they were ordered to execute. Prior planning and preparations 
coupled with the deliberate nature of the mission allowed this to happen. Decision makers 
can look to unit standard operating procedures, Time Phased Force Deployment Logistics 
List (TPFDLL), and the unit commanders for information to assign relative values for 
deployment availability and code between 0- 100. 
Corresponding doctrine refers to the degree to which each phase corresponds with 
the unit's doctrine. Logically, if a mission completely corresponds with the doctrine of a unit, 
that unit has a higher probability of success than a unit which is operating outside published 
or normative doctrine. This variable is coded between 0-100 and may be the same value for 
SOF and GPF although they might accomplish the mission differently. This variable 
received some close examination from the Holloway Commission when they examined the 
question of using different helicopter pilots than the ones involved in the accident at Desert 
One. To paraphrase the question they posed, they asked if doctrine correspondence was 
more difficult to adjust to than the transition to an aircraft variant. They concluded "that 
learning new and vastly different complex mission skills [skills required by doctrine] is far 
more difficult than transitioning to an aircraft of similar design and performance 
 characteristic^."^^ While carefully avoiding blame to any pilots involved, the Commission 
highlighted the importance of doctrine correspondence and recommended the formation of 
"an operational helicopter unit responsible for maintaining mission capability in this area."34 
Unit doctrine and unit commanders can provide the decision maker with the information 
required to determine to what degree the three phases of the mission, as planned andlor 
required, correspond with the doctrine of the unit. 
32 Ibid., p. IV-2. 
33 The Holloway Commission, p. 35. 
34 Ibid., p. 36. 
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Supportability speaks to the logistics tail and outside support a unit necessarily 
introduces to the mission. This variable includes the assets needed for deployment to support 
the unit before, during, and after the mission. This support includes: transportation of 
personnel and equipment; transportation and logistic support at a forward staging base 
(FSB); insertion platforms not inherent to the unit; close air support; naval gunfire support; 
command and control support; and intelligence support. These variables produce more of 
a limiting affect on the unit than an actual affect on the probability of success of each phase 
of a mission. They provide a dose of reality of what is required for the effort and are 
routinely considered prior to deploying a force. Operation RICE BOWL included a 
significant, yet well-managed, supportability variable that in the final analysis did not hinder 
the probability of mission success. The TPFDLL, mission concept, unit doctrine, and unit 
commanders can provide the decision maker with the information to determine the affect of 
supportability on probability of success. 
The principles of special operations, as described in McRaven's Theory of Special 
Operations, provide the lowest common denominator between SOF and GPF and their 
respective operational principles. The principles of special operations are a subset of the 
principles of war and therefore afford the decision maker the ability to examine the mission, 
and SOF and GPF, with the same lens. The principles include: simplicity; security; 
repetition; surprise; speed; and purpose. McRaven summarizes the primacy of these 
concepts in obtaining what he calls relative superiority, and limiting the affects of chance, 
when he writes: 
Special Operations Forces succeed, in spite of their numerical inferiority, 
when they are able to gain relative superiority through the use of a simple 
plan, czirefully concealed, repeated and realistically rehearsed, and executed 
with surprise, speed and purpose.35 
35 McRaven, p. 17. 
These principles can be almost inversely related between SOF and GPF, particularly in the 
case of surprise and repetition. Some GPF require surprise while others can use their ability 
to maneuver and bring massive, offensive firepower to bear with little to no surprise 
involved. Additionally, the fluid nature of operations normally conducted by GPF precludes 
the necessity for numerous repetitions of the full mission profile. In describing the principles 
of special operations, McRaven describes the principle of simplicity as containing three 
elements that are critical to success: "limiting the number of objectives; good intelligence; 
and inn~vation."~~ The purpose of security "is to prevent the enemy from gaining an unfair 
advantage through foreknowledge of the impending attack," and with particular care for the 
timing and means of insertion.37 Repetition "is indispensable in eliminating the barriers to 
success," and should include one or two full dress rehearsals prior to the mission.38 Failing 
the ability to "(s)trike the enemy at a time and place, or in a manner, for which he is 
unprepared,"39 "surprise is gained through deception, timing, and taking advantage of the 
enemy's v~lnerabilities."~~ Speed is simply a function of time on target, unlike the relative 
relationship that exists for conventional or large scale warfare, where action, reaction, and 
counter action are the norm of doing business. The final principle is purpose. Every 
operator must understand the purpose as it is defined by the mission statement, and make a 
personal commitment to achieving that end.41 In order to determine the probability of 
accomplishing each phase of the mission, the decision maker can review training records, 
SORTS, and mission concepts to determine the affect, and the dependence of the mission on 
36 Ibid., p. 17. 
37 Ibid., p. 21. 
38 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
39 Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, p. E-5. 
40 McRaven, p. 27. 
41 Ibid., pp. 34-36. 
the principles of special operations. These principles are coded positively between 0- 100, 
coding will be high if they assist friendly forces in achieving the objective and low if they 
do not add to the probability of success. For the most part, Operation RICE BOWL coded 
on the high end of the principles of special operations variables. The discussion of variables 
affecting probability continues below with the variables that affect probability of success 
negatively. 
2. Negative Affects on Probability 
Enemy OOB refers to the location, manning level, morale, level of training, combat 
effectiveness, current effectiveness, missions and functions, capabilities, operational 
limitations, and equipment status of ground, naval, and/or air forces at or near the objective 
with a response capability. The applicable enemy forces are analyzed against the particular 
type of force being considered for the mission, and coded between 0- 100 in a negative coding 
scheme. All of the variables mentioned above had to be considered for Iran, as well as the 
forces from other countries besides Iran, for Operation RICE BOWL. The ground OOB was 
virtually negligible except for at the embassy, where they were significant. The naval OOB 
was significant electronically, especially as far as the Soviet forces were concerned, in 
detecting the raiding force as they entered Iranian airspace, and is discussed below. The air 
OOB was negligible as far as actual air patrols, but significant electronically in penetrating 
coastal air defense zones and is discussed below. Since the OOB in Iran did not pose a 
serious and continual threat to the friendly forces, the enemy OOB is considered fairly low, 
and the probability worksheet is coded with the negative, or inverse, of the enemy OOB. 
Since the tactics and doctrine that SOF and GPF operate under differ considerably, the 
implications of enemy OOB are different between SOF and GPF. While SOF have been 
known to defeat forces numerically superior to them, this phenomenon generally occurs 
when SOF have properly planned and prepared for a specific mission and fully utilize the 
principles of special operations. Contact with large, unexpected enemy forces generally leads 
to mission failure or abort for SOF, while larger GPF can more easily adapt to the situation 
and continue with the mission based on their operating tactics and doctrine. Decision makers 
will need accurate intelligence to accurately establish the value of this variable and the 
following two variables. 
Enemy communications and electronic OOB refers to enemy fixed communications 
sites in the area, types of communications, who is communicating with whom, role of each 
site in overall defense posture, enemy portable communications abilities, both coastal and 
air early warning capabilities, local electronic countermeasures (ECM) capability, local 
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capability, local electronic support measures 
(ESM) capability, enemy direction finding (DF) capability, local civilian electronic OOB, 
undersea electronic OOB and its ability to detect small craft, ground sensors in the area, and 
non-electronic means of detection such as sentries, animals, and other personnel detection 
measures. Essentially, this variable accounts for the enemy's ability to detect the friendly 
force, and is coded negatively as above. In Operation RICE BOWL the greatest enemy threat 
of detection and subsequent reporting to higher authority occurred as the raiding force 
entered Iranian airspace. Once inside Iran, the force was relatively safe from electronic 
detection. Again, this variable may differ between SOF and GPF as operating tactics and 
doctrine are dissimilar between the two forces. 
Weapons OOB refers to the missile and AAA defense sites and their locations, 
functions of sites, operational characteristics, types of personal weapons in and around the 
target, types of land and sea mines in and around the target, and types of booby traps in and 
around the target. The essence of this variable is the enemy's ability to react once they have 
detected the friendly forces. The raiding force in Operation RICE BOWL experienced some 
vulnerability to the Iranian weapons OOB when they breached the airspace of Iran. The 
threat then subsided and increased exponentially the second night as the force moved via 
vehicle to the embassy. The greatest threat would have been reached as the force began their 
assault and attempted to exfiltrate with the hostages. The Iranian weapons OOB would have 
continued to increase to the level of the worst case scenario, and this is the value to be used 
in the probability worksheet for the actions at the objective phase. At this same time, the 
rescue force would have obtained a marked increase in firepower support, in the form of AC- 
130 gunships, providing close air support during this phase. This factor should not be 
considered for determining the enemy weapons OOB. An important point that these events 
raise is that the variables are coded independently from each other and events such as this. 
The highest weapons OOB for the enemy would be considered high and therefore coded low 
for the friendly force, while the high firepower support provided by the AC- 130 would be 
considered high, and therefore coded high for the friendly force. Considering the two 
variables independently allows a realistic estimate of probability and may cancel each other 
out in the final analysis. Obviously, different variables are more important than others at 
certain times. The decision maker must use his knowledge and judgement to determine 
which variables are most important for each phase of the mission. Probabilities are also 
affected by variables outside the control of either the friendly force or the enemy. Other 
elements, such as the inherent difficulty of a mission, contribute negatively to the probability 
of success. 
Mission dificulty varies across the three phases of a mission. Deployment, 
infiltration and insertion, as well as exfiltration, extraction, and redeployment, are a function 
of mechanical dependence, terrain and obstacles, weather conditions, distance, and time. 
Mission dzfSiculty at the objective is based on the above variables, in addition to the difficulty 
increasing as time on target increases, and the objectives become more complicated, spread 
out, and numerous. This variable was the most limiting in Operation RICE BOWL as the 
insertion involved 14 aircraft, 242 personnel, infiltrating across the barren mountain ranges 
of Eastern Iran and through the unforeseen haboobs, 624 nautical miles to the refueling point 
at Desert One, with a second movement of helicopters during night one and their subsequent 
cache at the lager site, and limited by the cover of darkness. The objectives had been limited 
by intelligence gathered just prior to launch, however, there was a possibility of increasing 
the number of objectives once inside the embassy compound, the complex nature of the 
mission at the embassy could not be avoided, and time on target was critical to mission 
success. This variable is coded negatively, the more difficult a mission becomes, the lower 
the probability of success. The decision maker need only examine the mission concept to 
determine the complexity and subsequent mission difficulty of a proposed mission, and its 
subsequent affect on probability of success. 
A summary of the probability worksheet, as it applies to Operation RICE BOWL, is 
provided as Appendix B. The worksheet shows a probability of success that is greater that 
most of the probabilities calculated in our case studies. As we will demonstrate in the next 
section, however, the SOF involved in Operation RlCE BOWL were also playing for higher 
stakes than most special operations, and all of our case studies. The value of accomplishing 
the mission was extremely high, as were the costs of failure. Now we turn our attention to 
the questions of value and costs of conducting a mission, and how it relates to our theory of 
the misuse of SOF. 
F. FACTORS AFFECTING VALUE AND COST 
Before a mission is launched, decision makers have already calculated an expected 
value and an expected cost of the specific mission, although it may not be considered in such 
terms. These values and costs can further be broken down into political and military values 
and costs. Although doctrine does not implicitly address these values and costs, the 
implications are clear: decision makers must determine the expected value and expected cost 
of conducting a mission before the mission is launched. As in the case of probability, the 
need for value and cost judgements is mandated but no method is provided. Doctrine 
suggests that "an imprecise understanding of SOF capabilities or the improper employment 
or support of SOF at any level of command can result in mission failure, attendant political 
costs, and possible loss of the entire force."42 Furthermore, the doctrine speaks to value and 
cost as it states that "commanders should clearly assess the risk by comparing the value of 
the target to the possible loss of the force and the attendant embarrassment to the nation or 
negative impact on the theater AS the probability of success or failure of each 
42 Joint Pub 3-05, p. 1-4, emphasis added. 
43 Ibid., p. D-2, emphasis added. 
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phase of a mission are subjective, so are the resulting payoffs, or value and cost, of each 
branch of the decision tree. 
Many times, when perfect information is unavailable, decision theory resorts to 
assigning low, medium, or high as the resulting payoffs. We have modified this procedure, 
and provide a coding scheme in Appendix C. The coding of these subjective values and 
costs places a relative weighting on an otherwise largely subjective variable, and allows us 
to provide an effective comparison of SOF and GPF. For simplicity, we have selected two 
important types of political and military values and costs. Political value and cost is 
differentiated as international and domestic, while military value is coded as the percent of 
h 
the mission completed, or mission effectiveness, and the value of the target. Military cost 
is coded as the opportunity cost and the cost of casualties to both personnel and equipment. 
These eight resulting payoffs, in the form of either value or cost, will be discussed in detail 
below, and again, Operation RICE BOWL will serve as an illustrative case to better 
understand our coding scheme. 
1. Political Value 
Political value can be gained both internationally and domestically from conducting 
a specific mission. International political value is obtained if the mission is perceived to 
satisfy the national interest of one or more of our allies, and/or the mission demonstrates or 
communicates a clear signal of direction, resolve, or capability meant to influence or deter 
other international actors. In times of war, the international political value that can be 
gained from a mission is largely based on the ability of the mission to satisfy the national 
interests of one or more allies. The number of these common interests or objectives, with 
a single or multiple allies, determines the level of international political value obtained. 
During operations other than war, international political value is primarily derived from the 
ability of the mission to send a clear message or signal to other international actors. The 
message or signal may have the effect of firming allied support, demonstrating U.S. resolve 
and convincing an adversary to reverse a course of action, or deterring further posturing or 
aggression from an international actor. These effects may be seen individually or 
simultaneously when a mission is launched during periods of peace or war. The 
international political value of a successful outcome to Operation RICE BOWL would have 
been the highest possible value. Terrorism was one of the major objectives against which 
the United States and her allies were combatting, and a successful mission would have 
demonstrated an unprecedented resolve and capability in the international arena. A failed 
outcome also garnered some international political value, in that, a clear message of resolve 
emerged from the audacity of the mission. 
Domesticpolitical value is obtained if the American public perceives the mission as 
important to our national interest andlor the mission demonstrates an amount of effective 
leadership or capability. National interest concerns generally become the foremost concern 
in missions conducted in operations other than war. Similarly, effective leadership is most . 
evident during, although not limited to, these same types of operations. Unless a war is as 
quick, as decisive, and as well covered by the media as Desert Storm, the amount of domestic 
political value is limited. A successful outcome to Operation RICE BOWL would have 
maximized the domestic political value as Ted Koppel began his "days of the hostage crisis" 
count and Americans perceived the hostages as one of the single, most important, national 
interests. Additionally, a successful mission would have demonstrated unprecedented 
capability, courage and leadership to the American public. A failed outcome to Operation 
RICE BOWL carried with it, limited domestic political value. 
2. Military Value 
Military value is quantified by the percent of the mission completed and the value of 
the target in a specific mission. The percent of the mission completed, or mission 
ejLectiveness, could obviously be coded as an all or nothing event, the mission was completed 
or it was not. However, because of the nature of direct action and special reconnaissance 
missions, there lies an are between all or nothing where some military value is gained by 
completing a portion of the mission. Suppose the mission calls for the coordinated 
destruction of a control van and the eight air defense artillery (ADA) batteries that the van 
services, to be conducted almost simultaneously with an air strike. The force on the ground 
places charges on the control van that do not detonate high order, and the control van is left 
unaffected but seven of the eight ADA batteries are destroyed. The mission was not 
completed, yet the mission had a severe military effect on the enemy and some military value 
was obtained. This is an attritional concept that identifies the probable military affect of 
completing the mission, partially completing the mission, and failing to complete any portion 
of the mission. Hostage rescue operations, like Operation RICE BOWL, fall more closely 
into the all or nothing category and would be coded closer to either end of the coding 
spectrum for each outcome, success or failure. 
Target value is derived from the classification of the target as strategic, operational, 
and tactical. As Joint Pub 3-05.5 states, the above terms "are not standardized within the 
Department of De fen~e , "~~  however, we will be using the terminology presented in Joint Pub 
3-05.5 as applicable to our coding scheme. The doctrine states that: 
Strategic targets are vital to the enemy's overall political, military, and 
economic operations or psychological stability. The objective of a mission 
against such a target is to severely impede the enemy's capability to carry on 
with the theater or overall war effo~-t.45 
The doctrine continues: 
Operational targets are deemed critical to the enemy's capability to conduct 
successful campaigns. Such targets include logistic and C31 actions required 
to support and direct tactical  operation^.^^ 
Finally, the doctrine notes: 
Tactical targets affect the enemy's capability to conduct battles on a relatively 
localized basis. Tactical military ground targets usually extend no higher 
- - 
44 Joint Pub 3-05.5, p. 11-9. 
45 Ibid., p. 11-9. 
46 Ibid., p. 11-9. 
than divisional level. Typical SO tactical targets would include command 
posts, individual ships, police stations, local telephone exchanges, and 
individual aircraft.47 
The doctrine further stresses to decision makers that they must consider how the "mission 
will affect the enemy's ability to function effectively at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels of war." The doctrine assigns strategic targets the highest value and tactical targets the 
lowest value, and cautions the decision maker that "strategic targets are rare and tactical ones 
plentiful. "48 This variable is an all or nothing variable, dependent on success or failure of the 
mission, and the target value as discussed above. Targets can be broken down at the 
strategic level as the single, most important, national strategic target, a national strategic 
target, and a theater strategic target. The hostages in Operation RICE BOWL would have 
to be considered the single, most important, national strategic target, making the coding of 
target value as high as possible. 
3. Political Cost 
Like political value, political cost can be incurred internationally and domestically 
from conducting a specific mission. International political cost is based on the perceptions 
of international actors, allies and enemies alike. The perception of being militarily weak, 
acting inappropriately, appearing indecisive, or being militarily and politicallx incompetent 
can lead to allies distancing themselves, speaking out against the U.S., or a loss of credibility 
with allies and enemies. Unlike international political value, international political cost is 
more likely to be incurred, across the board, regardless of the state of environment (war, 
conflict, or peace) the mission is conducted under. The international political cost of 
successfully completing Operation RICE BOWL included probable condemnation from the 
Arab community for violating the sovereignty of Iran, and possible adverse reaction to heavy 
Iranian casualties. A failed attempt came with the perception of incompetence price tag, and 
48 Ibid., p. 11-10. 
a loss of credibility as far as both our allies and our enemies were concerned, as well as some 
of those costs incurred with success. 
Domestic political cost is incurred if the American public losses confidence, 
Congress subsequently takes action, and the media begins to question the leadership of 
decision makers. Both the domestic political value and the military cost of casualties, figure 
into the calculus of determining domestic political cost. The American public is intolerant 
of casualties suffered during a mission conducted to achieve a goal that is not perceived to 
satisfy a vital national interest. Because of this phenomenon, domestic political cost is more 
dependent upon getting all, or a high percentage, of U.S. forces back alive than on mission 
success, although mission success does have a vital role in determining domestic political 
cost. As most authors agree in one form or another, the failed rescue mission "eventually 
contributed to the defeat of Jimmy Carter for a second term."49 The public lost confidence 
in his ability to lead, Congress conducted numerous hearings immediately following the 
failed attempt, and the media blitz was second only to the Watergate attacks on President 
Nixon. Had the mission succeeded, however, domestic political cost would have been zero. 
4. Military Cost 
Military cost is expressed in terms of the opportunity cost incurred, and the cost of 
the skill and experience of casualties and the dollar cost of casualties to equipment. 
Opportunity cost is an economic term which speaks to the opportunity lost by employing the 
force on one mission vice another possible mission. The number of units, either SOF or 
GPF, and the number of other possible employment opportunities make up opportunity cost 
in our theory. With no other missions to be conducted, the opportunity cost is zero, 
regardless of how many units the decision maker has at their disposal. Conversely, with 
many missions that could be conducted by a unit, and limited units to conduct them, the 
opportunity cost of using that unit is high. Opportunity cost is generally higher during times 
49 Gabriel, p. 103. 
of war than during operations other than war because of the number of missions available. 
The opportunity cost for conducting Operation RICE BOWL was essentially zero because 
there were no other missions for that unit to conduct at that time. Had another, equally 
pressing and dyer, hostage rescue mission outside of the United States been needed, the 
opportunity cost of conducting either would have been extremely high. 
The cost of casualties is based on the percentage of casualties, their replaceability, 
and the dollar cost of equipment casualties. In purely military terms, the cost of training, the 
incalculable cost of skill and experience, and the investment of training time, coupled with 
the lag time of replacement, generally make the cost of casualties to SOF greater than the 
cost of casualties to GPF on a soldier for soldier scale. The percentage scale that we have 
provided in the coding scheme, levels the playing field and replaceability establishes a 
relative difference between SOF and some GPF. Highly technical GPF such as pilots and 
aircrew are generally coded on a similar or higher scale than SOF. The dollar cost of 
casualties to equipment, invariably favors the use of SOF, however, the decision maker must 
calculate the trade off between: a failed mission, sixty highly trained SOF personnel killed, 
and low dollar cost; and a failed mission, one B-2 Bomber and crew lost, and a very high 
dollar cost. While dollar costs are worth considering, more emotional and less well-defined 
costs are usually more important to decision makers. The cost of casualties in Operation 
RICE BOWL was extremely high as the ground element was of a one of a kind nature at the 
time and virtually irreplaceable in the short term. 
The tenets of our theory have been described above. Our definition of the misuse of 
SOF was provided with the concepts of absolute and comparative advantage established as 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper use of SOF. The machinations of the 
decision tree were explained with the framework used to consider and determine both the 
probability of success of each phase of a specific mission, and the payoffs of each subsequent 
branch of the decision tree. The next section describes our case study methodology and the 
manner in which we intend to validate our theory of the misuse of SOF. 
G. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
To further explain the Theory of the Misuse of SOF, we will present four historical 
\ 
cases and provide an analysis of each. The cases were selected because they are commonly 
believed cases of misuse and they are representative of the four types of errors identified in 
Table 1 and Figure 1. The SEALS at Paitilla airport during Operation JUST CAUSE are 
commonly believed to have had an absolute advantage but not a comparative advantage and 
to represent a simple error of commission. Merrill's Marauders operating in Burma during 
World War I1 are commonly believed to have possessed neither an absolute or comparative 
advantage but were used to defeat the Japanese at Myitkyina and are believed to represent 
a complex error of commission. The Mayaguez incident and Operation URGENT FURY 
have both been criticized for their intelligence failures and the failure to use SOF for . 
gathering intelligence. SOF were believed to hold an absolute and comparative advantage 
for both operations but were not used. Because of the threat and environment, GPF were 
believed to hold an absolute advantage during the Mayaguez incident and therefore 
represents a simple error of omission. The threat and environment were more complex in 
Grenada and GPF were believed to hold neither advantage prior to Operation URGENT 
FURY and therefore represents a complex error of omission. 
We limited the period under analysis from the beginning of World War I1 to the 
present. As Eliot Cohen noted in his work Commandos and Politicians, World War II 
"inaugurated a new class"50 of SOF as technology enabled small groups of men to usher in 
a different type of warfare. The institutionalization of SOF began in the 1960s with the 
creation of Special Forces and SEAL Teams, however, Rangers began operating during 
World War II. The framework decision makers operated under during World War 11 was 
much different than today's environment, however, the same principles are applicable to the 
early uses of SOF. Additionally, the cases selected are well known and reasonably well 
documented in the general literature in order to avoid obscure missions and to facilitate quick 
50 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modem 
Democracies, (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), p. 19. 
discussion. The four cases sufficiently demonstrate the validity of the theory and show the 
relationship between expected value, expected cost, and the concepts of absolute and 
comparative advantage. 
The basis of our research was proceeded by official reports and records. When 
possible, we relied completely on the official literature to determine values of the 
probabilities and payoffs. When this was not possible we ensured that at least three 
secondary sources supported our evaluation. The historical dust has completely settled on 
Merrill's Marauders and we were able to rely almost completely on official reports for their 
study. Because of slow declassification procedures the dust has not settled on the other three 
cases and required extensive reliance on secondary sources. Because of the subjective nature 
of decision making in an uncertain environment, and the subsequent subjective nature of our 
theory, the threat of skeptics accusing the authors of "cooking the books" is real. No doubt 
countless special operators, general purpose force members, and academics will have 
differing views from our analysis of each case. That said and acknowledged, once we agree 
that there exists such concepts as expected value and expected cost of conducting a specific 
mission, that one or both force may have what we have termed an absolute advantage, and 
that one force has or does not have a comparative advantage, then we can begin to agree to 
disagree about probabilities and payoffs, and unravel the misuse of SOF. 
After a brief synopsis of the events surrounding each mission, the cases are divided 
into six sections which include the following: the background, which provides the political 
and military setting surrounding a specific mission; the objective of the mission; the 
alternatives available to the decision maker, including a discussion of the factors affecting 
the probabilities of each uncertain event and the political and military values and costs 
associated with the objective; the execution of the mission, omitted for counterfactual errors 
of omission; and an analysis of the operation, including the expected value and expected cost 
of the mission and the subsequent necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of 
SOF. 
We will provide a decision tree for each mission, calculate the expected value and 
expected cost, and explain why misuse did or did not occur. Because we believe misuse 
occurs when decision makers lack understanding of SOF, through the use of our theory, the 
decision tree for each specific mission, and an absolute and comparative advantage graph 
for each specific mission, we hope to continue to break down the wall between SOF and 
decision makers. 
The next four chapters will discuss each case study in detail and demonstrate the four 
types of errors associated with the misuse of SOF. The analysis will show how SOF are 
misused and demonstrate the usefulness of our theory. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the proper use of SOF is both an absolute advantage and a comparative 
advantage. Although the theory is abstract and heuristic in nature, these necessary and 
sufficient conditions are useful and can be used as a powerful tool to alleviate 
misunderstanding and subsequent misuse of SOF. 

11. PAITILLA AIRPORT OPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On the early morning of 20 December, 1989, three platoons of U.S. Navy SEALsS1 
and their command, control and communications (C3) element approached the beach at the 
southern end of Paitilla Airport, Panama City, Panama. As they proceeded, they could see 
the explosions and tracers from gunfire illuminating to the n~rthwest.~' Operation JUST 
CAUSE, formerly BLUE SPOON, was in progress. A half hour earlier, Commander Joint 
Task Force South (CJTF advanced H-hour "from 0100 to 0045 in the area of 
Panama City, trying to resurrect a semblance of tactical surprise following 'premature contact' 
between PDF (Panamanian Defense Force) and American forces."54 The SEALs could not 
make the new time line. They were consequently forced to execute a mission that was 
compromised before they had reached the target. 
SEALS are an elite U.S. Navy commando unit. The acronym, SEAL, is taken 
from the environments in which these commandos operate - SEa, Air, and Land) 
52 Malcolm McConnell, JUST CAUSE. The Real Story of America's High-Tech 
Invasion of Panama, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 130-137. The fires 
observed by the SEALs were likely coming from the Comandancia, PDF headquarters, 
L, under attack by Task Force (TF) Gator, a TF Bayonet element which included M-113 
armored personnel carriers (APC) from the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment of the 5th 
Infantry Division (Mechanized); Charlie Company 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne); 
and supporting fires from an AC-130 Spectre Gunship. 
53 Ibid., pp. 30-3 1. Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, Commander of the XVITI 
Airborne Corps was tasked as Commander Joint Task Force South (CJTF South) a .  a result 
of General Maxwell Thurman's lobbying. General Thurman was Commander in Chief of 
U.S. Southern Command (CINCSO) during JUST CAUSE. 
54 Ibid., pp. 33-39. At 0026 on 20 December 1989, an element of TF Bayonet 
(Bravo Company, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry of the 193d Infantry Brigade), enroute in 
Humvees to their assigned target, exchanged gunfire with an unknown PDF unit outside the 
Albrook Air Station guard post. Operation JUST CAUSE was compromised. 
When the operation was over, the mission had been accomplished. Repeated fire 
fights with enemy forces, however, had resulted in the death of four SEALs and the 
wounding of another eight. The SEAL casualty rate was perceived to be inordinate. This 
resulted in the Paitilla mission becoming the most controversial of JUST CAUSE. The 
decision to utilize SEALs for this mission has been condemned by military scholars and 
critics. It has also led to a great deal of dispute within the special operations community. 
This is particularly true among Naval Special Warfare (NSW) personnel. Proponents of the 
decision to use the SEATS assert it was Clausewitztfriction of war, "the force that makes the 
apparently easy so difficult"55 that led to the casualties. Opponents of the decision, claim that 
the airport was not a SEAL mission and suggest that it should have been assigned to U.S. 
Army ~ a n ~ e r s ~ ~  o  U.S. Marines. Initially, we assumed this case study was an example of . 
misuse, but the results of our investigation supported a contrary conclusion. 
In this chapter, we provide a historical overview of the 20 December, 1989 Paitilla 
Airport mission of Operation JUST CAUSE. We investigate the SEAL option that was 
employed and two additional options, one SOF and the other GPF. We evaluate whether or 
not there was an absolute advantage associated with the SEAL option and each of the 
alternate options, weigh these factors to determine the comparative advantage, and determine 
if there was a misuse of SOF. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Political and Military 
In May 1989, the Panamanian people voted General Manuel Antonio Noriega out of 
his position of power by defeating his puppet presidential candidate, Manuel Solis Palma. 
55 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (Princton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), p. 121. 
56 McConnell, p. 54. Author notes the mission was more suited for Rangers. 
Guillenno Endara was elected in the first free Panamanian presidential election in 2 1 years.57 
Remarkably enough, the democratic process was successful even after Noriega attempted to 
fix the election by using his Dignity Battalion  digb bat^)^^ to physically attack the Endara 
candidacy, by allowing his military personnel multiple ballets, and by stealing and altering 
election results. Even so, Noriega's man lost the election. The Panamanian people were 
outraged when Noriega declared the election invalid. The Endara candidacy looked to the 
north for assistance as the Panamanian people waited for the U.S. to resolve the parody.59 
The United States did not respond, so, in the early morning of 3 October 1989, 
soldiers of the PDF 4th Infantry Company (Urraca) and troops of the Security Company (the 
~obermans)~' took Noriega prisoner as he entered the Comandancia. Noriega was given the 
opportunity to stand down and install the elected Endara presidency.61 Noriega refused this 
option and stalled for time. The dictator was held prisoner for several hours while PDF units 
failed to attempt a rescue. Instead, many units waited passively to see what the outcome 
would be. The renegade unit that had captured Noriega requested U.S. assistance. 
Assistance was not f~r thcoming.~~ In the face of U.S. indecision, the 7th Company of the 
57 Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation JUST 
CAUSE: The Stormin? of Panama, (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 2-6. 
58 McConnell, p. 5. The Dignity Battalion or Digbats were "citizens he 
(Noriega) had recently had armed and trained as a PDF auxiliary militia." They were 
extremely loyal to Noriega. During the presidential campaign, they assaulted Endara's Vice 
Presidential Candidate, Guillermo "Billy" Ford, and fatally shot his body guard. They beat 
supporters to intimidate the public into casting their ballets for Noriega's candidate. 
59 Donnelly, p. 46. 
60 The Dobermans were Noriega's fiercest riot squads. 
61 McConnell, p. 9. 
62 Ibid., pp. 9-1 1. General Thurman, the new commander of U.S. Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM), and his staff had been advised of the impending coup several 
days in advance but did not take the information seriously assuming it was a Noriega attempt 
to deceive and embarrass the United States. SOUTHCOM was unaware of the 0630 attempt 
Macho de Monte and a mechanized column of Battalion 2000 responded in an attempt to 
release of Noriega. When it was clear the U.S. would not back them, the renegades 
surrendered. Noriega personally executed the leader of the coup after hours of brutal torture. 
This had been the second failed coup attempt in 17 months.63 Democracy in Panama had 
collapsed and the public as well as elements of the military objected.64 
Noriega was also at odds with his one time supporter, the US.. Noriega reportedly 
was involved in extensive narcotrafficking and money laundering operations with Colombian 
Cartel barons.65 In addition, he was warming up to communist regimes in Central America 
and the Caribbean as well as world wide.66 The Panama Canal Treaty, governing control 
until several hours after it occurred. Even then, they were slow to respond. The United 
States finally provided a Marine bloclung force on the Bridge of the Americas. This action 
denied some of Noriega's most loyal troops, the 6th and 7th Mechanized Infantry companies - 
the Macho de Monte, access to the Comandancia. U.S. soldiers also blocked the gates of 
Fort Amador. (Maps 1 and 2) Loyal Noriega forces based on Fort Amador, the 5th Cholo 
Infantry Company, did not challenge the blockade. The coup leader, Major Moises Giroldi 
Vega, wanted to turn Noriega over to the US. but this was boggled at the highest levels. 
SOUTHCOM had no idea how to proceed under these conditions. 
Southcom had only blocked only two of four routes into the Comandancia, and 
eventually the 7th Company of the Macho de Monte from Rio Hato and a mechanized 
column of Battalion 2000 from Fort Cimarron surrounded the Comandancia. Before long 
it was over as the once feared Doberman and Urraca soldiers surrendered without resistance 
and were marched off to prison and torture, if they were lucky. 
63 Ibid., p. 6. The first coup attempt against Noriega occurred in May 1988. It 
was actually crushed by Giroldi, the man who led the second coup. 
Donnelly, p. 46. Author identifies numerous outbreaks of civil violence and 
protest as a result of Noriega's actions. 
65 Ibid., p. 19. "On 4 February 1988, two Florida grand juries ... indicted Noriega 
on separate charges rising out of his connection with the drug cartels." See also, Greg 
Walker, At The Hurricane's Eye: U.S. Special Operations Forces from Vietnam to Desert 
Storm, (New York, NY: Ivy Books, 1994), p. 141. 
66 McConnell, p. 10. Noriega had established normal relations with Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. See also, Walker, p. 141. 
over the waterway, was coming to a conclusion and the United States did not want the canal 
to fall under the control of a hostile regime. Name calling, accusations and threats between 
President Reagan, and later President Bush, and Noriega escalated. Bush repeatedly called 
for the Panamanian people to oust ~ o r i e g a . ~ ~  
The United States first considered removing Noriega from power as early as 
November 1987.68 Early contingency plans (CONPLANs) did not regard the PDF as an 
enemy force. The new planning order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) which directed 
the defense of the Panama Canal and American citizens, however, regarded the PDF as a 
hostile force.69 The new plans, originally developed under the code name ELABORATE 
MAZE, and later PRAYER BOOK, covered a wide range of combat and post-combat 
operations. BLUE SPOON was the combat portion of the plan and included "varying options 
and troop lists, ranging from forces already stationed within Panama to very large forces 
coming in to augment them. Elaborate plans were made to cover a range of contingencies 
from conducting a surgical operation oriented on Noriega all the way to full-scale combat 
 operation^."^^ Between early 1988 and December 1989, the Joint Task Force (JTF) 
conducted numerous partial and full mission profile rehearsals in both the U.S. and in 
Panama in preparation for the various options. 
By December 1989, the situation in Panama had deteriorated to an all time low. 
Though Noriega's popularity had plummeted, he had declared himself Panama's "Maximum 
LeaderW7l and directed the PDF and his Digbats to harass all U.S. citizens. In response, the 
67 Ibid., p. 2. 
68 Donnelly, p. 17. 
69 McConnell, p. 29. 
70 Dohnelly, p. 18. 
71 McConnell, p. 38. 
United States exercised its rights to move troops and conduct operations in the Canal 
Noriega and the PDF saw these actions as provocation operations. Many of the operations 
were rehearsals for the BLUE SPOON CONPLAN.73 
The final straw came on the night of 16 December, 1989 when PDF soldiers first shot 
and killed a U.S. Marine officer at a road block and later took a U.S. Naval officer and his 
wife into custody. The officer, a SEAL, was badly beaten while his wife was fondled and 
threatened with rape. The next morning General Thurman telephoned General Colin Powell, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and recommended the execution of Operation 
BLUE SPOON. Later that afternoon, General Powell returned General Thurman's call with 
President Bush's order to execute the long awaited, well rehearsed plan to invade Panama and 
remove Noriega from power.74 
What followed would be the largest military operation since the Vietnam War.75 The 
overall objective was to remove Noriega from his position of power and replace him with 
the elected president, Guillermo Endara. This meant neutralizing PDF loyal to Noriega and 
removing Noriega from Panama to face charges in the U.S. The U.S. assault began within 
three days of receiving the president's order to invade Panama. 
72 Ibid., p. 2. The Carter - Torrijos Accord (Panama Canal Treaties of 1978) 
gave U.S. forces the right to operate and maneuver within the Panama Canal Zone. 
73 Ibid., pp. 32-33 and Donnelly, p. 31. Southcom executed SAND FLEA, 
PURPLE STORM, TOTAL WARRIOR and other exercises in the Canal Zone as rehearsals 
for the BLUE SPOON contingency. 
74 Ibid., p. 19. 
75 Ibid., p. 29. See also, Vandenbroucke, p. 174. JUST CAUSE was also one 
of the largest special operations endeavors in history. 4100 special operations personnel and 
7 1 special operations aircraft were employed. 
2. Task Force White 
Task Force White (TF White) was the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) or SEAL. 
contingent of both operation BLUE SPOON and JUST CAUSE. TF White, commanded by 
Commander Naval Special Warfare Group Two (NSWG-2),76 was assigned several missions 
of which the Paitilla Airport qission was the largest.77 
Elements from SEAL Team Four (ST-4) were tasked to execute the assault on Paitilla 
Airport. The ground assault element was made up of three sixteen-man platoons commanded 
by a seven-man C3 element. Special Boat Unit Twenty Six (SBU-26) and Naval Special 
Warfare Unit Eight (NSWU-8) personnel also had support roles in the Paitilla Airport 
operati&. The MK III Patrol Boat (PB) and crew that escorted/towed the combat rubber 
raiding craft (CRRC) to their insertion point and maintained the afloat C3 element were SBU- 
26 assets.78 In addition, NSWU-8 personnel in Cayugas (Panamanian canoes) provided 
reconnaissance teams to the east of the airp0rt.7~ The ground c3 element was augmented by 
two Air Force Special Operations Combat Control Teams (CCT) communicators. Finally, 
7 an Air Force Special Operations AC-130 Spectre Guqhip assigned exclusively to the Paitilla 
76 NSWG-2, as well as SEAL Team Two and SEAL Team Four, were home 
based at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia. 
77 McConnell, pp. 144- 145. Elements from SEAL Team Two (ST-2) would 
destroy a PDF patrol boat that was pier side in Balboa Harbor. Naval Special Warfare Unit 
Eight (NSWU-8) SEALS and members of Special Boat Unit Twenty-six (SBU-26), both 
stationed in Panama, would provide security for ships in the Panama Canal. They would also 
block one escape route of the PDF units and Noriega at the Caribbean entrance to the canal. 
See also, Joel Nadel and J. R. Wright, S  n 1 
S S t ,  (London: Greenhill Books and Pennsylvania, 
Stackpole Books, 1994), p. 205. 
78 Interview with Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Cliff Olsen, 4 November 
1994. LCDR Olsen was Delta Platoon commander during the Paitilla Airport mission. He 
provided most of the details concerning what actually happened during the mission. 
79 Nadel, p. 206. 
mission was to loiter 8000 feet8' above the target throughout the mission to provide fire 
support and intelligence for the ground force. 
The mission plan called for the PB to tow/escort the SEALs in their CRRCs from 
Rodman Naval Station to the CRRC insertion point. (Maps 1 and 3) From there the CRRCs 
would transport the force to the beach opposite the southern end of the airport runway. The 
SEALs would move up each side of the runway securing the airport and blocking the runway 
as they moved. Finally, when they reached the PDF hangar, they were to disable Noriega's 
aircraft. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
As already discussed, the overall objective of Operation JUST CAUSE was to 
remove Noriega from power and replace him with elected President Endara. The importance 
that was placed on capturing Noriega to face narcotrafficking charges cannot be over 
emphasized. JTF planners were greatly concerned about eliminating the possibility of 
Noriega's escape once the invasion began.81 The reason for this is obvious: Noriega had 
many extremely loyal supporters within Panama. Failure to capture him could have resulted 
in the U.S. facing the same problem years later upon the return of an exiled Noriega. Many 
of the planned operations were designed to eliminate the possibility of such a calamity.82 
-3 The SEAL mission was to deny Noriega one of several escape routes from 
Noriega's private Learjet was protected by PDF security forces in a hangar at the northwest 
Department of the Air Force, Head Quarters Air Force Special Operations 
Command, AFSOC Regulation 55- 130, Volume X, 1 October 199 1, p. 4. See also, Walker, 
p. 157. Walker wrote that the AC-130's orbit was 3000 feet over the runway. 
McConnell, p. 37. During the initial phases of the operation, F-15 aircraft 
stood by in holding patterns to be prepared to intercept the aircraft of a fleeing Noriega. 
82 Interview with Commander (CDR) Patrick Toohey on 11 November, 1994. 
CDR Toohey was the ground force commander for the Paitilla airport mission. 
83 Toohey interview and McConnell, p. 53. 
end of the Paitilla Airport runway. BLUE SPOON planners were concerned that once the 
fighting had started Noriega might have made his way to the airport and fled the country.84 
A secondary concern was the possibility of Paitilla Airport being used to land troops 
to rescue Noriega or reinforce the PDF within the city as was done during the October 89 
coup attempt." Considering Operation JUST CAUSE attacked every element of the PDF 
that was capable of providing support to Noriega or reenforcement to other PDF units, this 
was unlikely. Still, JTF planners wanted to eliminate every available opportunity for escape 
or reinforcement. 
Paitilla Airport is a civilian airport that is located on southern coast of Panama City 
north of the Bay of Panama. (Map 2) It's 3500 foot runway has a north south alignment. Its 
southern end approaches the bay to within several hundred yards. It lies in the midst of 
heavily populated Panama City with high- and low-rise apartments and embassy buildings 
to its west, a secondary school compound and slums to its east, and a major highway 
bordering its northern end." (Map 3) In addition to Noriega's aircraft, the airport serviced 
only private airplanes. Many of the private aircraft were suspected of being owned and 
operated by the Colombian drug cartels." The runway is flanked with a number of aircraft 
hangars on the west and by the control tower, administration buildings and several hangars 
on the east. A number of private aircraft were parked on the ramp outside the hangars on the 
west side of the runway. Suspected cartel aircraft were located in the hangars on the west 
84 McConnell, p. 53. JTF planners suspected Noriega would try to escape to one 
of three countries, Nicaragua or Cuba because of cultivated communist ties and Colombia 
because of his may allies in the drug trade. 
Ibid., p. 53. During the October 1989 coup attempt, the 7th Company of the 
Macho de Monte flew into Tocumen Air Base from Rio Hato to rescue Noriega. 
86 Ibid., p. 51, Walker, p. 147, and Nadel, p. 206. 
87 Walker, p. 154. 
side of the runway.88 The civilian population's proximity to the airfield resulted in a concern 
for collateral damage and civilian casual tie^.^^ 
The SEALs were directed to disable Noriega's aircraft and deny use of the runway by 
any other aircraft. They intended to accomplish this by puncturing the Learjet's tires and 
moving aircraft and other obstacles onto the runway to block any other aircraft that might 
attempt to land to evacuate Noriega or reinforce PDF elements. The SEALs accomplished 
their mission but it was at great cost to human life. 
1 
D. ALTERNATIVES 
Iryaddition to the above TF White option, one U.S. Army Ranger option and one a 
U.S. Marine Corps amphibious assault force option will be described for the Paitilla mission. 
1. U.S. Army Ranger Option 
As with the TF White option, a Ranger option would have required the short notice 
deployment of a Ranger Company plus (approximately 150-200 soldiers) from a continental 
U.S. (Conus) home base.% The Rangers could have been forward deployed to Panama on 
two C- 130s or one C- 141. This would have allowed for a locally launched helicopter borne 
assault on Paitilla. With the air assault, the Rangers could have simultaneously attacked all 
target threat areas and maintained tactical surprise over the PDF. This option would have 
1 required the deployment of a minimum of six additional UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to I Panama prior to ~ - d a ~ . ~ '  These helicopters would have been transported on two to five C- 
88 McConnell, pp. 52-64. Also Toohey and Olsen interviews. 
89 Ibid., p. 53. 
1st Battalion is located at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, 2nd Battalion is 
located at Ft Lewis, Washington, 3rd Battalion is located at Ft Benning, Georgia along with 
the Regiment. 
91 To infiltrate a Ranger Company plus a headquarters element would require 
twelve UH-60 helicopters or 2-3 MH-47 helicopters. If the Rangers were permitted to move 
in two waves instead of one, six UH-60s would have been adequate. If the Ranger's 
indigenous vehicles (Range Rovers - armed with dual 50 calibre machine guns) were also 
5A aircraft depending on which helicopter option was to be used.92 This would have raised 
the movement signature of the overall operation but it probably would not have affected the 
compromise of JUST  CAUSE.^^ Though signature would not have posed a problem, the Air 
Force was already stretching its airlift capability limits. Additional requirements may not 
have been supportable. 
The Rangers could have exercised the same method of insertion that was used by the 
SEALs, the waterborne approach from a forward staging base (FSB). The same type of 
logistics support would have been required for the Rangers that was required for the SEALs. 
The Rangers, however, would have required more assets for infi l trat i~n.~~ 
A third option available to the Rangers was the air land or air drop assault via two C- 
130 aircraft. This option would have eliminated the need for an FSB since the Rangers could 
have dropped or landed directly on their target from their deployment aircraft. As a result, 
the Ranger deployment would not have increased the signature of JUST CAUSE with troop 
andlor helicopter movement into Panama prior to H-hour. 
Operation JUST CAUSE was an air traffic controllers nightmare with hundreds of 
transport and attack helicopter and fixed wing aircraft involved in the initial assault alone.95 
Assets, especially helicopters, were tasked to their limit. This precluded a SEAL helicopter 
inserted, two MH-47s would have been required in addition to the UH-60s. 
92 A minimum option of either six UH-60s or two MH-47s would both require 
two C5As while the maximum package would require five CSAs, two for the MH-47s and 
three for the UH-60s. 
93 McConnell, p. 25. On the eve of JUST CAUSE, the PDF reported that U.S. 
transport aircraft were landing at Howard Air Force Base (HAFB) every 5 minutes. The 
additional aircraft required to support the Rangers probably would not have affected 
operational compromise. 
94 With three times the number of personnel, the Rangers would have required 
three times the number of CRRCs and additional PBs to tow the CRRCs and Rangers to the 
insertion point. 
95 McConnell, p. 37. 
assault on Paitilla. During the initial planning phases, the waterborne SEAL option had been 
approved largely because it had not required  helicopter^.^^ Presumably, a Ranger helicopter 
borne or air assault would have also been di~approved.~~ In addition, Paitilla was and 
did not offer a good target for either the air land or air drop assault. There were also 
problems with the use of Rangers in a waterborne operation.99 Because there were problems 
with all the Ranger options we applied the air assault option the decision tree framework 
since it would have been the Ranger's most preferred option. 
2. U.S. Marine Amphibious Assault Option 
A U.S. Marine option would have required the deployment of an Amphibious Ready 
Group (ARG) within several days steaming time of Panama. ARG amphibious ships could 
have launched a rifle company reinforced (1 50- 175 soldiers) in their 1 1 - 12 indigenous 
Amtrack vehicles to role ashore opposite Paitilla airfield at H-hour.'@' Amtracks not only 
would have protected the soldiers from small arms fire but could have been used to block the 
runway. This would have eliminated the need to move aircraft. 
There was some concern among Marines over the Amtrack's ability to negotiate the 
extensive mud flats seaward of Paitilla ~irport."' Even if the Amtracks could not be used, 
96 Toohey interview. 
97 Donnelly, p 85. Other Ranger targets included Rio Hato and Torrijosl 
Tocumen airfields. 
98 Nadel, p. 206. The entire airport was only 5000 feet long and its location in 
the city made parachute operations precarious. 
99 Rangers are much less proficient at waterborne operations than SEALS; a 
CRRC insertion of this magnitude would have been extremely difficult both mechanically 
and in command and qontrol aspects. 
'@' At the time of JUST CAUSE, ARGs carried 1 1 - 12 amtracks which hold 16-28 
Marines each. 
lo' Olsen interview. The mud flats opposite Paitilla reach out as much as half a 
mile from the shore at low tide. 
light cushioned assault craft (L-CACs) could have infiltrated the Marines and either 
Amtracks or light armored vehicles (LAV)."~ 
The Marine option would have required the positioning of the amphibious contingent 
within 1000 miles of Panama for an extended period of time. This raised two problems: 
first, the irregular deployment of amphibious ships would have increased the U.S. military 
signature in the region and possibly compromise the impending BLUE SPOON operation.lo3 
Secondly, Marines embarked on ships are highly restricted in the type of training they can 
accomplish which would have resulted in mission skills deterioration if they had been 
embarked for a lengthy period of time. 
Early in the planning phase of BLUE SPOON, the use of Marines was considered, 
but the Marines did not have the assets to commit an ARG to within two to three days 
distance of Panama. In addition, had the Marines been able to keep an ARG and its 
battalion size expeditionary force staged within striking distance of Panama, they would have 
likely been tasked with a mission of higher priority than Paitilla Airport. At least, they would 
have been tasked with several other missions in addition to Paitilla. Consequently, all the 
assets mentioned above would not have been available for the airport. Subsequently, we 
assumed that a rifle company with one L-CAC and three LAVs could have been assigned the 
Paitilla mission with the other ARG assets assigned to other missions. 
3. Probability of SEALS, Rangers, and Marines 
Appendix D contains the completed probability worksheet for the SEAL, Ranger and 
Marine options for the Paitilla airfield mission. For this case study, we consider only the 
infiltration and the actions at the objective phases of the operation. The mission called for 
l M  At the time of JUST CAUSE, ARGs carried six LAVs. Each LAV could 
cany six soldiers. Also each ARG carried two LCACs which could carry either four LAVs 
a? two amtracks each. 
lo3 Panama had no means to detect the ARG but it is possible that it could have 
received intelligence on the ARG's position indirectly from the Soviets or by watching Cable 
Network News (CNN). 
the force to secure the airport and hold it until relieved by elements of the 82d Airborne 
Division, about five hours after H-hour. When exfiltration was executed, it was 
administrative and had no effect on the probability of success for the overall mission or the 
expected values and costs. 
We remind the reader that the values for the different variables are the values that the 
planners would have assigned based on the information and intelligence they had prior to the 
execution of the mission. Obviously, we now know more about the disposition of the enemy, 
the problems with communications, the compromise of H-hour, etc. Subsequently, we can 
assign more accurate values to the variables. Unfortunately, the planners did not have this 
luxury so we tried to assign values we believe the planners would have used. 
During the infiltration phase, all three options had high values in almost every 
category with only a few significant exceptions. The high values reflect the high priority of 
the overall mission and the amount of time that was allowed to prepare for it. In addition, 
the infiltration techniques used were all methods that the particular forces were extremely 
proficient in. In addition, the enemy forces had no means to counter the infiltration 
techniques. The only exceptions were with the availability and supportability of the Rangers 
and the availability of the Marines. In the Ranger case, both the Rangers and support 
helicopters were not available because they were tasked with other missions. Both of these 
variables were determining factors in selecting the force for this mission. In the case of the 
Marine option, they were not available even within the theater to execute the mission. 
Supportability was not considered a limiting factor for the Marine option since if the Marines 
had been available, they could have relied on mission support assets within the ARG. 
The probability of success for the actions at the objective for Paitilla was very high. 
Even with the smallest of the three forces considered, the mission planners provided such an 
unbalanced application of force that there was little chance that the airport would not be 
secured. Each force had high values for mission skill and mission proficiency since the 
airport mission required no skills that were not repeated during their routine training or that 
were not repeatedly practiced during the mission rehearsals. Thefirepower of each force, 
though there was a substantial difference between the options, was vastly superior to the 
expected firepower of the enemy and directly applicable to it. Readiness of the forces was 
high since this was a standing CONPLAN that had much preparation time. 
Availability was the first area that showed a significant breakout among the three 
options. SEALs were available for the mission with significant assets to successful execute 
it. Rangers were available within the theater but were tasked with higher priority JUST 
CAUSE missions. The Marine ARG was not available even for consideration since it was 
deployed on a western Pacific cruise. 
Corresponding doctrine shows a significant breakout of the SEAL option from the 
other two. The actions at the objective directly correspond to Ranger and Marine doctrine. 
SEAL doctrine, however, does not include working in larger than platoon size elements, - .  
securing large objectives or defensively holding a target. 
The PDF at the airport were estimated to be well trained soldiers. However, the 
Enemy OOB, Communications/electronics OOB and the Weapons OOB were not significant 1' 
threats to any of the three options. All three options had high values in these categories, 
although the values were slightly different depending on the size of the friendly force. The 
Marines, protected in their LAVs, were particularly invulnerable to the enemy forces. 
Mission dzfficulty was low for both the Rangers and the Marines because both options 
included an adequate amount of soldiers to execute a mission. In addition, they were 
completely familiar with the mission and experienced at executing it. As a result, the values 
were high. For the SEALs, mission di@culty was high since the target was much larger than 
a normal SEAL target, they did not have a large enough force to execute all mission 
objectives simultaneously, and the mission was outside their doctrine. Consequently, the 
value for mission difficulty was low for the SEAL. 
Supportability on the Paitilla mission meant close air support by either the AC- 130 
or in the case of the Marine option, Cobra gunships. In all three cases the assets would have 
been available and the coding would have been high. 
The remaining variables, the principles of special operations, all had high values with 
no significant break out except in the case of simplicity. Considering simplicity, the mission 
would have been uncomplicated for the Rangers and Marines because of the size of their 
force and vast experience they had with similar and more complex targets. The same 
mission was complex for the SEALs based on the number of target objectives, the dispersion 
of the objectives on the target, the size of the target, the smaller number of SEALs and their 
lack of experience in this type of mission. 
The value for Security was affected negatively because security concerns for the 
entire operation had restricted the friendly force from a target reconnaissance until the day 
before D-day (D-1). Repetition value was high because the SEALs, like all JUST CAUSE 
forces, had executed numerous rehearsals prior to the actual mission.'04 We assumed that 
if a different option had been chosen, the selected force would have been involved in the 
rehearsals. 
The value for Surprise was down slightly since the influx of military aircraft into 
Howard Air Force Base (HAFB) would have eliminated at least strategic surprise if not 
operational surprise. (Map 1) Speed was not a key variable in this operation because there 
was little consequence of remaining on the target for extended periods of time since the PDF 
was being attacked everywhere and could not have likely provided reinforcement to the 
airport. Purpose was high in all options because of the situation in Panama; U.S. military 
and civilian personnel were being attacked by Noriega's PDF. 
The probability worksheet shows that the Marines and Rangers were equally capable 
of executing the mission with the Rangers having a slight advantage over the Marines on the 
objective and the Marines having a slight advantage during infiltration. The SEALs had the 
highest value for infiltration but their value for actions at the objective were lower than the 
Rangers' and Marines'. These variables, along with the values and costs, which will be 
discussed next, will be applied to the decision tree model as illustrated in Appendix D. 
'" McConnell, p. 60. 
4. Political Value 
Prior to Operation JUST CAUSE, American citizens in Panama were being 
mistreated by PDF and Digbat militia, the canal was in jeopardy of falling into the hands of 
a nation unfriendly to the U.S., democracy disappeared, and the self proclaimed "Maximum 
Leader" of Panama was a narcotrafficker. Noriega was at the root of these problems. When 
President Bush decided to use force, it was not only because the political value of removing 
Noriega had become very high, but also because the political cost of letting him remain in 
Panama had escalated. 
Operation JUST CAUSE met the criteria for high international political value (IPV). 
It showed that Bush would not be pushed around by a third world thug; it demonstrated the 
U.S. resolve to support democracy; it showed U.S. allies a hard stance against 
narcotrafficking; and it ensured the Panama Canal would remain in friendly hands. 
The international political value of the Paitilla mission would have been unchanged 
regardless of which option was used. Since the objectives of the Paitilla mission contributed 
to the large objective of JUST CAUSE, the international political value was high for all 
Paitilla options provided all the objectives were accomplished. For example, if the airport 
was secured, but only after Noriega's escape by that route, the international political value 
of seizing the airport would have been much less. 
Domestic political value is based on American's perception of a mission's 
importance and demonstrated U.S. leadership. Bush's actions would distinguish him as a 
president that would not stand for criminal violators of democracy. More importantly, it 
demonstrated that he would protect the American public. Finally, the security of the canal 
was clearly a U.S. national interest. Again, mission failure was highly unlikely and since 
both objectives of the Paitilla mission contributed to the JUST CAUSE objectives, the 
domestic political value was high for all three options. Again, the value was somewhat less 
with partial mission failure, such as Noriega's escape. 
5. Military Value 
The military value of the entire operation was based on the Panama Canal's strategic 
importance. Without Noriega's removal, the future could have produced a Panama 
unfriendly to the U.S. and possibly friendly to U.S. enemies. As U.S. basing rights expired 
at the end of the century, our adversaries might have replaced us, on what were once U.S. 
facilities. 
In the short term, it was the military and their families that were being assaulted by 
the PDF and Digbats. The climate in Panama was becoming more and more adversarial to 
the U.S. military. SOUTHCOM needed to change this for the safety of its own people. 
Like political value, the military value would have been the same for all three options 
because success had the same "big picture" results regardless of which force executed the 
mission. 
Estimated military effectiveness of the Paitilla mission as well as the entire operation 
was high because of the overwhelming force that was applied by the U.S. The target value 
of the overall operation was high but as we discussed, it was difficult to know the value of 
the particular Paitilla mission. We assigned a low-medium value since the likelihood of 
Noriega using this avenue of escape was low, as was the likelihood of PDF reinforcement 
through the airport. 
6. Political Cost 
Failure to defeat the PDF and install the Endara presidency was nearly impossible 
with the ratio of forces drastically on the side of the U.S. The capture of Noriega, however, 
was not as certain. Anything less than total victory, which included Noriega's capture, could 
have resulted in embarrassment to the administration, loss of credibility, distancing of allies 
and harsh criticism from enemies. 
Some international political costs were likely to be incurred even with overwhelming 
victory. For example, the United States could have been criticized for using too much force, 
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creating too much collateral damage, causing civilian casualties, and violating the 
sovereignty of another nation.lo5 
With victory all but assured in both the overall operation and the Paitilla mission, the 
international political costs would have been low although extensive collateral damagelM 
and the invasion of another country's sovereignty would have some negative effect. For the 
Paitilla mission, there could be minor differences between the cost incurred by the different 
options. The amount of force that could have been applied for each option was different; 
the Marines would have had the greatest ability to apply force, followed by the Rangers and 
then the SEALS. The strict rules of engagement (ROE) attempted to minimize collateral 
damage to civilians and property, however, requirements to complete the mission could have 
outweighed the ROE. This was the case in the actual SEAL execution of the mission. 
Domestic political costs were mounting in the months before JUST CAUSE. 
President Bush had to act or lose the confidence of the nation. There were several plans to 
remove Noriega, each applying different levels-of military force. Applying minimal force 
might not have accomplished the objectives leaving Bush with a Bay of Pigs type catastrophe 
and American citizens in Panama at the mercy of the PDF and Digbats. Applying a medium 
amount of force might allow the PDF to resist much longer and escalate American casualties, 
something the American public would not support. This left Bush with one option, 
application of overwhelming force even though it would likely result in some international 
political costs. The likelihood of only limited casualties was high and the domestic political 
costs were low for the overall operation. In the case of the Paitilla mission, the resistance 
at the Airport was estimated as minimal and casualties were not expected so the domestic 
political cost was also estimated to be low. There would have been minor differences 
lo5 It is likely that many Latin American countries saw this action as a resurgence 
of forced U.S. influence in Latin America even if they disapproved of what was happening 
in Panama. 
lo6 This applied to the Paitilla mission since it was situated in the middle of a 
densely populated area. 
between the estimated domestic political costs for the different options. With American 
casualties being the key variable since mission success was all but guaranteed, the Marines 
in LAVs had the lowest chance of sustaining casualties followed by the Rangers and then the 
SEALs.'07 
7. Military Cost 
For the overall mission, opportunity costs were minimal. The United States was not 
involved in any other military confrontation and the forces to accomplish the objectives were 
readily available. For the Paitilla mission there were no opportunity costs for the SEALs 
because there were no other missions for the Paitilla SEALs to be tasked with.''' For the 
Ranger option, the opportunity costs were high since they were assigned several other higher 
priority missions. Finally, for the Marine option, the opportunity costs were also high 
because they had other commitments that kept them from even becoming part of the BLUE 
SPOON CONPLAN. 
While the dollar costs to the military for deployment was high, in terms of casualties, 
skills and experience the overall military costs were moderate. During the operation, the 
cost varied between the units. Overall, only 23 American soldiers lost their lives during the 
operation. As far as the military was concerned, these were probably acceptable losses for 
the entire operation. 
'07 The Rangers would have had a slight advantage over the SEALs. With their 
larger numbers the Rangers could have secured the airport faster and would have been 
exposed to danger for less time. 
log NSWG-2 commands all three east coast SEAL Teams and though the teams 
are regionally oriented, (ST-2 is responsible for providing SEALs to Europe, ST-4 is 
responsible for providing SEALs to SOUTHCOM, and ST-8 is responsible for providing 
SEALs to Africa and on the MARGs) NSWG-2 can augment one team with platoons or 
assets from another when he considers it necessary. For example, SEAL Team Four SEALs 
were tasked with the Flamenco Island mission when it was still valid. Because ST-4 also had 
other platoon commitments, they were virtually out of trained SEALs to execute the Balboa 
Harbor ship attack. Consequently, NSWG-2 tasked ST-2 with the mission. When the 
Flamenco Island mission disappeared, so did the requirement for a number of ST-4 SEALs. 
At Paitilla, the likelihood of material losses was low for any of the forces because of 
the nature of the mission. Personnel casualty costs were possible but considered minimal. 
For the SEAL option at Paitilla, again since the resistance was considered minimal, casualty 
costs would have been estimated as low. The Ranger option which would have provided an 
even more unbalanced force against the PDF would have been less likely to suffer casualties. 
Finally, the Marines led by armored vehicles would face the lowest chance of incurring 
casualties of any type. 
The resulting values and costs discussed above along with the probability variables, 
are applied to our decision tree. Before providing the complete analysis of this case, we will 
describe the execution of the mission next. 
E. EXECUTION 
The mission for TF White, as well as all other JUST CAUSE participants, began with 
the 17 December 1989 short notice alert and deployment orders for elements of NSWG-2, 
ST-2, and ST-4.'09 TF White recalled and loaded out all personnel that were to participate 
in the mission. By the evening of 18 December the force was enroute from Little Creek, 
Virginia to HAFB, Panama aboard two C-141 Starlifter aircraft. Once TF White arrived at 
HAFB, they were moved overland via bus and truck to Rodman Naval Station. (Map 1) An 
operations center was established at the NSWU-8 compound, TF White's FSB. 
Planning, preparation, equipment checks, and briefings continued until about 2100, 
19 December, when the Paitilla assault force loaded their fourteen CRRCs and rendezvoused 
with waterborne C3 element aboard the 65-foot PB supportlescort vessel. The PB towed the 
CRRCs from near Rodman to the CRRC insertion point 2000 yards seawardH0 of the 
southern end of Paitilla Airport. (Map 3) Though there were other options for the SEAL 
insertion, the waterborne assault was chosen primarily because there was a lack of air assets 
'09 McConnell, p. 5 1. 
'lo Ibid., p. 47. 
and because the JTF planners did not want to compromise JUST CAUSE with additional 
ground movements. " 
At approximately 0050"~ the CRRC broke away from the PB."3 The SEALS reached 
the beach and established a perimeter at about 0100, the original H-hour, and then began 
moving up the runway. 
Two 16-man  platoon^"^ (Bravo and Golf) leap frogged up the west side of the 
runway while the third 16-man platoon (Delta) and the seven-man ground C3 element115 
moved up the east side of the runway. The tasks of Bravo and Golf were to disable the 
Learjet, secure the buildings on the west side of the runway, block the runway with civilian 
aircraft and other obstacles, and establish a blocking force to the north to prevent access 
from the highway. The mission of Delta on the east side of the runway was to secure the 
control tower and buildings on the east side of the runway. The mission of the ground C3 
element was to maintain command of the mission and to provide a link to the afloat C3 
element and the AC-130 Spectre Gunship circling 8000 feet above the airfield and to direct 
supporting fires if necessary. 
"' Toohey interview. Overland infiltration was proposed but denied because the 
number of vehicles required to move the SEALs to the target could have compromised JUST 
CAUSE. Air drop and air assault were both ruled out because of the lack of air assets. 
McConnell, p. 47. 
'I3 The PB provided a platform for the afloat C3 element during the entire Paitilla 
mission and a weapons platform to protect the CRRC in case of compromise during the 
infiltration phase. CRRC are extremely vulnerable in the water if they are detected on their 
own. The PB could have provided protection with its MK 19 - 40 mm grenade launcher, 
twin 50 caliber machine guns, two M-60 machine guns, and 80 mm mortar. 
A SEAL platoon is composed of 16 men: two officers, one chief petty officer, 
one E-6 leading petty officer and 12 other enlisted men between the rank of E-3 to E-5. 
'I5 Olsen interview. The seven man C3 element included the ground force 
commander, two CCT personnel, a SEAL Lieutenant responsible for overseeing 
communications, two corpsman and one other enlisted shooter to provide security. 
As Bravo and Golf platoons moved up the west side of the runway they encountered 
civilian maintenance and security personne1116 in the hangars suspected to be operated by 
cartel personnel. Objections from the hangars arose when the SEALs began moving aircraft 
onto the runway. The platoons identified themselves as American soldiers and directed the 
personnel to evacuate the airport. What started generally as a verbal confrontation turned 
into a brawl as SEALs subdued and bound those refusing to leave the hangars. 
While moving up the east side of the runway, the C3 element received a transmission 
indicating that a helicopter was inbound and Noriega could be on board. The ground force 
commander (GFC) ordered Delta to terminate their movement forward and establish an 
ambush in preparation for the aircraft. 
In the following moments, the C3 element received another transmission that three 
armored personnel carriers (APC) were traveling in the direction of the airport along the 
highway to the north. This reinforced suspicions that Noriega was inbound; possibly the 
APCs were going to the airport to ensure it was secure for his arrival and subsequent 
departure. l7 
The GFC warned the platoons on the opposite side of the runway and directed them 
to move up the runway to counter the APCs as quickly as possible. The platoon carried 
several AT-4 shoulder fired antitank rockets118 which would have provided substantial 
defense against the APCs. The platoons accelerated their movement toward the north and 
the PDF hangars. 
McConnell, pp. 63-64. Some of those encountered were uniformed and 
clearly official airport security, however, others of the more seedy and less intimidated 
variety were most likely the cartel's security personnel. 
117 Toohey and Olsen interviews. No aircraft ever arrived at the airport and 
thought the APCs were traveling along the highway they were enroute to some other 
destination as they simply passed by the end of the runway. 
l8 Olsen interview. 
As Bravo and Golf reached the PDF hangars, Golf platoon second squad set up on 
line in firing positions opposite the first open bay of the PDF hangars. Noriega's Learjet 
could be seen inside along with several PDF security personnel. Also visible in the hangar 
were several 55 gallon drums and a forklift that could have provided cover and concealment 
for the enemy. At this point, another vezbal confrontation and standoff ensued as the PDF 
refused to evacuate the hangars. 
Golf platoon first squad was by this time the lead element and was moving north 
adjacent to the northern most PDF hangar bay and toward the northern end of the airfield to 
intercept the APCs. They moved in an L-shaped formation with the base of the L to the 
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north toward the possible APC approach and the vertical part of the L parallel to the hangars 
, , . to their west. This trained their firepower in the direction of the two areas that posed the 
greatest threat. 
There are a number of accounts of what happened next. Some say a PDF security 
guard opened fire on the lead element.'19 Other accounts say one of the SEALs in the lead 
element saw a PDF soldier move into a covered position and level his AK-47 on the lead 
I' element. The SEAL instinctively opened fire on the PDF.lZ0 AS the lead element dropped 
to the ground to take firing positions, many were struck with the opening volley of enemy 
fire. In addition, their position on the runway with no cover and little con~ealrnent'~~ 
provided shooting gallery like conditions for the PDF. Even shots that were fired low found 
their mark as they hit the concrete and then traveled along the runway to the prone SEALs 
only thirty yards away.'" 
119 McConnell, p. 65. 
lZ0 Toohey interview. 
12' McConnell, p. 65. McConnell says thin skinned Cessna and Piper aircraft 
"parked on the grassy ramp" provided little concealment for the SEALs. 
lZ2 Toohey Interview said the SEALs were on the pavement, however, 
McConnell, p. 65, said they were in the grass strip next to the pavement. 
The SEALs returned a tremendous amount of fire. Unfortunately, the squad with the 
best vantage point to strike the enemy was the squad that had just taken the casualties. Seven 
of the eight squad members were hit with only the platoon commander escaping the enemy's 
initial volley from the hangar.lZ3 Second squad of Golf platoon maneuvered to suppress the 
fire from the hangar. Second squad personnel, vJho attempted to rescue downed personnel 
from first squad, also became casualties. The platoon commander radioed for help, reporting 
mass casualties to the GFC. The GFC ordered both Bravo and Delta platoons to provide 
assistance to Golf. Delta moved across the runway to the northern flank and Bravo moved 
directly opposite the hangar. It was at this point that more casualties were suffered by Bravo 
platoon. 
The GFC, whose element was farthest from the firefight, left one SEAL officer and 
the CCT behind to raise communications with the AC- 130 as he raced across the runway to 
the PDF hangar. He arrived to find the full force of the SEAL weaponry pouring into the 
hangar. There was no longer any return fire. The GFC called a cease fire and directed the 
movement of the casualties into a perimeter and then called for a medical evacuation 
(medevac) for the wounded troops. The medevac came approximately an hour later. 
Throughout the rest of the early morning hours, the SEALs blocked and secured the 
runway in preparation for their turnover to the 82d Airborne Division at 0600 that day. Their 
relief did not come until 37 hours after H-hour at 1400 on December 21. It was not the 82d 
Airborne that relieved the SEALs. Instead, it was 250 Army Rangers who arrived in six MH- 
47 Chinook helicopters to relieve them.'24 
lZ3 McConnell, p. 67. 
124 Ibid., p. 95, and Toohey interview. The SEALs were not relieved as 
scheduled because the scheduled relief was an 82d Airborne follow on mission for after they 
had secured their original targets. Because of icing problems at Pope AFB, North Carolina, 
most of the twenty C-141s scheduled to transport the 82d Airborne to Panama were delayed. 
Much of the 82d did not reach their primary targets until daylight and encountered 
unexpected resistance since all prospects of surprise were lost and the enemy had the chance 
to prepare. As a result, they were not able to relieve the SEALs. 
i 
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Other incidents occurred such as: sporadic sniper fire, threats of mustering PDF 
assaulters, securing of the outlying runway areas by the SEALs, and reinforcement by other 
elements of TF White and TF ~ 1 u e . l ' ~  These incidents were not specific to the success or 
outcome of the assigned mission so they will not be discussed in further detail. 
We remind the reader that it is not the purpose of this thesis to determine the cause 
of casualties or to place blame. These aspects are covered in detail only because they are the 
root of controversy concerning this mission. It is, however, the purpose of this thesis to 
determine whether or not the expected value of the mission outweighed the expected cost. 
With this in mind, we move on to the analysis of the mission. 
F. ANALYSIS 
We initially believed that the SEAL execution of the Paitilla Airport mission 
represented a simple error of commission. We thought the expected value for the mission 
would be greater than the expected cost giving the SEALs an absolute advantage for the 
mission. We also assumed that the SEALs would not possess the comparative advantage 
because we expected that one of the other options had a greater absolute advantage than the 
SEALs. The results are quite the contrary. As Appendix D illustrates, both the Marines and 
the Rangers had higher expected values than the SEALs by a relatively narrow margin. 
However, their expected costs were much higher than that of the SEALs resulting in lower 
absolute advantages. Consequently, the SEALs had both an absolute advantage and the 
comparative advantage and the mission was not a case of misuse. 
We have already discussed the variable that most strongly affected the outcome; 
opportunity costs. In both the Marine and the Ranger options, the forces either had higher 
priority JUST CAUSE missions or commitments elsewhere in the world that kept them from 
being employed on the Paitilla mission. In this case, since the other values and costs were 
relatively constant between the different options, the large difference in opportunity costs 
determined which force should have been used. Had opportunity costs not been a factor, the 
Walker, p. 143. TF Blue was another SEAL contingent. 
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Marines, followed by the Rangers, would have been the best choice to execute the mission. 
Use of SEALs would have been a simple error of commission as originally thought. 
Another variable that should have had more effect in determining the proper use or 
misuse of SOF was availability. However, when availability was averaged with the other 
sixteen variables of the probability worksheet,. the low score the Marines and Rangers 
received were countered by the higher scores. Clearly, there are some variables that carry 
more weight than others especially when they are at the extremes: if a force is not available 
to execute a mission, they are not available and the highest scores in all the other areas can 
not get the mission accomplished. Additionally, it is likely that the significance or 
importance of one variable will change from mission to mission. 
In summary, Appendix D provides a completed decision tree for the use of SOF 
versus the use of GPF for the Paitilla Airport mission. Using Equations (7), (8), (lo), and 
(1 1); the values and costs discussed above; and the probabilities discussed above, the 
resulting expected values and expected costs from the decision tree are as follows: 
To demonstrate the effect of the opportunity cost on the Marine and Ranger options, their 
expected costs minus their opportunity costs were also included. 
In the Paitilla Airport case study, SEALs had an absolute advantage and a 
comparative advantage. This demonstrates proper employment of SOF. 

111. MERRILL'S MARAUDERS AT MYITKYINA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
"GALAHAD is okay. Hard fight at Nphum. Cleaned up Japs and hooked up. No 
worry there."126 With these thoughts, General Joseph W. Stilwell sent Merrill's Marauders 
on their final mission, to strike and seize Myitkyina. Merrill's Marauders were the only U.S. 
combat troops in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, and had been modeled after Orde C. 
Wingate's Chindits in response to Allied pressure for greater U.S. involvement in the CBI 
theater. The Marauders numbered roughly 3000 men, and had received three months of 
unconventional, or special operations, training. As Charleton Ogburn Jr. explains: 
It was often noon before you had a chance even to wash your face or brush 
your teeth. Our meals we ate without sitting down, standing before tables 
constructed of red-sandstone slabs on posts, while pariah kites perched about 
waiting to pounce on any unguarded morsel. After dark we had critiques on 
the exercises we had held during the day - until these were extended to last 
overnight. We shot off quantities of ammunition, mostly at informal or p o p  
up targets; 3rd Battalion had brought back from the Pacific a conviction of 
the uselessness of conventional firing ranges. There was scouting and 
patrolling, squad and platoon attacks upon entrenchments, pillboxes, 
roadblocks, bivouacs, practice booby-trapping, taking airdrops, evacuating 
wounded, trailing and trail concealment, demolition, and approaching, 
withdrawing from and crossing rivers. There were attacks under varying 
conditions by half the battalion against the other half. (Said the training 
schedule nervously: "This attack to be without ammunition.") And there 
were marches. 
126 Quote from General Stilwell's diary, 11 April 1944, cited in E. D. Smith, 
Battle for Burma (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 72. 
127 Charleton Ogburn, Jr., The (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 
Inc., 1956), pp. 58-59. General Samuel V. Wilson, a member of Merrill's Marauders and a 
respected General Officer with vast experience in special operations, has said that Ogburn's 
book "is exquisitely accurate." See "Interview with General Samuel V. Wilson" by Dr. J.W. 
Partin; Rice, VA; 11 July 1988; held at U.S. Special Operations Command. 
Throughout the seven months the Marauders operated in the CBI theater, they 
conducted three prolonged missions that culminated at Myitkyina. The first mission was to 
provide a blocking force near Walawbum, the second was another blocking mission at 
Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng, and the final mission was to take Myitkyina. The siege at 
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Myitkyina began on 17 May 1944 and lasted until 3 August 1944. The Allies won a hard- 
fought victory but only 100 out of 3000 Marauders participated in the final battle. Merrill's 
Marauders had fought valiantly to the point of decimation and today's Rangers wear the 
Marauder colors and insignia. How can a successful operation that is heralded as one of the 
birthplaces of the modem Rangers be considered a misuse of SOF? We examine this 
question in detail below. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Political and Military 
The political situation in the CBI theater was dictated by the critical military situation 
the Allies found themselves in by mid-1942. At the end of May 1942, the Japanese held 
most of Burma and there were no longer any Allied troops on Burmese soil, except a 
relatively small comer in the north that was held by the Chinese.12' The Japanese, as Charles 
F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland state in the subseries THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA 
THEATER, of the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR 11: 
had completely isolated China by land and could reasonably hope to isolate 
it by air. From Burma they could launch their attacks into China or India as 
they chose. From Burma they could bomb Calcutta and its neighboring cities, 
the very center of the Indian war effort, or they could reach far into Western 
12' Smith, p. 3 1. 
129 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), p. 148. 
The Japanese had defeated forces from China, India, Burma, Great Britain, and the United 
States with a force of "10 infantry and 2 armored regiments with ample air support."130 
Stilwell had arrived in theater on 24 February 1942 and had participated in the walk-out from 
Burma.l3l He was immediately faced with numerous military and political problems that 
continued through the walk-out and into the planning process of an offensive campaign to 
retake Burma. 
The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 provided extensive material support to Chinese 
forces.132 Chiang Kai Shek, however, preferred that "offensive action in China Theater be 
the task of American aircraft and American airmen."133 The command relationships were 
dynamic and complex,134 and continual requests by Stilwell for U.S. combat troops were 
13* Ibid., p. 148. 
l3' Ibid., p. 93. 
133 Ibid., p. 261. Numerous references are made by Stilwell about Chiang Kai- 
shek personally and Chinese military aims to preserve the nationalist military strength in 
order to fight Mao and his communist forces after World War 11. Personal comments are 
generally directed at "Peanut" as Stilwell was wont to call Chiang Kai-shek. He writes of 
Peanut" "same as ever - a grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake" and the Chinese 
government, "a gang of thugs ... intriguing, double-crossing, lying reports. Hands out for 
anything they can get; their only idea to let someone else do the fighting; indifference of 
'leaders' to their men ... And we are maneuvered into the position of having to support this 
rotten regime and glorify its figurehead, the all-wise great patriot and soldier - Peanut. My 
God!" in Ogburn, p. 29, and Joseph W. Stilwell arranged and edited by Theodore H. White, 
The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p. 207. 
'34 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), pp. 6-7. Stilwell eventually became, all at 
once: Commanding General, United States Armed Forces CBI; Commanding General, 
Northern Combat Area Command; Deputy Commander, South-East Asia Command; and 
Chief of Staff China Theater. See also William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma 
Road, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 151. 
denied.135 The Sino-American political situation and the lack of significant U.S. military 
presence made Stilwell's position problematic at best. Plans for an offensive against the 
Japanese were initiated as Burma was being lost. Initial correspondence and meetings 
i 
between the Allies created more difficulties, however, than actual plans. In June 1942, 
Chiang Kai-shek issued what came to be known as the Three Demands, calling for: three 
American divisions, 500 combat planes fighting on the front, and an increase in aerial 
support to 5,000 tons per month.136 Stilwell realized that if Washington flatly refused 
Chiang Kai-shek's demands, Stilwell's leverage and usefulness would be gone. Stilwell 
analyzed the situation and determined that the British and Chinese had to be persuaded to 
join in the retaking of Burma. He also decided that the reopening of the lines of 
communication between Burma and China was the essential solution to the strategic 
problems of China.137 Subsequent meetings and plans continued to foster debate and 
compromise as the Allies searched for the solution in the CBI theater of operations. 
In the months May 1942 - April 1943, the Allies planned their offensive. ANAKIM 
was the first plan to emerge. The plan was to break the blockade of China and reform the 
Chinese Army by defeating the Japanese in Burma. The "Chenault plan"138 was appealing 
to the Chinese and the President, in spite of allied strategic bombing efforts producing little 
effect. Stilwell and Chennault were called to Washington for the TRIDENT conference in 
May 1943.139 The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully supported ANAKIM. The President, however, 
135 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 75, 121, 151, 179, 
222,242,246,247. 
136 Ibid., p. 172. 
137 Ibid., p. 178. 
13' Ibid., pp. 250-254. Chennault claimed that with 105 fighters, 30 medium 
bombers, and 12 heavy bombers he could defeat Japan by: attacking Japanese-held objectives 
in China; destroying the Japanese Air Force when it tried to defend them; and then bombing 
the Japanese home islands after the Japanese Air Force had been destroyed. 
'39 Ibid., pp. 3 17-320. 
wanted immediate action in Burma and favored the air option. The TRIDENT conference 
ended with an agreement that e ed the Chennault plan and made ANAKIM a 
smaller operation to take north Burma without significant Chinese participation.140 Italy's 
surrender breathed fresh life into the combined planning, and the QUADRANT conference 
held in Quebec from 19-24 August 1943 was called to weigh the new Allied situation. 
Prime Minister Churchill had invited Brigadier General Orde C. Wingate to the 
conference where his views on Long-Range Penetration Groups (LRPG) and their 
effectiveness were well received. General Marshall agreed to form an American LRPG with 
the codename GALAHAD. Furthermore, Marshall directed the formation of a special air 
unit to support Wingate's Chindits and GALAHAD.141 The South-East Asia Command 
(SEAC) was established with Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as the Supreme Allied 
Commander, and Stilwell as his Deputy. As Romanus and Sunderland state about the 
QUADRANT conference, "(t)he strategic decisions ... were a reaffirmation of TRIDENT, 
calling for the occupation of north Burma (D Day, mid-February 1944) to establish overland 
communications with China, and by taking Myitkyina to broaden the air route to China, for 
its saturation with transport aircraft could now be foreseen." Preparations for Allied 
amphibious operations would continue, however, there were no specific plans. Additionally, 
"the Hump route was to be built up to intensify operations against the Japanese, keep China 
in the war, maintain a larger Fourteenth Air Force in China, and equip and train Chinese 
forces. " '42 
Ibid., pp. 327-333. 
14' Ibid., p. 366. GALAHAD was the codename of the 5307th Composite Unit 
(Provisional), they were coined "Merrill's Marauders" by James Shepley of Time and Life 
after their commanding officer, Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. Number 1 Air 
Commando was the elite air unit's title. It was a custom-made aggregation of liaison aircraft, 
helicopters, light bombers, fighters, gliders, and transports. 
14* Ibid., p. 363. Message from Marshall to Stilwell. 
The political dilemmas produced out of military fact and necessity were complex. 
Each participant had his own agenda and disposition to one another's agenda. I Stilwell faced 
a highly politicized military environment. He was pressured by civilian and military leaders 
to produce grand results with meager resources while the spirit of cooperation was severely 
lacking among the allies. He seized command, from the British, of the only U.S. combat 
force available, and effectively commanded the Chinese forces. The brief background 
discussed above is meant to provide an appreciation for the convoluted political and military 
situation that unfolded in the CBI theater during World War II. It is by no means a complete 
description of the elements at work in CBI during that period, and should be recognized as 
such. 
2. Merrill's Marauders 
Following Marshall's directive of 1 September 1943 ordering the formation of a 
special commando unit of "jungle-tested veterans who would operate with the Chindits in 
the coming campaign,"143 the 5307th Composite Unit Provisional began to be formed on 5 
September and was fully manned by 20 ~eptember . '~~  "Jungle-tested veterans" were asked 
to volunteer for a short duration, unspecified "hazardous" mi~s i0n . l~~  The War Department's 
concept was "that the unit was provided for one major mission of three months' duration, 
whose close might find the unit so exhausted and depleted that its survivors would require 
three months' hospitalization and rest."146 By the end of October 1943, GALAHAD had 
reached India. They came under SEAC's operational control and began training under 
Wingate's doctrines. General Sam Wilson stated that this initial training consisted of the 
following: 
143 David W. Hogan, Jr., U.S . Armv S~ecial  O~erations in World War Il, 
(Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), p. 98. 
Romanus and Sunderland, -~ommand, p. 34. 
14' Hogan, pp. 1 12-1 13. 
'46 Romanus and Sunderland, >, p. 34. 
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Mostly training in light infantry tactics. Again, patrolling, ambushing, quick 
strikes on pre-selected targets, checking out all of our weapons. It was 
shakedown training. We were a fairly seasoned outfit--at least the people in 
the outfit were fairly seasoned when we began that three months of training. 
It was fine-tuning training. Nothing surprising in it all, I don't think. We did 
a lot of swimming and a lot of stream-crossing. We had not done a lot of 
that. That was important.'47 
The organization was broken into three battalions. Each battalion was broken down 
into two combat teams with 16 officers and 456 enlisted men.'48 As Romanus and 
Sunderland describe: 
The combat team had a rifle company of three rifle platoons and a heavy 
weapons section, a heavy weapons platoon to support the rifle company, a 
pioneer and demolition platoon, a reconnaissance platoon (I & R platoon), 
and a medical detachment. The combat team had 306 M1 rifles, 52 
submachine guns, 86 carbines, 4 8 1 h n .  mortars, 4 60-mm. mortars, 2 heavy 
machine guns, 2 light machine guns, and 3 2.56-inch rocket 1a~nchers. l~~ 
There had been much discussion about the proper employment of the LRPG at the Quebec 
Conference. One school of thought held that the LRPG were wasted if they were used too 
far in the interior of Burma, "that their proper use, given the circumstances of jungle terrain 
and air supply, was for short  envelopment^."''^ Stilwell was of this school. As Ogburn 
notes, Stilwell was the quintessential practitioner of the progressive series of short hooks to 
the enemy's rear area, and that was the way in which Merrill's Marauders were to be used."' 
147 Partin, "Interview with General Samuel V. Wilson," p. 5. 
'48 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 34-36. 
149 Ibid., p. 35. 
Ibid., p. 36. 
lS1 Ogburn, p. 25. 
Stilwell began the campaign to reenter Burma southward through the Hukawng 
Valley with the Chinese 38th Division and elements of the 22d Division in December 1943. 
(Map 4) The Japanese opposing the offensive were the 55th and 56th Regiments of the 18th 
Division. (Map 5 and 6) On the China side of Burma, eleven divisions of the Chinese 
Expeditionary Force attacked to the west against the Japanese 56th Division. One Japanese 
division, the 54th, was left in reserve.152 Stilwell's strategy, which had twice been attempted 
prior to the arrival of Merrill's Marauders, "was to get a force around behind the 18th 
Division, in what is called an envelopment, and destroy it, which would leave the Kamaing 
Road [major north-south road] to his Chinese divisions."L53 Merrill's Marauders conducted 
three distinct operations in Burma and their objectives included: to envelop the 18th 
Division's east flank and block the Kamaing Road at Shaduzup, but later changed to, near 
Walawbum and attack the Japanese 18th Division command post;154 to place a blocking 
force behind the 18th Division at Shaduzup and Inkangahta~ng;'~~ and the taking of 
~ y i t k y i n a . ' ~ ~  (Map 7) The final operation is the focus of this chapter, however, the first two 
operations are worth some mention. 
Early on 24 February 1944, Merrill's Marauders, led by the three intelligence and 
reconnaissance (I & R) platoons, began their south-eastward looping patrol around the 
Japanese right flank. (Map 8) Within two days, two of the I & R platoons had made contact 
with the Japanese, which continued throughout this first General Tanaka, the 
commander of the Japanese 18th Division, was prematurely informed on 1 March 1944 of 
152 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 119- 121. 
'53 Ogburn, p. 9 1. 
Romanus and Sunderland,  pp. 146-150. 
Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
'56 Ibid., pp. 204-205. 
157 Ogburn, p. 97-130. 
the American's presence in Walawbum. This was the chance Tanaka had been waiting for. 
As Romanus and Sunderland describe: 
Quickly analyzing his situation, he decided that the Chinese 22d and 38th 
Divisions were moving so slowly that he could contain them with a small rear 
guard while the main strength of the 18th Division hurled itself on the 
Americans. On 2 March he made his decision, and the movement back began 
on 3 March.'58 
Organized attacks against Merrill's Marauders began on 4 March and continued I 
through 8 March while the Chinese divisions fought south and'south-east toward Walawbum. 
On 8 March, the 18th Division escaped from Stilwell's trap, "but in so doing it had yielded 
control of the greater part of the Hukawng Valley to the Allies, and the Chinese Army in 
India could celebrate a well-earned victory."'59 (Map 9) As for Merrill's Marauders, Ogburn 
states that: 
In five days, the American Forces in Action Series notes in its history of the 
unit, 'the Americans had killed 800 of the enemy, had cooperated with the 
Chinese to force a major Japanese withdrawal, and had paved the way for 
further Allied progress. This was accomplished at a cost to the Marauders of 
eight men killed and 37 wounded. Up to this point, 19 patients had been 
evacuated with malaria, eight with other fevers (mostly dengue), 10 with 
psychoneurosis, and 33 with injuries. Miscellaneous sickness totalled 109.' 
Of the 2,600 men, more or less, who set forth from Margherita, about 2,300 
remained to carry on.'"" I 
Four months after the offensive campaign in Burma had begun, the Allies had achieved their 
first victory, and Stilwell was anxious for more. 
lS8 Romanus and Sunderland, s, p. 150. 
'59 Ibid., p. 158. 
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Following the victory at Walawbum, neither SEAC or the Chinese government 
enthusiasticly supported Stilwell. Mountbatten sent a mission to London and Washington 
to plead for cancellation of the campaign and Chiang Kai-shek was ordering his generals to 
proceed slowly.161 Stilwell, in an effort to achieve success before he could be ordered to 
cease operations, ordered Merrill's Marauders to split up and conduct missions similar to the 
first. (Map 10) The 1st Battalion, followed at a day's interval by a regiment of Chinese, was 
to make a shallow envelopment toward Shaduzup. (Map 11) The 2d and 3d Battalions, 
followed by another Chinese regiment, was to make a wide swing to the east, south, and then 
west toward 1nkangahta~ng.l~~ (Map 12) The 1st Battalion moved toward their objective 
on 13 March 1944, participated in numerous skirmishes, and cut fresh trails around alerted 
Japanese forces. On 28 March 1944, 1st Battalion achieved complete and overwhelming 
surprise over the Japanese forces and established their roadb10cks.l~~ The Japanese feared 
a situation like Walawbum and withdrew west of the 1st Battalion on 29 March 1944. 
The 2d and 3d Battalions began their march on 12 March 1944. Their orders were 
modified and the force was ordered to split into 2d Battalion (plus) and 3d Battalion (minus) 
in order to block both the Kamaing Road and the approaches from the south of Tanai valley. 
The Japanese forces at Inkangahtawng were too strong and the Marauders were forced to 
withdraw from their blocking positions on 23 March 1944, against vigorous Japanese pursuit. 
(Map 13) At about this time, intelligence indicated that Japanese forces were moving north 
in the Tanai valley to attack the Chinese forces descending on Shaduzup, and 2d Battalion 
(plus) was ordered to intercept and block any movements north of Nphum Ga.'@ Merrill 
ordered 2d Battalion to defend the high ground of Nphum Ga which controlled the airfield 
that 3d Battalion would defend at Hsamshingyang. Both battalions were in place by 28 
Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 160. 
162 Ibid., p. 176. 
Ibid.,pp.183-185. 
Ibid.,pp.180-183. 
March 1944, having been engaged with the Japanese for more than thirty-six hours almost 
without interruption.'65 (Map 14) For eleven days the 2d Battalion, isolated and surrounded, 
withstood heavy attacks and shelling while the lst, which had been moved hastily once 
\ 
communications were established with Merrill, and 3d battalions attempted to break through 
to them. Up to this point, Stilwell had used the Marauders in the strategic role envisioned 
by himself and Menill. The change to a static defensive role represented a radical change 
in the concept of the Marauders' employment. 166 (Map 15) Finally, on 9 April 1944, the 1 st 
and 3d battalions reached the 2d, and the Japanese withdrew south. Only 1,400 Marauders 
remained, and they were "utterly exhausted, half starved, with many suffering from dysentery 
and malaria."167 The Marauders anticipated a lengthy rest, but Stilwell, as mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter, had other ideas. He wanted to capture Myitkyina. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
Following ANAKIM, TRIDENT, and numerous other planning meetings, the Allied 
objectives remained fluid. Strangely, just prior to the raid on Mytkyina, "(a)llied authorities 
were engaged in discussing whether Mytkyina's capture was worth while and should be 
attempted."16' Mountbatten and Stilwell had prepared the plan of operations in October 
1943, based on the directives of the TRIDENT and QUADRANT Conferences. The 
objectives prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff included: 
1. to carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve 
the air route and establish overland communications with China. Target date: 
mid-February , 1944. 
2. to continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of 
China, and the development of air facilities with a view to: 
- 
165 Peers and Brelis, p. 158. 
166 Hogan,pp.115-117. 
'67 Smith, p. 72. 
16' Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 200. 
a. Keeping China in the war. 
b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese. 
c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China, 
d. Equipping Chinese ground f 0 r ~ e s . l ~ ~  
The 300 divisions in the Chinese order of battle were of dubious quality, and the 
bolstering of the fighting capabilities of such a large resource was of utmost importance to 
Stilwell. Myitkyina, however, remained The Objective. Romanus and Sunderland provide 
two reasons for the importance' of Myitkyina as an Allied objective: 
In the first place, its geographic position at the southern tip of the hump of 
mountains over which the transports flew from India to China meant that its 
capture would greatly improve the air route to China. As long as the 
Japanese held the Myitkyina airstrips, the threat of their fighters forced the 
U.S. aircraft to fly far to the north, then swing south to the Kunming air 
terminals. This increased fuel consumption and cut the pay load.170 
They continue: 
Secondly, since fall 1942 the U.S. engineers had been building a road south 
from Ledo, Assarn, which was intended to cross north Burma and ultimately 
link with the old Burma Road. The Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, down 
which the Ledo Road was being constructed, enter(ed) the Irrawaddy valley, 
which is the most habitable part of north and central Burma, within a few 
miles of the Myitkyina-Mogaung area. Both towns are on the rail and road 
net of prewar Burma, so when the Ledo Road reached them the engineering 
problem would become one of improving existing facilities rather than 
constructing new ones in the virgin wilderness. Therefore, taking the 
Myitkyina-Mogaung area was the prerequisite to completing the Ledo Road 
and opening a ground line of communications, with an all-weather road and 
gasoline pipeline, to China.171 
169 Ibid., p. 9. 
170 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
l7' Ibid., p. 10. 
Stilwell had several alternatives to achieve this objective. He could have solely used 
the Chinese GPF to fight the set-piece battles, or, he could have used both the Chinese GPF 
and Merrill's Marauders to fight these same conventional battles. These alternatives had 
various factors affecting their expected value and expected cost. These alternatives, the 
factors affecting their probability of success in each phase, and their political and military 
value and cost are discussed below. 
D. ALTERNATIVES 
Faced with the coming monsoon season, Stilwell realized that "if he was to take 
Myitkyina he must take it with a quick bold stroke before the rains began."'72 He hoped to 
persuade Tanaka that the principal effort was coming down the Mogaung valley while a task 
force of Marauder survivors plus two Chinese regiments and a ~ a c h i n ' ~ ~  screen would move 
east over the Kumon Range and strike directly on the Myitkyina airstrip.'74 Stilwell hoped 
that Myitkyina's garrison would "be depleted to help defend Mogaung from the Chindits." 17' 
The specialness of this initial mission was clear, the Marauders and their attached forces 
were to take a route to Myitkyina that was 65 miles long, over a 6,000 foot pass, through 
'72 Ibid., p. 204. 
'73 Ibid., p. 36. Romanus and Sunderland describe the Kachins as the "(m)ost 
powerful of the Burman peoples in the path of the projected North Burma Campaign ... They 
are a great fighting stock who have cut their way into Burma from the mountains to the north. 
Expert woodsmen, and uncannily adept at invoking the nats, or minor deities, of the 
surrounding hills, the Kachins reminded some of those Americans who worked with them 
of the American Indian in his greatest days. They had a trait that sometimes amused and 
sometimes touched the Americans who sought to enlist them against the Japanese: their 
culture did not recognize deceit in personal relations ... The Kachins' potentialities as scouts, 
guides, and irregulars were obvious ... The force thus formed was known as the Kachin 
Rangers." 
174 Ibid., p. 226. The airstrip was about two miles west of the town of Myitkyina. 
17' Ibid., p. 205. 
dense jungle,176 and achieve, if not strategic then tactical surprise on the Japanese garrison 
left at Myitkyina. Following the seizure of the airfield, the mission took on a different flavor 
as Merrill's Marauders were used to fight linear, set-piece battles for terrain. In terms of 
alternatives, this is our point of departure, and where we believe misuse occurred. 
In lieu of a counterfactual scenario and the development of ways in which Merrill's 
Marauders could have been used instead, the alternatives we are limiting ourselves to, are: 
the conventionalization of Merrill's Marauders to fight set-piece battles for terrain during the 
siege; and strictly using GPF for the set-piece battles during the siege at Myitkyina. Each 
alternative had different factors affecting the probability of their success, as well as, certain 
values and costs associated with each alternative. Appendix E provides the complete 
graphical representation, in the form of a probability worksheet and a completed decision 
tree, of the factors and variables discussed below. 
1. Probability of Merrill's Marauders and Chinese GPF 
Appendix E contains the completed probability worksheet for Merrill's Marauders 
and the Chinese GPF. Each variable is coded for the insertion and actions at the objective 
phase. The extraction phase is omitted in this case because the mission called for seizing and 
holding the airstrip outside Myitkyina, followed by the town of Myitkyina. Merrill's 
Marauders generally have the advantage during the insertion phase except for the variable 
of mission dificulty and readiness. The terrain the Marauders faced was extremely difficult. 
Additionally, the Marauders suffered from severe illness brought on by physical exertion and 
lack of substantial food in a wet, dense jungle environment. The Chinese GPF fought their 
way down the Kaiming Road and continued to fight through the Mogaung valley in order to 
reach Myitkyina. The biggest obstacle to the Chinese GPF reaching Myitkyina was the 
Japanese themselves. Our framework was developed around special operations and it is hard 
to consider the siege at Myitkyina as a special operation in any sense. For this reason, 
variables become difficult to discern and place in all three phases of our decision tree. As 
17' Louis Allen, Burma: The Loncest War, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 
p. 365. 
shown in Appendix E, Merrill's Marauders had a slight advantage during the insertion phase, 
considering all variables equally. For the purpose of our decision tree, we have determined 
that Merrill's Marauders had an 80% chance of completing the insertion. The Chinese GPF, 
by contrast, had a slightly lower probability than Merrill's Marauders, around 70%. 
The relationships between the coded probability of the two forces for each phase 
provides a relative difference between one alternative and another, while the most significant 
variables allow the decision maker to determine what that difference is. In our case, the 
advantage Merrill's Marauders had by taking an unexpected and difficult route with limited 
Japanese forces was offset by the difficulty of actually taking that route. The greater 
resistance met by the Chinese GPF and the subsequent loss of surprise were offset by the 
relative ease of their mission and their mission skill and proficiency. Interesting relationships 
exist between the phases and the coding of each force. The relative relationships between 
forces may change between phases, as well as, the relative coding of each independent force 
between phases. Once the mission was launched, the availability variable becomes not 
applicable as we move into the actions at the objective phase. 
The Chinese GPF generally have an advantage during the actions at the objective 
phase. The important variables during this phase include: mission skill, mission proficiency, 
firepower, corresponding doctrine, and mission dzficulty. The Chinese GPF had a larger 
advantage than Merrill's Marauders during the insertion phase and were coded as having an 
80% probability of completing actions at the objective. Because they were a specially 
trained, light-infantry organization developed for special operations, Merrill's Marauders 
were given a 60% probability of completing the actions at the objective. The probabilities 
themselves are obviously subjective. The relative difference of each factor and subsequent 
probability, both between forces and between phases, however, is highlighted by the 
probability worksheet. 
2. Political Value 
The case of Merrill's Marauders is unique to our framework in that SOF and GPF are 
not of the same country. Subsequently, as our theory applies to the United States and the 
decision process of U.S. decision makers, the various values and costs of this case, and their 
weight to U.S. decision makers, are generally skewed. Merrill's Marauders have higher 
resulting values, but at the same time, higher resulting costs, than the Chinese GPF. This is 
unique in our case studies, and may speak to coalition warfare and how values and costs are 
considered among Allies. International political value is dependent upon a successful 
mission. Because of the unique nature of this case, this value is greater for U.S. SOF than 
Chinese GPF in terms of the United States. The successful completion of the mission by 
Merrill's Marauders would result in the accomplishment of one of several objectives. It 
would also have the additional benefit of demonstrating extreme resolve and capability in a 
theater with limited resources.177 The resulting political, military, and psychological affect 
on Japanese forces would be significant. Sole use of Chinese GPF would have also led to 
the accomplishment of one of several objectives. The Chinese, however, were expected to 
fight their long-time enemy and would have had less significant political, military, and 
psychological affects on the Japanese. 
Domestic political value is dependent upon the American public perceiving the 
mission as important to our national interest and/or demonstrating an amount of effective 
leadership. Again, because of the alternatives in this unique case, domestic political value 
is greater for SOF than GPF. The Marauders enjoyed ongoing media attention. Attention 
that was also given to Chinese GPF, although to a lesser extent. Obviously, a successful 
operation, across our decision tree, by Merrill's Marauders would have been reported to the 
American public and would have resulted in some domestic political value. The reporters 
and political leaders would have made the American public aware of the importance of 
177 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 4. The authors 
point out that "with the exception of transport aircraft, [Stilwell] received little in the way 
of supplies and manpower from the United States; to a great degree Stilwell was left to carry 
out his mission with what resources he could conjure up in China and India." 
Myitkyina, the objective would have been viewed as an important national interest, and 
Stilwell would have been perceived as providing good leadership. Limited domestic political 
value could have been gained from a failed mission because the "boys" would have been 
"fighting their hearts out" in a far off land. Failure to complete insertion or extract the force, 
had no domestic political value. The Chinese GPF might have obtained limited domestic 
political value, but only in the case of a successful mission. The American public had so 
much war material on their collective plates, that limited domestic political value would have 
been gained by Chinese operations. Stilwell would have been perceived as an effective 
I 
leader of the Chinese GPF. As shown in Appendix E, the political values of completing the 
mission were greater for Merrill's Marauders than the Chinese GPF, this is not the case with 
military value, as we demonstrate below. 
3. Military Value 
The military value we have referred to as mission effectiveness is a function of the 
portion of the mission completed and the ability of the friendly force to inflict damage to the 
enemy. If the mission is completed, in either the SOF or GPF case, then mission 
effectiveness is given the highest value. To the contrary, if insertion is not completed, in 
either the SOF or GPF case, then the mission effectiveness is given the lowest value. When 
the mission is attempted, but not completed, the GPFsfirepower generally prevails. Merrill's 
Marauders, with limited firepower but excellent accuracy, would have been expected to 
achieve minor military effect on the enemy if the mission failed. The GPF Chinese, with 
combined arms, would have been expected to achieve significant military effect on the 
enemy. The target value is the military value of the target and does not change between SOF 
and GPF. In the case of the town of Myitkyina, the airstrip was the actual theater-strategic 
target while the adjacent town was a necessary addendum, and thus, a theater-strategic target 
as well. 
4. Political Cost 
Like political value, the unique aspects of this case affect the political cost. Because 
the framework applies to U.S. decision makers, the political costs are skewed against SOF. 
International political cost is generally incurred when the mission fails, and moreso when 
the force fails to insert. The international political cost to U.S. decision makers of a failed 
Chinese GPF mission, however, would be reduced by reflecting on the Chinese military 
rather than the U.S. military. An argument could be made that by not acting and allowing 
the Chinese to fail, the U.S. could expect to incur some political cost. It is important to 
remember, however, that we are assuming that Merrill's Marauders would have been 
gainfully employed in a different manner. Successful missions, across our decision tree, do 
not incur political costs. A failed mission for SOF would have given the perception of a 
militarily weak force and caused a loss of credibility. A failed mission for GPF would have 
caused the United States to lose credibility. Failure to insert SOF would have made the U.S. 
look militarily weak, incompetent, and our Allies would have spoken out against us. Failure 
to insert GPF would have given the perception of military weakness and caused a loss of 
credibility with both our Allies and enemies. 
Domestic political cost, again, favors the non-American GPF. In the case of Merrill's 
Marauders, the media and public would have questioned the leadership if the mission failed 
and the force was not extracted. A failed mission and failure to insert would have resulted 
in a public loss of confidence and a media attack. In the case of Chinese GPF, this cost 
would have been limited to the media and the public questioning the leadership if the mission 
failed or the force failed to insert. The domestic political cost is implicitly related to the 
domestic political value, the military cost in terms of casualties, and how the media presents 
the "facts" to the public. 
5. Military Cost 
The opportunity cost is generally greater for SOF than GPF. Merrill's Marauders 
were the single U.S. combat unit in theater and they were the single SOF directly available 
to Stilwell. With one SOF unit, there were many other missions the SOF could have been 
conducting, but were not. The Chinese GPF on the other hand, were one of several units of 
their kind with several types of similar missions they could be conducting. Opportunity cost 
is the same throughout our decision tree for each respective force. The cost of casualties is 
generally higher for SOF than GPF. Merrill's Marauders were well-trained. They had three 
months of intensive training prior to operations and received the benefit of training from 
actual combat operations, additionally, they held a high level of skill and experience that was 
irreplaceable in the short term. The Chinese GPF were also well-trained and held a high 
level of skill and experience, however, the training was at a different level of complexity and 
necessary cohesion, and they were generally more easily replaceable in the short-term. The 
resulting cost of casualties, based on months of experience, would result in the spectrum of 
light-to-heavy casualties as the mission progressed down the resulting cost of success-to- 
failure, with the replaceability of forces and the cost of skill and experience separating SOF 
from GPF. Before the complete analysis of this case, we briefly describe the execution of 
the mission below. 
E. EXECUTION 
Merrill's Marauders were down to 1,400 troops following the seige at Nphum Ga and 
had to be combined with Chinese troops to fill their ranks.'78 The three combat teams that 
were created began their advance to Myitkyina on 28 April 1944, an advance that would take 
the Marauders over treacherous terrain and add 65 miles to the 500 they had already 
marched. (Map 16) Half of the animals died of exhaustion or fell into gorges during the 
march and the men were further harassed by fevers and dysentery.'79 After two engagements 
with Japanese forces, one of the three teams of Merrill's Marauders attacked the airstrip west 
of Myitkyina and the ferry terminal at Pamati, just southwest of the airstrip, on 17 May 1944. 
(Map 17) "The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese 
17' Ibid., p. 223. 
179 Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise."'80 The 
Marauders sent the prearranged code signal that the airstrip had been captured in good 
condition and food, ammunition, and infantry were to begin reinforcing the force. They also 
sent word for the other two teams of Marauders to quickly assist the forces at Myitkyina. 
Reinforcements were disappointing as anti-aircraft weapons and construction engineers were 
some of the first forces to be flown in. The remaining portion of Merrill's Marauders did not 
arrive until two days later. 
The Japanese did not reinforce the airstrip on 17 May and the Marauders concluded 
that the Japanese did not hold Myitkyina in strength.'*' Several attempts to capture the town 
were failures. The three combat teams were reshuffled back to Merrill's Marauders and the 
Chinese regiments, and the Japanese began to reinforce the town. By 23 May 1944, the 
Allies were on the defensive and faced a formidable Japanese force as "an estimated 3,000 
to 4,000 enemy had come in"'82 to reinforce and take the offensive. During this period, 
Merrill's Marauders' evacuation rate was between 75 and 100 casualties a day and 2d 
Battalion was down to twelve men.'83 The Marauders continued to fight pitched battles 
against the attacking Japanese while suffering physically from the previous three months of 
arduous duty. (Map 18) Ogburn states that to be evacuated: 
a man had to run a fever of 102 degrees or better for three consecutive days 
and be certified as unfit by a board of medical authorities before being tagged 
for evacuation. All the same, at the end of May only 200 of the 3,000 men 
with which the 5307th had started - a remnant of 1st Battalion - were 
Is0  Ibid., p. 226. 
''I Military Intelligence Division, Merrill's Marauders, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
War Department, 1945), p. 108. 
182 Ibid., p. 1 10. 
18' Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 237 
considered fit to remain at Myitkyina. The point was now clear. 'Galahad,' 
wrote Stilwell in his diary, 'is just shot."84 
With the deterioration of the situation in Myitkyina, Stilwell ordered that any Marauders able 
to walk were to be sent to Myitkyina immediately, to continue the fight. 
Marauders were moved between the rear and Myitkyina as "New GALAHAD" were - 
sent into battle, "receiving instruction in their weapons in the planes taking them to 
M ~ i t k ~ i n a . " ' ~ ~  Myitkyina fell on 3 August 1944 and New GALAHAD participated with 
roughly 200 original Merrill's Marauders in the capture of the town. Merrill's Marauders for 
our purpose, however, were essentially decimated by the beginning of June 1944. Officially, 
the 5307th was disbanded on 10 August 1944. 
F. ANALYSIS 
Employing Men-ill's Marauders during the seige at Myitkyina represents a complex 
error of commission. Arguably the most heinous misuse of SOF. The case represents the 
danger "of placing SOF under the operational control of GPF commanders without a 
corresponding special headquarters to assist in planning, training and administrative 
 requirement^."'^^ Missions were planned by GPF planners187 and no mechanism for the 
training and assignment of replacements existed. We recognize that no doctrine for the use 
of SOF existed during World War 11, however, as David Hogan notes: 
184 Ogburn, p. 240. 
Is' Ibid., p. 243. 
186 Michael M. Kershaw, "Integration of SOF and GPF," M.A. Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1994, p. 123. 
I R 7  Merrill and Hunter, the two commanders of the Marauders, each thought and 
planned in "conventional" terms. As Obgurn notes: "Hunter had a belief in the Army, a 
belief in discipline, and a deep aversion to prima donnas ... when he came to write up the 
lessons learned from GALAHAD, (Hunter) emphasized that they chiefly confirmed the hard 
lessons learned in the past and embodied in Army doctrine," p. 239. 
No doctrine, or even a generally accepted concept, of the proper employment 
of Ranger units existed in World War 11, and, thus, one technically cannot 
accuse the Army of misuse of the Rangers. Nevertheless, the repeated use of 
specially selected and trained troops to carry out tasks for which their light 
organizations were ill suited, tasks which any line outfit could have 
performed, was a wasteful practice for an Army which faced chronic 
shortages of combat manpower. . .GALAHAD, otherwise known as 'Merrill's 
Marauders,' served as line infantry and suffered heavy losses. . . .Ig8 
Apparently, Stilwell did not recognize the unconventional potential he had under his 
command and did not understand the greater, strategic, role that the Marauders could have 
played in his overall campaign. 
The expected value of using Merrill's Marauders, a theater-strategic force, to conduct 
tactical operations to achieve an overall strategic goal was not greater than the expected cost 
of using the Marauders in this manner. They did not hold either an absolute advantage or 
a comparative advantage for the mission of defeating the Japanese at Myitkyina. The 
Chinese GPF had both advantages in conducting tactical set-piece battles against the 
Japanese. 
The most significant costs associated with using Merrill's Marauders to fight pitched- 
battles were the military costs. Assuming that Stilwell would not have been willing to allow 
Merrill's Marauders to simply recover from the physical trauma they had suffered while 
conducting continual operations in a harsh environment for three months, the opportunity 
cost of using them in a line infantry role was significant. Japanese reinforcements and 
supplies continued to flow into Myitkyina once the seige began and Merrill's Marauders 
could have been used to conduct intelligence, raiding, or sabotage operations. Additionally, 
each casualty to Merrill's Marauders was irreplaceable and represented a loss of valuable 
188 Hogan, "Rangers Lead the Way?: The Problem of Misuse of U.S. Army 
Ranger Units in World War 11," unpublished paper, based on material in David W. Hogan, 
Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantrv?: The Chan  in^ Role of the U.S. Army Ran ers from Dieppe 
to Grenada, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992). 
training in special operations skills and unit standard operating procedures, as well as an 
intangible loss of unit integrity and cohesion. 
General Wilson was asked whether the Marauders represented a case of a misuse of 
light infantry, per se? Or if the Marauders were left in the field too long? His explanation 
was as follows: 
No. The concepts were sound. The concepts worked. There was just the 
appropriate level of gamble and risk in the things that we were asked to do. 
We were well-trained enough, cocky enough, and mean enough to pull them 
off. At Myitkyina, regardless of what happened, we were sort of like a guy 
at the gaming tables who was going to make one last big splurge when he 
should have known that he had spent all his luck. He should have pulled 
every single member of the Marauders, devoted a little time to putting us in 
a camp back somewhere in the tea plantations of Assarn, and given us a 
chance to put on a little weight, to loll around in the sun, to drink some 
Bullfight brandy and Rosa rum, and to chase little Indian girls. . . If he had 
done that, we could have gone back as soon as the rainy season was over, and 
we could have done it for them all over again. Instead, on the 10th of August 
1944, there were 100 combat effectives left in the field, and 99 of those 
weren't very effective. They had simply been used up until there was nothing 
left. There, I think, was his mistake.ls9 
The expected value of using the Marauders as infantry until they were all "used up," did not 
outweigh the expected cost. 
Appendix E provides a completed decision tree for the use of Merrill's Marauders 
versus the use of Chinese GPF to conduct the seige-type infantry battles at Myitkyina which 
resulted in the decimation of the only special operations force in the theater. Using 
Equations (7), (8), (lo), and (1 1); the values and costs discussed above; and the probabilities 
discussed above, the resulting expected values and expected costs from the decision tree are 
as follows: 
EVsoF = 142.4 ECsw = 170.0 
EVGpF = 148.4 ECGw = 99.6 
189 Partin, p. 16. 
Merrill's Marauders did not hold an absolute or comparative advantage but were used, 
demonstrating a complex error of commission. The next case examines the Mayaguez 
incident and the application of our theory to a simple error of omission. 
IV. THE MAYAGUEZ CRISIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By 0630 , Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Austin, the acting ground force commander 
(GFC),lW realized that the situation on the beach was well beyond precarious. "Expecting 
a 'walk-ashore' operation, the Marines instead flew into the teeth of a defense prepared by 
numerically superior, well-entrenched, and well-disciplined Khmer Rouge soldiers evidently 
expecting an attack on the i~land."'~' Commencing at approximately 0615,192 the United 
States attempted to insert a 179-man Marine reinforced rifle company'93 on Koh Tang194 to 
rescue the American crew of the S.S. M a y a g ~ e z . ' ~ ~  The Marines were met with ferocious 
resistance. 
l W  Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1977. p. 29. LtCol Austin was the Marine 
ground force commander. 
Ig1 Christopher Jon Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mavaauez 
Crisis, (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1988), p. 21. With the nearly constant 
fly over of surveillance aircraft and continued attacks on Cambodian gunboats, Khmer 
soldiers undoubtedly knew that a U.S. attack was imminent. 
192 Gazette, p. 21. All times are local for the Gulf of Thailand. See also 
Vandenbroucke, p. 102. 
19' Roy Rowan, The Four Days of Maya~uez, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc., 1975), p. 201. 
193 Ibid., p. 89. Koh Tang is a small jungle island approximately three miles 
long and two miles wide. It is located about thirty-four miles southwest of Kompong Som, 
Cambodia. At least some of the Mayaguez crew were believed to be held on Koh Tang when 
the rescue operation was launched. (Maps 19,20 and 2 1 )  
I95 Ibid., pp. 15, 37, 49-50. The S.S. Mavaguez was a 31 year old, 504-foot, 
10,485-ton container ship owned and operated by U.S. Sea-Land Services, Incorporated. It 
had a crew of forty and carried 274 thirty-five-foot containers when it was captured. 
The first two helicopters to approach the eastern helicopter landing zone (HLZ) were 
shot down.'% One was hit by a hail of intense automatic weapons fire and at least two rocket 
propelled grenades (RPG) causing it to crash in the water about fifty yards from the beach. 
Seven Marines, two Navy corpsman and the Air Force co-pilot were either killed in the crash 
or by enemy fire. Three more Marines were cut down in the surf as they exited the downed 
aircraft and tried to reach the tree line. Ten Marine and three Air Force survivors swam 
seaward as they watched their equipment and weapons being consumed in the inferno of the 
crash. The second helicopter made a controlled crash at the surf line. Its crew and 
passengers were able to move to the tree line and establish a perimeter. Several of the 
Marines were wounded.lg7 
At the western HLZ, things were just as perilous. Of the first two helicopters to 
approach the beach, only one was able to disembark troops. After leaving the beach, it 
crashed into the water killing one of its crew members. The other helicopter was critically 
damaged and limped back to Thailand with one engine shot out and the Marines still 
aboard.I9' LtCol Austin's helicopter, carrying the battalion command group, was forced to 
land at the shoreline about 1,200 meters southwest of the western HLZ because of intensive 
enemy resistance at the HLZ.'99 (Map 2 1) 
'96 Gazette, p. 28. Two HLZs, one on the northwest beach and one on the 
northeast beach of Koh Tang, had been selected for the infiltration of the Marines. (Map 21) 
197 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
19' Ibid., p. 30. The helicopter that returned to Thailand had to land 50 miles 
short of its destination, Utapao, because of damage the aircraft sustained. 
199 Ibid., p. 30. 
Of the 179 marines that should have been ashore within the first moments of the 
operation, 109 were spread out at three separate locations, fighting for their lives.200 Of these 
109, several were already badly wounded. 
To add to the problem, the Marines' key communications equipment was lost or 
destroyed in the downed helicopters. This severed their vital link to close air support which 
was on station overhead. Additionally, it would be another four and a half hours before the 
Marines could expect reinf~rcement.~" What had begun as a mission to rescue forty 
merchant sailors who had been captured by Cambodian military personnel, had turned into 
a fight for the Marines' own lives. The Marines attempted to link their three elements 
together and establish defensive positions against the numerically superior, well armed, and 
well dug in combat seasoned enemy forces. 
To make matters worse, of the eight helicopters in the first wave, all but one had been 
destroyed or were critically damaged. With the addition of four other helicopters, only five 
were available to lift the second and subsequent waves of Marines.202 The original plan 
called for twelve helicopters.203 Not only had the unexpected enemy resistance drastically 
reduced the fighting strength of the first wave of Marines, it severely jeopardized the 
movement of reinforcements to Koh Tang by crippling the means to deliver them. 
200 Ibid., p. 30. Twenty-nine Marines were with the command group; sixty were 
at the western HLZ; and twenty were at the eastern HLZ. See also, Vandenbroucke, p. 102 
and Lamb, p. 22. Other interpretations of the first hour of the invasion claim that at the end 
of the first hour, only 58 Marines.were ashore and 14 of them were dead. The insertion was 
unexpectedly and effectively resisted, regardless of which account is more accurate. 
I 20' Ibid., p. 28. 
202 Ibid., p. 3 1. Additional helicopters included those used to move Marines to 
the USS Holt for the boarding of the Mayaguez, another that had been declared down until 
the situation on Koh Tang had necessitated it being declared flyable, and one other aircraft 
that arrived in Utapao after the 041 5 launch of the first wave of Marines. 
201 Ibid., p. 28. 
At approximately the same time the first wave of Marines were coming ashore, the 
Mayaguez' crew was released from Kompong Som by their Cambodian captors.204 By 1015 
the crew of the S.S. Mayaguez had been recovered by the U.S.S. Wilson.205 Since all crew 
members were recovered, President Ford issued the order to cease all offensive military 
operations and to withdraw forces from Koh Tang.'06 This added to the delay between the 
first and second waves of Marines. The second wave was turned back toward Utapao to off 
load its Marines so empty aircraft could be used to evacuate the Marines ashore. LtCol 
Austin requested the reinforcements continue on their original course to Koh Tang because 
the additional troops would be required so Austin could withdraw his force without being 
overrun.207 When reinforcements finally arrived, they were also met with fierce resistance. 
Only four of the five helicopters were able to insert their passengers. The fifth was forced 
to limp back to the Thai coast for an emergency landing.208 
Once the additional Marines were ashore and the wounded were extracted, the 
mission objective changed from what was originally a rescue operation of the Mayaguez 
crew to a rescue operation of the Marines. Extraction attempts continued into darkness and 
resulted in the evacuation of all but three Marines.''' 
In the end, fifteen U.S. military personnel lost their lives, three more were missing 
in action and fifty were wounded.210 Had it not been for the courageous performance of the 
204 Lamb, p. 2 1. 
205 Rowan, p. 216. See also Vandenbroucke, p. 106. 
'06 Ibid., p. 217. 
207 Ibid., p. 2 17. See also Lamb, p. 25. 
208 Gazette, p. 33. 
209 Lamb, p. 29. Three Marines were accidentally left behind and presumably 
overrun by Khmer Rouge soldiers after the evacuation helicopters departed. See also, 
Vandenbroucke, p. 1 12. 
210 Ibid., pp. 29, 3 1,223. See also Head, p. 14 1. 
Marines, airmen and sailors, the entire force could have been lost. Luck was certainly on the 
U.S. side. The loss of one helicopter filled with Marines during infiltration or extraction 
could have easily doubled or tripled the number of U.S. cas~a l t i e s .~~ '  Also, U.S. Pacific 
Command's (PACOM) helicopter heavy lift capability was devastated; only one of the 
eleven helicopters used in the operation was not badly damaged or destroyed.212 Additionally, 
fifty-five Cambodian soldiers lost their lives while seventy were wounded on Koh Tang.21" 
Christopher Lamb asked the question "why did a numerically inferior American 
assault force attack (Koh) Tang when Marine Corps' doctrine calls for a three-to-one 
711214 numerical superiority over enemy forces during this type of operation. Why did the 
Marines meet with such fierce resistance when they expected it to be minimal? Was there 
some intelligence shortfall that led the'Marines to believe that the forces on Koh Tang were 
far less significant? Why were the intelligence estimates provided to the Marines so 
inaccurate? Finally, was there some other option that was not used that could have provide 
the Marines with a more accurate intelligence picture than that which was available? 
We contend that SEALS, who were deployed in the Pacific Theater, were available 
to conduct reconnaissance of Koh Tang and could have provided the assault force with 
valuable intelligence concerning the disposition of enemy forces on the island. As 
Commander Bosiljevac wrote about the assault on Koh Tang: 
2" Ibid., pp. 28-32, Casualties could have been much higher particularly if one 
of the extraction helicopters had been hit while leaving Koh Tang or if a midair collision had 
occurred. One of the helicopters was overloaded with 44 Marines aboard in addition to their 
crew. 
212 Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis 
, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 141. 
213 Vandenbroucke, p. 112. 
2 1 4  Lamb, pp. 32, 136. See also, Vandenbroucke, pp. 88-89, and Head, p. 120. 
No SEAL or UDT (Underwater Demolition Team) element was used for a 
clandestine reconnaissance of the island prior to the assault, as is 
characteristic of most amphibious operations. Such a mission is completely 
within the design and character of UDTISEAL teams. A small 
reconnaissance party of combat swimmers might well have been able to 
discover that the captured crew was not on the island. At the very least, they 
would most likely have been able to notify planners of the heavily fortified 
bunkers and weaponry the Khmer Rouge had on 
Because SOF were not employed, we assert this case study is an example of an error of 
omission. 
This case study compares a SOF (SEAL platoon) which was not employed, with GPF 
(reconnaissance aircraft) which were employed. It should be noted that the use of SOF in 
this case would not have excluded the use of GPF. The best intelligence results are usually 
obtained when a variety of means are used. In this case, both GPF and SOF should have 
been used. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Mayaguez - the Crisis 
At 16 12 on 12 May 1975, U.S. National Military Command Center (NMCC) received 
a message from the American Embassy Jakarta, Indonesia that the merchant ship S.S. 
Mayaguez had been seized on the high Earlier that day, the Mayaguez was transiting 
at about 12.5 knots following a standard sea lane and trade route in the Gulf of Thailand from 
Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand. At about 1418, she was fired upon by a Cambodian 
gunboat and subsequently boarded and captured by Cambodian military forces.217 At the 
215 T. L. Bosiljevac, SEALS: UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam, (New York, 
IVY Books, 1990) pp. 178-179. 
* I 7  Head, p. 101. See also, Lamb, p. 18. The Mayaguez sailed a regularly 
scheduled shuttle service between Hong Kong, Sattahip, and Singapore. 
9 8 
time of the incident, the Mayaguez was sailing in international waterways approximately 60 
miles from the mainland Cambodian coast in the vicinity of Poulo Wai (Maps 19 
and 20) 
The ship's captain was directed to follow the gunboat to an anchorage about seven 
miles north of Poulo Wai, where the ship remained throughout the night.219 On 13 May, the 
ship, with its crew and their captors aboard got underway by 0845 and moved to an 
anchorage one mile north of Koh Tang.220 That evening, the Mayaguez crew was loaded onto 
two fishing boats and transported into an inlet one hundred yards from the beach.221 
Unknown to the U.S., the crew was kept on the two boats throughout the night.222 They were 
told they would be returned to the Mayaguez the following morning. 
The next morning, the crew was moved to the larger of the two fishing boats and set 
sail in the direction of the Mayaguez. Before reaching the container ship, the fishing boat 
changed course to starboard and headed in the direction of the mainland.223 The fishing 
vessel made a quick anchorage in Kompong Som Harbor and then sailed to Koh Rong Sam 
218 bid., pp. 101-106. Ownership of this island, as well as others in the Gulf of 
Thailand, had been contested for a number of years by several countries, to include South 
Vietnam. See also: Rowan, p. 47. 
2'9 Lamb, p. 19. 
220 Rowan, pp. 83-84. 
22' Ibid., p. 95. 
222 bid., p. 168. The fishing boat and crew were Thai. They had been captured 
by the Cambodians five days earlier for entering waters that the Cambodians claimed as 
territorial. 
223 Ibid., pp. 129- 13 1. 
Lem, one of two islands that protected Kompong Som   arbor.^^^ There the crew was moved 
ashore and held in a barracks type facility throughout the night. 225 
At 0620 the following day, the fishing boat was underway for the Mayaguez with all 
crew members aboard.226 While enroute to the Mayaguez, they were intercepted and 
recovered by the U. S. S. Wilson at approximately 1007 .227 
2. Political 
The Mayaguez seizure occurred at a time when the prestige of the United States in 
Asia was at an all time low. After more than ten years of a controversial war in Southeast 
Asia, a war that resulted in the loss of 58,000 American "the United States had 
suffered a demoralizing military and political setback with overtones concerning its 
continued reliability as an ally which went far beyond the Asian context."229 U.S. 
policymakers were seriously concerned about the nation's image. Having witnessed the 
recent collapse of two U.S. allies in Cambodia and South Vietnam, they feared that both 
enemies and allies would conclude that the U.S. either would or could no longer defend its 
vital interests. 
South East Asia had recently undergone tremendous political change with the fall of 
regimes friendly to the U.S. in both South Vietnam and Cambodia. Communists forces had 
captured Phnom Penh on 17 April and Saigon on 30 April, only weeks before the Mayaguez 
incident. In addition, North Korea had become increasingly hostile toward South Korea 
224 bid., p. 158. 
225 bid.,  pp. 160- 16 1 
226 Ibid., p. 207. 
227 Ibid., p. 214. 
228 Vandenbroucke, p. 74. 
229 Head, p. 102. 
since the fall of South ~ietnam.'~'  The Ford Administration saw the aggression as a test of 
U.S. resolve and capability. 
The United States' international leadership ability was also impaired by events that 
had occurred elsewhere on the globe. In the Middle East, U.S. efforts to secure an agreement 
for a disengagement of forces between Israel and Egypt had been unacceptable to the Israelis. 
U.S. inability to influence even its closest allies was in question. In addition, just nine 
months before the Mayaguez was seized, the strength of the U.S. Presidency had been dealt 
i 
a crippling blow when under public and congressional pressure, President Nixon had 
resigned. As a result, Vice President Ford assumed the Presidency without the benefit of a 
political mandate from the electorate. To make matters worse, Ford lost credibility on the 
domestic front when he immediately pardoned Nixon. Finally, the oil crisis was having 
drastic effects on the U.S. economy as well as the economies of the The apparent 
decline of the U.S. caused much doubt about the nation's ability to function as a world leader. 
The situation in Cambodia was also tenuous. After thirty years of fighting in 
Southeast Asia, the last ten resulting in victory over the U.S., the Communists had toppled 
the last non-Communist governments in Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam. The new 
communist government in Phnom Penh attempted to establish their nationalist credentials 
and legitimacy by pursuing several initiatives. This included mass executions of the 
members of the defeated regime.232 Partly due to this, the country remained in chaos with 
little visible sign of centralized control. 
In addition, the new leadership in Phnom Penh moved to extend their territorial 
waters to ninety miles from shore. The expanded limits included Paulo Wai, Koh Tang and 
other islands that Cambodia had historically claimed. More importantly, it included a major 
23 1 Head, p. 102. 
232 bid.,  p. 103. "It has been estimated that as many as six hundred thousand 
Cambodians were killed or died during the first months after the Lon No1 government fell;" 
this was almost one tenth of the countries population. 
trade route to Asian ports. The new Cambodian government planned to seize any foreign 
vessels that violated the new limits. Consequently, the Mayaguez attack was not an isolated 
incident. Several Thai fishing boats had been seized and released on 2 May;33 a South 
Korean ship was fired upon in an attempt to capture her on 4 May, several South Vietnamese 
small craft were seized and released on 6 May, and a Panamanian ship was seized on 7 May 
and held for 36 hours before she was released. On the same day the Mayaguez was captured, 
a Swedish ship had been fired on but out ran the Cambodian gunboats and a Thai freighter 
had been seized and held for two hours off Poulo Wai.234 
After the seizure, the United States made an attempt to settle the crisis through 
diplomatic channels. The administration, however, placed little hope in a nonmilitary 
solution.235 There were problems determining who to negotiate with because the new 
Cambodian government was not well established, it had few foreign missions, and the U.S. 
had no diplomatic relations with the new regime.236 In addition, the U.S. had no way of 
knowing whether the incident was the individual act of a local commander or a considered 
act by the new Cambodian government. Consequently, the United States passed demands 
through both the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China and the Cambodian 
Embassy on 13 May. The Chinese and Cambodian embassy officially refused to forward the 
demands to the Phnom Penh government, though there was little doubt that the message was 
233 Rowan, p. 50. A border dispute between Thailand and the Khmer Rouge, led 
to Thai fishing boat seizures. 
234 Head, p. 103. See also Rowan, pp. 67, 140 and Vandenbroucke, p. 85. 
23s Vandenbroucke, p. 77. 
236 bid.,  pp. 75-76, 86. 
re~eived.~" The United States also attempted to use United Nations channels to effect a 
release of the ship.238 
On 15 May, Phnom Penh finally responded with a radio broadcast that attacked the 
U.S. for intentionally violating their territorial waters in an attempt to provoke an incident 
and conduct espionage. They also assailed the U.S. for attacking Cambodian gunboats with 
U.S. attack aircraft within Cambodian territorial waters. The same message included 
Cambodia's intent to release the Mayaguez, though it stated the release was not a result of' 
U.S. threats. The broadcast actually began just minutes before the Marines began landing 
on Koh ~ a n g . ~ ~ '  
At the same time that the U.S. was seeking a diplomatic solution to the Mayaguez 
crisis, President Ford ordered the U.S. Military to prepare for a forceful rescue mission of the 
container ship and her crew. The ultimatum the U.S. presented to the Cambodian leaders 
conveyed to the world that the U.S. still took seriously any challenge to its interest. It also 
gave the American people a sense that the Administration was firmly in charge of the 
situation. Ironically, had the Cambodians desired to release the ship and crew, the ultimatum 
made it more difficult for them to do so without losing face.240 A military confrontation was 
almost inevitable. 
237 Head, p. 116. "President Ford directed that a strong diplomatic protest note 
be delivered to Cambodian authorities via the PRC." See also Rowan, p. 175. The Chinese 
had the note for a day before they returned it in an attempt to "preserve a degree of formal 
disassociation." It is also likely that the Chinese did not want to leave themselves open to 
Soviet criticism by serving as an "American lackey." See also Vandenbroucke, pp. 78-81. 
238 Vandenbroucke, p. 8 1. 
239 Rowan, pp. 203-204. See also, Vandenbroucke, p. 105. 
240 Vandenbroucke, p. 77. 
3. Military 
When the Mayaguez was captured there were few PACOM forces in the Gulf of 
Thailand. The Mayaguez was seized just two weeks after the completion of Operation 
FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of Saigon, and four weeks after Operation EAGLE 
PULL, the evacuation of Phnom Penh. The U.S. armada which had stood off the coast of 
Vietnam and Cambodia had been dispersed. US. warships were delivering evacuees to other 
locations and returning to their normal operating stations. There were only two U.S. Navy 
ships, the U.S.S. Harold E. Holt and the U.S.S. Henry B. Wilson, within twenty-four hours 
steaming time of the Mayaguez when it was seized."' 
Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Noel Gayler, commanded 
operations within the Pacific theater. Gayler assigned Commander, US. Support Activity 
Group17th Air Force (COMUSSAG/7AF), Lieutenant General John J. Burns, as 
Commander Task Force 79 (TF-79) and the on scene commander/central coordinating 
authority for the recovery operations.242 
Early on 13 May, CINCPAC directed the destroyer U.S.S. Holt, the guided missile 
destroyer, U.S.S. Wilson and the U.S.S. Coral Sea243 carrier task group to proceed to the 
24' Gazette, p. 25, 29. See also Rowan, p. 73-74. 
242 USCINCPAC, Command History, 1975, Appendix VI, "The SS Mayaguez 
Incident," (San Francisco, 1976), p. 5. "Air Force and Marine assets were placed under the 
operational control of, and Naval assets (minus the Marines) supported COMUSSAGl7AF." 
See also Gazette, pp. 25-26, Vandenbroucke, pp. 94-98, and Rowan, pp. 176-177. 
243 Rowan, p. 143. After President Ford gave the execution order, PACOM and 
CJCS requested a twenty-four hour delay of the operation. The delay to 16 May would have 
given the Coral Sea carrier battle group the opportunity to reach the area of operations (AO) 
and act as the forward staging base for the Marines. With the Marines and assault 
helicopters staged on the Coral Sea instead of at Utapao, the time between the first and 
second waves of Marines would have been reduced from over four hours to only minutes. 
Reportedly, this was denied because the Administration wanted to act before the Mayaguez 
crew could be moved to the mainland. The administration feared that if the crew was moved 
ashore, the U.S. would be subjected to months of negotiation, thus, vulnerable to another 
Pueblo type crisis. See also, Vandenbroucke, pp. 82,90-91, Lamb, pp. 122-123, and Head, 
p. 122. 
( 
waters off Kompong Som, Cambodia.244 In addition, 1,100 Marines of the Third Marine 
Division stationed on Okinawa and in the Philippines were flown to Utapao Air Base in 
Thailand.245 (Map 19) Finally, the 56th Special Operations Wing and heavy helicopters of 
7th AF were deployed to U t a p a ~ . ~ ~  Utapao was the closest U.S. base to the crisis 
Supporting roles were played by both carrier launched Naval and land based Air 
Force strike aircraft. In addition, Air Force slow moving propeller driven OV-10 Broncos 
and AC- 130 Spectre gunships were used to provide close air support and reconnaissance of 
the Mayaguez and Koh Tang. Navy P-3 Orion aircraft were tasked early in the operation to 
locate and collect intelligence on the Mayaguez and later to collect intelligence on Koh Tang. 
We found this justification suspect since the administration had already known that 
at least some of the prisoners had been moved to the mainland on 14 May. We surmise that 
the Administration actually wanted to punish Cambodia before the prisoners were released. 
Considering several other ships had been taken and released by the Cambodians in the past 
two weeks, it was likely that the Mayaguez and her crew would also be released. It is also 
possible that the ship was held longer than the other ships as a result of the U.S. threats to 
retaliate if the ship was not released within twenty-four hours. See Lamb, pp. 124-127. Had 
the Cambodians succumbed to the U.S. demands, they would have likely lost prestige in the 
Asian world. If the U.S. had attacked Cambodia after the crew had been released rather than 
while the prisoners were still being held, international criticism would have been more likely. 
241 Gazette, p. 25. 
245 Vandenbroucke, p. 94. Elements of the 3d Marine Amphibious Force (III 
MAF), Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/9 from Okinawa and a company from 1st Battalion 
in the Philippines, deployed to Utapao. See also, Rowan, p. 69. 
246 Gazette, p. 26. Helicopters were drawn from two squadrons: the 2 1 st Special 
Operations Squadron (CH-53s) and the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron 
(HH-53s). There were a total of fourteen CH/HH-53 helicopters deployed to Utapao, 
however, one crashed on the night of 13 May leaving only thirteen for the operation. Two 
were assigned Search and Rescue (SAR) responsibilities leaving only eleven for the Marine 
infiltrations. Three of the eleven were assigned to the Mayaguez recovery mission leaving 
eight available for the operation on Koh Tang. 
247 Lamb, p. 29. 
The SOF element that was not employed during the Mayaguez operation, was SEAL 
Team One's Delta Platoon. At the time of the incident, the platoon was deployed to Subic 
Bay in the phi lip pine^.^^^ 
The disposition of enemy forces was critically under estimated by U.S. intelligences 
sources. Contrary to the estimates disseminated to the Marines, Koh Tang was a well 
fortified island.249 Post operation estimates of the enemy troop strength range from 140-300 
well-armed and well entrenched Khmer communist troops. In addition, there were at least 
seven U.S. made gunboats operating in the vicinity of Koh Tang during the crisis. 
On the mainland, there were 2400 Khmer troops that, theoretically, could have 
responded to the incident with aircraft and gun boats from Kompong Som and Ream.2s0 
Because of the Khmer's ability to respond and increase the danger for the Marines, President 
Ford ordered the bombing of Kompong Som Harbor and Ream Airfield simultaneous with 
the retaking of the Mayaguez and the landing at Koh Tang. (Map 22) 
Prior to the operation, there had been three intelligence estimates of the enemy 
disposition on Koh  an^.^" The first, which was the only estimate the Marines have 
acknowledged receipt of, greatly underestimated the enemy strength at about 20-30 Khmer 
Rouge irregulars. This estimate initially came from a former Cambodian Naval Officer who 
had allegedly been on the island recently. It was supported by interviews with Cambodian 
refugees who had also allegedly been on the island.2s2 A second estimate, provided by 
Intelligence Pacific (IPAC) on 13 May, concluded there were ninety to a hundred soldiers, 
248 Orr Kelly, Brave Men Dark Water: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALS, 
(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), p. 175. See also, Bosiljevac, pp. 78-79. 
249 Head, p. 104. Fortification was probably a result of expected confrontations 
with Vietnam or Thailand over ownership of Koh Tang and other islands. 
250 Vandenbroucke, p. 84. 
2.5 1 Lamb, p. 129. 
252 Gazette, p. 27. See also, Vandenbroucke, p. 99. 
on Koh Tong. These soldiers were reportedly augmented with a heavy weapons squad of ten 
to fifteen soldiers armed with a 82-mm mortar, a 75-mm recoiIIess rifle, three machine guns 
and two rocket launchers. The most accurate estimate, which was furnished by Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) on 12 May, identified an enemy of 150 to 200 regular Khmer 
soldiers that were thought to possess several 82-rnm mortars, several 75-rnm recoilless rifles, 
numerous machine guns and numerous rocket launchers. Supposedly, the third estimate 
never reached the USSAG and neither the second or third estimates ever reached the Marine 
assault 
GPF intelligence assets undoubtedly included spy satellites and high flying 
sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft. These assets had photographic equipment that should 
have identified at least some of the Cainbodian fortifications on Koh Tang.254 It appears that 
either because of the time critical nature of the operation, kinks in the intelligence 
dissemination process, or poor interservice cooperation, the Marines were not provided with 
the essential intelligence that these assets should have provided. Instead, the Marines relied 
on photographs taken by the GFC with a hand held camera during a leaders reconnaissance 
over Koh Tang. In addition, the Air Force and Navy reconnaissance and attack aircraft as 
well as the AC-130 gunships continuously flew over the island talung photographs, drawing 
253 Lamb, pp. 129- 130. There were other failures inherent to this operation in 
addition to the error of omission that is the subject of this chapter. Had there been no 
dissemination problems, there would probably not have been as great a need for SOF to 
execute a reconnaissance of the target. In this chapter, we do not attempt to determine the 
source of the intelligence problem. Instead, our results are based on the fact that only aircraft 
and satellite reconnaissance were accomplished and the Marines did not get the intelligence 
they needed. Had a ground reconnaissance been accomplished, the Marines would have 
known the intelligence estimate that they received was inaccurate. See also Vandenbroucke, 
pp. 88-89,99- 100, and Head, p. 120. 
254 Vandenbroucke, p. 99- 100. 
enemy fire and identifying the sources of that enemy fire.255 Again, this information never 
reached the Marine planners. 
As already mentioned, LtCol Austin did conduct a leaders reconnaissance from an 
Army U-21 aircraft flying 6000 feet over Koh Tang. Unfortunately, the dense vegetation 
concealed the enemy strength 
C. OBJECTIVES 
1. Mission Objectives 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, has written, 'The purpose of the 
engagement of U.S. military forces was simply to extract our people from 
Cambodia--and to provide a lesson for the Cambodians and others.' 
Scowcroft was even blunter: 'Frankly, we argued the strikes on the mainland 
as militarily justified and theoretically, of course, we struck targets that could 
have aided them [the Cambodians] in the operation. In fact it was a 
demonstration--a punitive strike.'257 
Vandenbroucke wrote, "the air strikes against Cambodia had little to do with recovery 
of the It can be argued that these missions were designed to eliminate Cambodia's 
ability or will to respond while the operation on Koh Tang was in progress. However, it was 
more likely that the purpose of the bombing missions was to "convince the Cambodian 
Government of U.S. resolve and to serve as a potent warning to other would be 
aggressors. 1'259 
255 Ibid., pp. 79, 99. An AC-130, employing sophisticated scanning devices, 
located at least three gun emplacements on a key beach where Marines planned to land. 
256 Lamb, p. 134. See also, Vandenbroucke, p. 99. 
257 Vandenbroucke, p. 85. 
258 Ibid., p. 84. 
259. Ibid., p. 85. 
The Marine mission to "... seize, occupy, and defend the island of Koh Tang, hold the 
island indefinitely (for a minimum of forty-eight hours) and to rescue any of the crew 
members of the Mayaguez found on the island, simultaneously seize Mayaguez and remove 
the ship from its current location,"260 was undeniably concerned with the recovery of the 
Mayaguez and her crew. In addition, the rescue operation would send a clear message to 
U.S. allies and enemies alike, that the U.S. still had the ability and resolve to defend its vital 
interests. 
In summary, the objectives of the operations were to recover the Mayaguez and her 
crew, punish the Cambodians for attacking the U.S., demonstrate U.S. resolve and military 
strength, and deter future aggression by our enemies.261 
2. Reconnaissance Objectives 
The reconnaissance objectives were to locate and track the crew of the Mayaguez and 
collect information on the disposition of enemy forces. As already mentioned, it was simple 
good luck that the failure of the reconnaissance assets to provide intelligence in these two 
areas did not result in a disaster for the Marines. The GPF intelligence assets were not able 
to locate and keep track of the Mayaguez' This was critical because of the 
possibility of killing the Mayaguez crew with friendly fire during the assault on Koh Tang. 
Preparatory fires were not used because the commanders feared such action would jeopardize 
the Undeniably, knowing the location of the crew would have been valuable to the 
assaulters. However, in this case, knowing where the crew was not located might have been 
enough to help the mission succeed. For example, if the U.S. knew the Mayaguez crew was 
not located in the immediate vicinity of the HLZs, preparatory fires could have been used to 
soften the HLZs, thus making the insertion less opposed and less hazardous. 
260 Gazette, p. 27. 
26 1 Vandenbroucke, pp. 84-85, 1 12- 1 13, Head, p. 1 10 and Lamb, pp. 89- 101 
262 Lamb, pp. 137- 144. 
263 Vandenbroucke, p. 88. 
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The second and more immediately impacting shortfall was the inability of the GPF 
intelligence assets to provide the Marines with an accurate estimate of the enemy's strength 
on Koh Tang.264 The Marines sustained numerous casualties and actually made no 
significant advance. For the most part, Marines held in defensive positions until they were 
evacuated. Had the Mayaguez crew actually been on the island, the Marines' effort to 
advance and find them would have resulted in many more casualties if, in fact, the Marines 
could have rescued the crew. Undoubtedly, the U.S. could have eventually moved enough 
Marines ashore to secure the island but it could have been at the cost of the crew's lives. As 
Lucien Vandenbroucke explained, in a rescue mission, the force must attack and neutralize 
the enemy very quickly so they do not have the opportunity to take reprisals against the 
prisoners.265 
Had a SEAL platoon been inserted to conduct a reconnaissance mission on Koh 
Tang prior to the Marine assault, their primary objective would have been to determine the 
disposition of the enemy force ashore. This would have included enemy strength and 
positions, particularly in the areas of the HLZs. Secondarily, if the SEALS could not 
determine the location of the crew, they could have at least determine where the crew was 
not located. This could have allowed for preparatory fires against the enemy. In addition, 
the SEAL platoon could have identified a large area for employment of the 15,000 pound 
BLU-82 bomb for the purpose of making an alternative HLZ.266 This option was not used 
for the infiltration because it posed a threat to the crew whose location was unknown. 
264 Lamb, pp. 129-137. 
26s Vandenbroucke, pp. 86-87. 
266 Lamb, pp. 27-28,97. The BLU-82 is the largest conventional bomb in the 
U.S. inventory. Delivered from a C- 130, it can be used to clear vegetation to create HLZs 
in jungle environments. Its use during the assault on Koh Tang was rejected because the 
location of the Mayaguez crew was unknown and the planners did not want to jeopardize 
their safety. One BLU-82 was dropped on Koh Tang to deter the enemy attack against the 
Marines during the evacuation but it was not used until after the Mavaguez crew had been 
recovered. See also, Gazette, p. 28. 
D. ALTERNATIVES 
There were numerous GPF assets available to conduct intelligence gathering 
operations against the enemy forces on Koh Tang. Both the Air Force and Navy had 
sophisticated fast and slow moving aircraft with high technology photographic equipment 
that were capable of taking detailed overhead photograph of the target.267 In addition, both 
the Navy's P-3 Orion and the Air Force's AC-130 gunship had night vision capability and 
extended loiter time. Finally, tactical fighter and attack aircraft continually flew over the 
island at high speeds attracting anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) from the enemy ground forces. 
The knowledge and location of AAA in itself was valuable intelligence since the Marines 
were infiltrating by helicopter. It appears as though even this information did not reach the 
Marines. All of these assets were used, however, as already mentioned, they did not provide 
the Marines with an accurate assessment of enemy disposition on Koh Tang. 
The single asset that could have provided an accurate assessment was the SOF 
element, Delta Platoon of SEAL Team One, that was staged and ready at Subic Bay. 
Execution of such a mission was consistent with SEAL standard operation procedures and 
doctrine.268 Up to forty-eight hours in advance of the Marine assault force, part or all of the 
fourteen-man SEAL platoon and their CRRCs could have been inserted into the area of Koh 
Tang island by boat, ship, submarine, helicopter or fixed wing aircraft. After approaching 
within 2000 yards of the island, the remainder of the distance could have been negotiated by 
swimmers. The SEALS would have first conducted reconnaissance of the designated HLZs 
and their surrounding area to determine if they were suitable for the Marine insertion. If they 
were not suitable, they would have designated other HLZs possibly for the use of the BLU- 
82. 
267 Ibid., p. 143. Strategic assets that should have been available for the mission, 
though none of the literature specifically identifies them, were the SR-7 1 and U-2 spy planes 
and spy satellites. In addition, tactical reconnaissance assets such as the RF-4 were available. 
Nadel, p. 129. 
It was unlikely that the SEALs could have located the prisoners without 
compromising the mission but it was highly likely that they could have determine the 
prisoners were not being held in the area of the designated HLZs. As a result preparatory 
Naval Gunfire Support or close air support could have been utilized. 
After the intelligence had been collected, the SEALs could have exfiltrated using one 
of the many possible techniques already discussed for insertion and provided the Marines 
with the valuable target intelligence. If time had been too critical to allow for extraction, the 
SEALs would have sent the intelligence out using encrypted radios and waited for the 
Marines to come ashore before they exfiltrated. This last option would have provided the 
Marines with up-to-date, real time intelligence. In addition, it would have provided guidance 
for the inbound helicopters and additional fire power on the H L Z S . ~ ~ ~  
1. Probability of SOF and GPF 
Appendix F contains the completed probability worksheet for SOF and GPF. Each 
variable was given values for each of the three mission phases for the GPF but only for the 
first two phases of the mission for SOF. Though the SEALs could have, theoretically, been 
extracted, we selected the option in which the SEALs radioed the intelligence back to the 
planners and remained ashore until the Marines assaulted the island. We assumed that based 
on mission constraints the SEALs would not have had enough time to infiltrate, execute the 
actions at the objective and then exfiltrate to Utapao with the intelligence. Remaining ashore 
would have provided the Marines more planning time with the initial intelligence and 
continuous intelligence updates. 
The GPF (reconnaissance aircraft of various types) values were high for all variables 
in both the infiltration and exfiltration phase of the operations. This was primarily based on 
the routine nature of the mission and the aircraft's invulnerability to enemy capabilities. In 
the actions at the objective phase, GPF dropped slightly in several categories but remained 
269 The SEALs could have preset demolitions to detonate just prior to the arrival 
of the helicopter to disrupt or eliminate close enemy resistance or to provide a diversion. In 
addition, they could have marked the HLZs with smoke or flares. 
high overall. The readiness value was down slightly because the sophisticated equipment 
required to execute the mission demanded a great deal of maintenance to keep it functioning 
properly. The enemy weapons OOB value was down slightly because there was a minute 
possibility that reconnaissance aircraft could have been hit by small arms fire or AAA. 
Mission dificulty, the category where GPF received their lowest value, was down based on 
the GPF's inability to identify enemy positions through the thick vegetation on Koh Tang. 
Finally, the speed value was lower than most of the others because some of the aircraft had 
limited loiter time on target. In addition, high speeds of many of the aircraft made it difficult 
to observe the target for any extended period of time unless the aircraft was at a high altitude. 
Speed, as described in Chapter I, was generally assumed to be beneficial because it referred 
to how fast the mission could be accomplished when minimum time on target was 
advantageous. In the case of reconnaissance, remaining on target for extended periods of 
time may be a mission requirement. Consequently, speed, restricted by loiter time, would 
have been detrimental. For this mission, the ability to loiter outweighed the need to get off 
the target, at least for the aircraft since they were relatively safe from any enemy action. 
The values for SOF were not nearly as high as the values for GPF. For the most part, 
this can be attributed to the higher risks that the SEALs would have been exposed to. Any 
confrontation with the enemy, whether at sea confronted by gunboats or ashore confronted 
by security patrols, could have been disastrous for the SEALs. This was dependent on the 
force ratios which was in favor of the enemy on the ground. Consequently, the SEALs'Jire 
power; enemy OOB; communications, electronic OOB; enemy weapons OOB; and surprise 
were all relatively low compared to other categories and to the values the GPF received. 
Surprise in a reconnaissance operations refers to not being compromised while on the 
mission. Surprise, or better stated, remaining undetected was essential to the SEAL platoon 
so its value was down slightly. 
Speed was a variable that worked against the SEALs in this scenario since they would 
have been required to remain on target to collect intelligence for a long period of time. 
Unlike the aircraft that were subject to only a minimal amount of danger, the SEALs would 
have been in considerable danger for the entire time they were ashore. 
Mission security could have played an important role in the decision not to use SOF. 
Reconnaissance missions have been disapproved because the operational commander thought 
the need for intelligence was not as great as the need for security or protecting the primary 
mission from compromise. In the Mayaguez case, we do not believe that security was a 
limiting variable because Koh Tang was continuously surrounded and overflown by U.S. 
aircraft and Cambodian gunboats were regularly being attacked. The Khmer Rouge on the 
island must have already expected an attack. Their suspicions may have been the initiative 
to send the Mayaguez crew to the mainland in view of U.S. aircraft and the subsequent 
release of the crew a day later. 
On the other hand, reconnaissance was a routine mission for the SEALs. 
Consequently, the SEALs secured high values in mission skill, mission proficiency, and 
corresponding doctrine. 
Reconnaissance missions are not generally considered difficult when the mission 
parameters allow the reconnaissance element to remain stationary to observe a target. 
However, in the Mayaguez case, the SEAL element would have been tasked to locate the 
forty crew members so, the value for mission dzficulty would have been high. The more the 
reconnaissance element had to move around, the more likely it was that they would have 
been compromised, thus the more difficult the mission became. 
Appendix F shows our decision tree with probabilities assigned to each phase of the 
mission based on the above values. Next we will discuss the political and military values 
and cost that will be applied to the decision tree to determine the expected values and 
expected costs for both SOF and GPF. 
2. Political Value 
Prior to U.S. military actions to recover the Mayaguez and her crew, the political 
value of the entire operation was assumed to be extremely high by U.S. leaders. Considering 
the recent fall of friendly governments in Saigon and Phnom Penh to communist 
insurgencies, and North Korea's belligerence toward the U.S. and South Korea, the Ford 
Administration had to act decisively in order to maintain some semblance of power in the 
international community as well as at home. The Administration feared inaction would lead 
to another Pueblo incident that would require extended negotiations and leave the U.S. 
resembling a "helpless giant." 270 
It is relatively easy to measure the political value of the overall Mayaguez operation, 
however, it is difficult to measure the political value of a ground reconnaissance operation 
that was never executed. Considering the reconnaissance was not executed, little value was 
given to the option by U.S. leaders at the time. It is unlikely that the planners did not 
consider sending a reconnaissance team ashore since the tactic was standard operating 
procedure for amphibious assaults. Probably, the SEAL mission was decided against 
because of time constraints or undeserved confidence in the intelligence already available to 
the planers. In retrospect, if the Mayaguez crew had been on the island, the mission that the 
Marines executed may not have resulted in their rescue. Instead, it is likely that it would 
have resulted in the recovery of their bodies and additional casualties for the rescue force. 
The political value of a failed rescue mission relative to a successful mission would be very 
low. On the other hand, if the rescue mission had been successful because the ground 
reconnaissance was successful, the reconnaissance would share the same high political value 
that the rescue mission achieved.. 
We applied the political value of the rescue mission to the ground reconnaissance. 
Had a ground reconnaissance been executed, the Marines would have known the intelligence 
estimates that they had used to plan their mission were wrong. They could have made 
270 Vandenbroucke, pp. 74-84, 1 12, Lamb, pp. 30-3 1, 157-1 66, and Head pp. 
144-148. 
adjustments in their plan to ensure a quick victory on the island.271 A quick victory, 
demonstrating leadership, resolve, and potency would bring about the highest possible 
political value. 
International political value for the overall mission was high. The mission 
demonstrated U.S. resolve and capability to secure its vital interest. This was particularly 
important in Asia, an area of the world where U.S. prestige and influence had plummeted. 
Decisive action and success would have established the President as a strong leader, and send 
a clear message to U.S. allies and enemies alike. Even failure to rescue the Mayaguez crew 
would have had some international political value since it would have demonstrated to our 
enemies that they would be punished for taking action against U.S. assets. 
The same can be said of domestic political value. Success would have assured the 
President's leadership ability for the American people. In addition, it would have 
demonstrated his resolve to protect U.S. interest and U.S. citizens. This was particularly 
important for President Ford since the position of U.S.'president had been tainted by his 
predecessor, Richard Nixon. The American people had lost faith in the Presidency and 
decisive action and success in the face of a crisis was one way to get it back. Failure, on the 
other hand would result in little domestic political value and might confirm the public's lack 
of faith in the Presidency. 
The political value of the over all operation can also be applied to the GPF 
reconnaissance missions because they provided intelligence that had some impact on the 
success of the overall operation. They were unable to provide accurate intelligence on the 
disposition of enemy forces on Koh Tang or the location of the crew of the Mayaguez, but 
they did provide essential information on the location of the Mayaguez and the mainland 
"' TO strengthen their plan, the Marines could have delayed the mission a day 
so the operation could have been launched from the Coral Sea affording only minutes 
between the waves of assaulters vice hours; they could have used preparatory fires to soften 
the beach; they could have secured alternate landing zones; and they could have begun the 
assault with a larger force using all available helicopters for the insertion instead of wasting 
three to transport Marines to the Holt for the recovery of the Mayaguez. 
targets that were bombed. The political values were lower than those achieved by SOF 
because the GPF contribution to the success of the rescue mission was less than what could 
have been expected from a SOF option. 
3. Military Value 
The military value of a ground reconnaissance was either considered to be minimal 
or the mission was considered to be infeasible because of time constraints or the fear of 
mission compromise. It is hard to imagine that the Marine planners would even consider not 
using SEALS to perform reconnaissance ashore since it was standard amphibious assault 
doctrine. In retrospect, the military value of the ground reconnaissance was extremely high, 
even critical to mission success. As already mentioned, had the Mayaguez crew been ashore 
on Koh Tang, the plan that was executed could have jeopardized their lives as well as the 
lives of many more Marines. The SOF values for both mission efiectiveness and target value 
would have been high. A ground reconnaissance would drastically increase the Marines' 
mission efectiveness. In addition, since the Mayaguez crisis was at the center of world 
attention and the rescue of the crew members was the stated top priority mission, the target 
value was also high. 
The GPF's target value would not have been as high as the values assigned for SOF. 
Although they provided essential elements of information for the mainland targets, their 
support of the primary target was less than adequate. Mission efectiveness value for 
collection of intelligence on the disposition of enemy forces on Koh Tang and the location 
of the Mayaguez crew would have been much lower than the value assigned to SOF. 
4. Political Cost 
The political cost of success would have been low both internationally and 
domestically. There was the possibility that the U.S. would have been criticized for attacking 
military facilities at Kompong Som since it was unlikely that Cambodia could have 
responded effectively with reinforcements from the mainland even if the U.S. had not 
attacked the bases. If the U.S. had not bombed the targets, the U.S. Military had the assets 
to intercept any reinforcements the Cambodians might have launched toward Koh  an^.^^^ 
In addition, some international political cost occurred as a result of the U.S. using the base 
in Utapao to launch the rescue mission. Publicly the Thai government denounced the use of 
their soil to launch the mission. This was actually a move to save face in the Asian 
community because privately Thailand approved of the operation.273 
The political cost of failure could have been high both domestically and 
internationally. Although the U.S. would have demonstrated resolve it would have also 
demonstrated impotency and would have lost prestige. 
The political cost of using GPF would be similar to the political cost for SOF because 
both missions would have contributed to success of the overall operation. The international 
political cost of using GPF could have been slightly higher than using SOF because their 
mission could have carried them into airspace claimed by third party nations (ie. Thailand 
or Vietnam) and lead to official protest. 
5. MiIitary Cost 
Military opportunity costs for SOF would have been negligible. The platoon that 
was deployed to Subic Bay was there to support contingency operations in the Pacific theater. 
There were no other contingencies elsewhere in the theater so the SEALS were readily 
available. The casualties costs for SOF would likely have been low considering a successful 
mission. In addition, since their mission would have likely reduced the casualties suffered 
by the Marines and Air Force crews and helicopters, the casualty costs would have been 
considered extremely 
272 Vandenbroucke, pp. 84-65. 
273 Head, p. 146. 
274 Lamb, pp. 30-32. Although the cost of casualties was significant on Koh 
Tang, they were only as low as they were because of luck and a courageous performance by 
the assault force. Casualties could have been much higher. The use of SOF could have 
corrected the inaccurate estimation of enemy forces and eliminated or reduced the casualties. 
As with SOF, opportunity costs were low for GPF since this was the only crisis at the 
time. It is, however, likely that some strategic intelligence assets were used and, 
consequently, they were not available to execute their regular missions of spying on the 
Soviets and Chinese. As a result, minimal opportunity costs existed. Casualties cost were 
fairly low for GPF because there was little chance that the reconnaissance aircraft could have 
been shot down by the C a m b ~ d i a n s . ~ ~ ~  Since the GPF were unable to provide the essential 
intelligence that the Marines needed on Koh Tang, GPF casualty costs cannot be related to 
reduced assault force casualties as was the case with the SEALS. 
The political and military costs and values are shown in Appendix F. Next we 
discuss the application of the cost and values to our decision tree to determine the expected 
values and expected costs of both SOF and GPF. 
E. ANALYSIS 
Expected Costs for both SOF and GPF were low compared to the expected values so 
both SOF and GPF had absolute advantage for the target. The Probability Worksheet values 
were significantly higher for GPF than they were for SOF and the expected costs of SOF 
were significantly higher than the expected costs of GPF. However, the great difference in 
mission efiectiveness of SOF over GPF resulted in SOF having a significantly higher 
expected value than GPF. As a result, SOF had the comparative advantage between SOF 
and GPF. Since GPF were used and SOF were not used, this demonstrates a simple error 
of omission. 
In this case, GPF and SOF were not in competition for the same mission. Whether 
SOF were employed or not employed, the GPF would have executed their reconnaissance 
missions. Since it was not a matter of using SOF instead of GPF, rather using SOF in 
addition to GPF, the comparison should actually have been the value of the GPF plus the 
275 If, by chance, an SR-71 Blackbird or other expensive high technology 
intelligence gathering aircraft was lost during the operation, the casualty costs for the aircraft 
would have been high in dollar value. More importantly, the casualty costs would have been 
high because of the loss of a limited strategic asset. 
value of SOF versus the value of GPF alone. With this in mind, even if SOF did not have 
the comparative advantage over GPF, as long as it did have absolute advantage, the SOF 
option could have been executed without violating our theory. 
The use of both SOF and GPF assets in reconnaissance missions may not always be 
advantageous. If the GPF had been a squad of Marines sent in to reconnoiter the island, their 
mission would have provided the same intelligence that the SOF mission would provide. In 
a case such as this, SOF would compare directly to GPF since either one or the other would 
have been used. 
In summary, Appendix F provides a completed decision tree for the use of SOF 
versus the use of GPF to conduct reconnaissance missions. Using Equations (7), (8), (lo), 
and (1 1); the values and costs discussed above; and the probabilities discussed above, the 
resulting expected values and expected costs from the decision tree are as follows: 
In the Mayaguez case study, SOF had an absolute advantage and a comparative advantage 
even without adding the absolute advantage of GPF to that of SOF but were not used. This 
demonstrates a simple error of omission. 
V. OPERATION URGENT FURY. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In October 1983 President Ronald Reagan ordered the commencement of Operation 
URGENT FURY, the U.S. invasion of the eastern Caribbean island nation of Grenada. (Map 
23) The Operation began on 25 October 1983 and hostilities ended on 2 November 1983. 
President Reagan and military leaders characterized the operation similarly. The recently 
declassified "Operation URGENT FURY Lessons Learned Executive Summary" summed 
this characterization by both the administration and military leadership when it stated: 
URGENT FURY, a joint combat operation conducted in the eastern 
Caribbean island of Grenada, was accomplished in a most successful 
manner ... Peacekeeping operations are continuing. The outcome of this 
military mission reaffirmed the outstanding professionalism, dedication and 
flexibility of all the forces involved in this effort.276 
The island had been divided into two sectors, the northern sector was the responsibility of 
the U. S. Marines and the southern sector was the responsibility of SOF. (Map 24) Both 
sectors were under control in relatively short order, and on the surface the operation seemed 
a resounding success for the United States. As some of the harshest critics even admit, 
"(w)hatever else the invasion of Grenada was, it was a political success."277 Militarily, 
however, the operation was criticized for several reasons, the'most important, for our 
276 USCINCLANT, Post Operation Report, "Operation URGENT FURY Lessons 
Learned Executive Summary," (Norfolk, VA: 1983), p. 1. 
277 Gabriel, "Scenes From an Invasion: How the U.S. Military Stumbled into 
Victory in Grenada" in The, February 1986, p. 41. Numerous critics 
offered various critiques of the military operations in Grenada, most notably the above 
mentioned author, and: Benjamin F. Schemmer, "JCS Reply to Congressional Reform 
Caucus' Critique of the Grenada Rescue Operation" in , 
July 1984, pp. 13-1 8 and 99; and, Edward N. Luttwak, The Pentagon and the Art of War, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). All found fault with the military operations but 
recognized the political value of the operation. 
purposes being, intelligence. Every decision maker, participant, and critic agreed that the 
intelligence was virtually non-existent and the lack of good intelligence severely hindered 
the operation. We believe that this represents a complex error of omission. SOF had both 
an absolute and a comparative advantage if used to conduct an SR mission and could have 
significantly changed the intelligence picture, but were not used. 
Since this argument is essentially counterfactual, we will develop a counterfactual 
scenario based on our theory to demonstrate how the expected value of using SOF to conduct 
SR missions prior to URGENT FURY might have outweighed the expected cost. We 
examine this phenomenon in detail below. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Grenada 
Since being "discovered" by Columbus in 1498 Grenada was subsequently colonized 
by the French and then became subject to British sovereignty pursuant to the Treaty of Paris 
in 1763.278 During the 1950s and 1960s, the people of Grenada began a movement toward 
independence, led for the most part by Eric Gairy. In 1967, by virtue of a conference held 
in Oxford in the summer of 1965, Grenada was given "statehood in association with the 
mother country."279 The quest for independence continued, complete with political unrest 
and civil disturbances, until 7 February 1974, when Grenada became an independent state 
within the Commonwealth. Gairy became Prime Minister, and "[slome measure of internal 
stability was subsequently imposed by [his] increasingly repressive, though pro-western, 
government."280 Opposition to Gairy involved different groups and underwent various 
permutations throughout this period. The most prominent group was the New Jewel 
27"iliam C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation, 
(New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1984), p. 11.  
279 Ibid., p. 17. 
280 Ibid., p. 19. 
Movement (NJM). Founded in 1973, the group reacted to changing circumstances 
pragmatically, rather than out of some Marxist-Leninist determinism as some have stated, 
and participated in the bloodless coup d'etat of 13 March 1979.~~ '  Maurice Bishop became 
the Prime Minister of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) and Hudson Austin - 
assumed command of the small People's Revolutionary Army (PRA).*~' 
Bishop was a popular and charismatic leader, who between 1979 and 1983 had 
accomplished two major achievements. He had tried to "break away" from the western world 
economically and politi~aIly,2~~ and he showed that a Caribbean revolutionary government 
could mobilize it's people for national reconstr~ction.~~~ By all outward appearances, 
Bishop's position was secure in October 1983 when he took a week long tour of Eastern 
Europe, followed by two days of talks with Cuban officials on the way home.285 
Dissatisfaction with his repressive leadership, however, resulted in his house arrest on 13 
October 1983 by members of the Central Committee of the NJM. Several other Cabinet 
Ministers were also arrested, enraging the Grenadians who supported Bishop's government. 
After almost a week of mild protests, Bishop was rescued by a crowd of Grenadians on 19 
October 1983. The crowd, after rescuing Bishop, turned toward the capital, seemingly with 
the intent of freeing other detained Cabinet Ministers. PRA troops intervened and fired into 
the crowd, causing a significant number of civilian casualties. The armed forces immediately 
re-arrested Bishop and the other Ministers, and executed them. The Revolutionary Military 
Council (RMC) was formed, headed by General Hudson Austin, and a "round-the-clock, 
28' Gordon K. Lewis, Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled, (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 15. 
282 Gilmore, p. 20. 
283 Lewis, p. 32. He points out that this was not a Grenadian initiative, but a 
Cuban idea proposed after decades of relations that continued to grow closer. 
284 Ibid., p. 33. 
285 Gilmore, p. 30. 
shoot-on-sight 96 hour curfew [was] imposed."286 Political outrage and international 
condemnation followed swiftly. 
2. Political 
Following the NJM seizure of power in 1979, U.S. Ambassador Frank Ortiz wrote 
to Bishop that the United States "would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of 
Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba." Bishop responded that: "No country has the right 
to tell us what to do or how to run our country, or who to be friendly with. We are not in 
anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale." From this point on, relations 
between the United States and Grenada deteriorated rapidly.287 The Carter administration 
decided to treat Bishop with "hands-off hostility," and President Reagan intensified the 
antagonism upon taking office, rather than change the basic U.S. 
Poor relations stagnated or worsened for the four years between 1979 and 1983. 
Grenada had sought assistance from Eastern Bloc countries and received it. The U.S. 
government either turned a blind eye to Grenada or took steps to hinder her progress. The 
crisis of 1983 came about in an environment of ill-will, inauspicious political ties, and 
economic punishment of the Bishop regime. In President Reagan's "National Security 
Address to the Nation" on 23 March 1983, he revealed an aerial reconnaissance photograph 
of a runway being constructed at Point Salines. As he explained: 
On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, 
the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing, are in the process of building 
an airfield with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air 
force. Who is it intended for? 
The Caribbean is a very important passageway for our international 
commerce and military lines of communication. More than half of all 
286 Ibid., p. 32. 
287 Robert J. Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics. Law. and Foreign Policy 
Decisionmakinz, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 25-26. 
288 Ibid., p. 26. 
American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The rapid buildup of 
Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this 
country of under 110,000 people and totally at odds with the pattern of other 
eastern Caribbean states, most of which are unarmed. 
The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short, can only be seen as 
power projection into the region.289 
The events of October served to intensify the anxiety of the Reagan administration and drive 
the President toward an invasion. 
On Thursday, 13 October 1983, high-level discussions about Grenada began to be 
held. The various groups that began debate on Grenada included the Restricted Interagency 
Group (RIG) chaired by the State Department, and the National Security Council (NSC) 
Staff. Prior to Bishop's house arrest, the division in Grenadian politics was already being 
discussed.2* By Monday, 17 October 1983, American planning took "place in an interagency 
forum with representatives of all relevant agencies participating on a daily basis."29' The 
murder of Bishop on Wednesday, 19 October 1983, brought about the beginning of "serious 
planning" for a "nonperrnissive evacuation" of American citizens.292 Accurate intelligence 
on the situation was unavailable at this time for at least three reasons: the curfew imposed 
by the RMC; the absence of a U.S. diplomatic presence; and Britain's loss of contact with its 
diplomats.293 The first day that the possibility of an American invasion of Grenada was 
considered at a cabinet-level meeting of the "Special Situations Group" (SSG) was Thursday, 
20 October 1983. Secretary Weinberger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Vessey, observed that a surgical strike to remove the Americans would be extremely 
289 Ibid., p. 30. 
290 Ibid., pp. 91-95. Beck provides an excellent blow-by-blow account of the 
high-level deliberations regarding Grenada prior to the invasion. 
29' Ibid., p. 97. 
292 Ibid., p. 100. 
293 Ibid., p. 103. 
difficult without securing the entire island and they began to seek improved intelligence and 
more time to plan the inva~ion.~" Vice President Bush chaired the meeting and immediately 
determined that steps must be taken to improve intelligence.295 The Crisis Preplanning 
Group (CPPG) also convened during this time, as both State and Defense agreed that 
planning a military operation was necessary.296 On Friday, 21 October 1983, President 
Reagan departed Washington for a golf week-end at Augusta, Georgia. It was felt that any 
changes to the President's itinerary would invite intense and undesirable speculation. Early 
on Saturday, 22 October 1983, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 
formally invited the United States to invade Grenada. By early Saturday morning, the stage 
was set for Operation URGENT FURY .297 
The SSG met Saturday morning and again Weinberger and Vessey stated that the 
invading forces needed to know "more about the weapons the Grenadian military possessed, 
their willingness to fight, and the willingness of ~ u b a n s . " ~ ~ ~  Additionally, Weinberger 
recommended "the use of Navy SEALS for pre-landing reconnaissance of the island."299 By 
1130 the meeting was adjourned with a consensus among the key decision makers. The 
United States would attack Grenada. The tenets of the mission statement were ironed out, 
and the military planners were instructed to proceed on the basis of a "go ~rder . ' '~"  
Beginning on Saturday afternoon, "SR-71 and U-2 spy planes made repeated passes over 
294 Ibid., p. 106. 
295 Ibid., p. 107. 
296 Ibid.,pp.104-105. 
297 Ibid., pp. 1 13-1 15. 
298 Reynold A. Bunowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada: An Account of the 
U.S.-Caribbean Invasion, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 78. 
299 Beck, p. 133. 
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Grenada while Grenadian radio transmissions were monitored.""' Additionally, the National 
Security Agency began to reposition reconnaissance satellites to provide imagery of the 
island. Other planning groups also continued to intensify their preparations for the coming 
invasion. 
Any doubts that the invasion of Grenada would receive a "go order," were quickly 
erased by a tragic event in the Middle East. Early on Sunday, 23 October 1983, the U.S. 
Marine headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon was bombed, causing extensive U.S. Marine 
casualties. President Reagan returned to Washington and began considering the events in 
Beirut and then Grenada.302 By late in the evening, several hours prior to receiving the 
written request from the OECS for military assistance, President Reagan signed the order 
authorizing "the Grenada operation to take place no later than dawn, October 25."30" 
Monday, 24 October 1983 was a day dominated by invasion preparation, not policy 
deliberation. 
3. Military 
On Monday, 24 October 1983, military plans began to be finalized. Admiral Wesley 
McDonald, USCINCLANT, convened a meeting at his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. 
The Grenada operation was described as a "coup de main" or "one-punch knockout" and the 
commanders were assured that there was no cause for worry. "(0)nce the PRA recognized 
that American troops were involved in the operation, they would promptly surrender; the 
Grenadian antiaircraft gunners were poorly trained and did not represent a threat; and the 
Cuban workers would not fight."304 A Navy SEAL unit had failed to successfully insert on 
Sunday night to recon the airfield at Point Salines and Major General Richard A. Scholtes, 
the SOF commander, "advocated a twenty-four hour postponement of the invasion to 
302 bid., pp. 146-147. 
303 Ibid., p. 150. 
'04 Ibid., p. 159. 
improve intel l igen~e."~~~ After some heated discussions, McDonald was convinced that the 
operation should proceed on 25 October, although he did shift "H-hour" from 0200 to 0400 
to permit further reconnaissance  effort^.^^ 
The short planning cycle and the expansion of the mission from one of naval 
presence1 show of force and possible non-combatant evacuation operation, to a full-scale 
invasion, increased the need for intelligence. The mission statement from the JCS, directed 
USCINCLANT to: 
conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated 
foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces, stabilize the 
internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with 
OECSIfriendly government participants, assist in restoration of a democratic 
government on Grenada.307 
The concept of operations called for an amphibious assault at Pearls Airfield in the northern 
sector by the U.S. Marines while the U.S. Army Rangers and other SOF were assigned Point 
Salines Airfield and other specific targets in the St. Georges area of the southern sector. The 
82nd Airborne Division was the designated reserve force tasked to relieve the southern sector 
on order. The Rangers and SOF encountered much stronger resistance from Cuban and 
Grenadian forces in the southern sector than anticipated. Elements of the Marine forces were 
withdrawn from the north and re-inserted near St. Georges to provide assistance to elements 
in that area.308 Every operation conducted during URGENT FURY would have benefited 
greatly from intelligence, yet only one unit from SOF was tasked with conducting a pre- 
305 Ibid., p. 159. 
306 Other sources also cite the belief that the USMC helicopter pilots could not 
fly at night as another reason for shifting H-hour. The effort to insert the same SEAL platoon 
on Monday night was another failure and the only attempt to get SOF eyes on the ground 
with enough time to make useful intelligence reports before the invasion. 
307 USCINCLANT, p. 1. 
308 Ibid., p. 2. 
invasion SR mission.309 Actual operations are less of a concern to us than the SR missions 
that were not conducted and will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
Under the sub-heading of "Reconnaissance," the USCINCLANT Lessons Learned 
stated, in part, "URGENT FURY operations highlighted the need to increase our capabilities 
and assets in this area."310 Although it is unlikely that several SR missions conducted by 
SOF would have yielded all of the answers to planners' questions, a vast majority of the 
questions could have been addressed in some fashion. As Mark Adkins points out: 
To ensure surprise, the planners had one need above all others: information. 
They needed intelligence on the Cuban presence on the island, the Cubans' 
and Soviets' likely reactions to attack, the PRA strengths, armaments, 
deployment, intentions, and morale. They needed to know what defenses had 
been set up at the airfields and where the PRA headquarters, communication 
centers, supply depots, and antiaircraft positions were. Because a main 
objective of the operation was the safety of foreign citizens, they needed to 
know where such persons were living, whether they were guarded, whether 
they were at one location or several, and how many were at each. They 
needed information on the geography of Grenada: the suitability of beaches 
for landing, the type of terrain, the road system, the hills, the layout of St. 
George's, and the details of approaches to selected targets. These were all 
critical for tactical planning.311 
309 Another SEAL platoon attached to the ARG did conduct a hasty pre-invasion 
reconnaissance of the beach and airfield aria around Pearls Airfield in the northern sector 
and provided the information that led to the cancellation of amphibious operations and the 
subsequent Marine helo assault on Pearls Airfield. This practice is a standard operating 
principle of amphibious operations and does not usually lead to the type of reconnaissance 
needed by the forces assaulting the entire island via different means. 
310 USCINCLANT, p. 4. 
31 1 Major Mark Adkins, URGENT FURY: The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 128. 
SR-71fs, U-2's, and satellites could not provide this type of information, especially in the 
mountainous jungle terrain of Grenada. The objective of SOF should have been to gather 
as much of this information as possible and pass it on to follow-on forces prior to their 
arrival in Grenada.312 To achieve this objective, McDonald and Vice Admiral Joseph 
Metcalf III, the Joint Task Force Commander, had the alternative of tasking and inserting 
more SOF to conduct SR missions on the specific target areas and points of interest, in 
addition to using aircraft and satellite intelligence gathering methods. The various factors 
affecting the probability of success of each phase of the mission and different political and 
military value and cost associated with each branch of our decision tree are discussed below. 
D. ALTERNATIVES 
The environment and the timing of the invasion limited decision makers to forces that 
would be able to insert from the air or sea onto the island of Grenada. Insertion from the air, 
however, was severely limited by the geography and topography of Grenada, the enemy 
OOB, and intelligence on prospective drop zones. For simplicity we will build our 
counterfactual scenario around a successful insertion of SEALs conducted in roughly the 
same manner as the failed attempt. Appendix G provides the completed graphical 
representation, in the form of a probability worksheet and a completed decision tree, of the 
factors and variables discussed below. 
1. Probability of SOF and GPF 
Appendix G contains the completed probability worksheet for SOF and GPF. Each 
variable is coded for each phase. We are assuming that the SR mission would continue until 
friendly forces attacked the Grenadian and Cuban forces and extraction would be affected 
after friendly forces had been established on the island. This assumption is not applicable 
to GPF forces conducting reconnaissance as they are only able to provide reconnaissance 
312 The two failures of the SEAL to insert could be used to argue against 
this point, however, the loss of one Boston Whaler and four SEALs in one water-parachute 
operation is extremely unlikely and does not provide a basis for predicting the probability of 
success of future operations of this type. In spite of this, we do recognize the argument. 
capabilities for limited amounts of time. GPF had a distinct advantage during all three 
phases in conducting what is generally considered a routine mission for them. Although the 
worksheet indicates a probability of almost 1.0 for GPF across the phases, we have assumed 
that nothing can have a probability of 1.0 in military conflicts and therefore give the GPF a 
probability of 95% for both the insertion and extraction phases. The actions at the objective 
phase required the GPF to rely heavily on technological devices while operating in their most 
vulnerable state and therefore give the GPF a probability of 90% for completing the actions 
at the objective phase. 
Availability, mission diflculty, and the orders of battle are the limiting factors for the 
probability of a successful insertion phase for SOF. We have determined that SOF had an 
85% probability of completing the insertion phase, assuming that availability did not provide 
a show-stopper. Firepower and orders of battle decreased the probability of success during 
the actions at the objective phase as SOF had to locate their target and evade the enemy to 
complete this phase. We have given SOF an 80% probability of completing this phase of the 
mission. The extraction phase has the highest probability of success, primarily because of 
the introduction of friendly forces. Limited by the enemy orders of battle, we have 
determined that SOF had a 90% probability of completing the extraction phase if they 
completed the mission, and 80% probability if they did not. 
2. Political Value 
Generally, political value is limited in SR missions, Unless the SR mission directly 
impacts the decision makers' actions, statements, or policies, little can be gained 
internationally or domestically from gathering intelligence that usually applies strictly to the 
military prosecution of an enemy. Once the mission and the operation are completed, some 
international political value can be gained if the SR mission is publicized and an ability to 
infiltrate whenever and wherever we want to is demonstrated. In the case of URGENT 
FURY, little international political value could be gained by a successful SR mission. 
Especially since our closest Allies, most notably Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime 
Minister, "raised strong objections to the entire operation and suggested that economic 
sanctions might be more appropriate."""he only international political value to be 
obtained would be from demonstrating above average resolve and capability in conducting 
SR missions. Additionally, the aircraft and satellite intelligence gathering techniques are a 
proven capability that other international actors would take for granted, and therefore the use 
of SOF would result in a larger international political value. Obviously, failure to insert, 
complete the mission, or extract in the case of GPF assets, would yield no political value, 
internationally or domestically. 
Domestic political value is similar to international political value in that SOF would 
receive a higher value coding then the GPF. The use of SOF, arguably, would have led to 
the gathering of much more tactically significant intelligence. The more significant 
intelligence would have increased the overall effectiveness of the operation, and the public 
would have perceived the operation as demonstrating both outstanding leadership and 
capabilities. Overall, the domestic political value of each mission would be greater than the 
international political value coded for each force. As Lewis painfully states: 
There is no doubt, of course, that the Grenada invasion was seen by both the 
public and mass media as a proper and popular exercise of national power, 
accepting uncritically the president's version of a strike against a dangerous 
Communist outpost in the Caribbean, although most Americans had never 
even heard of Grenada before, or even knew where it was. Even more, it 
unleashed a mood of euphoric nationalistic jingoism just as the British attack 
on the Falklands a year before had let loose a similar jingoistic response in 
the British public ... Not even the traditional 'liberal' press was immune to that 
Domestic political value, as we have 
success AND extracting the forces. 
demonstrated before, is more dependent on mission 
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continues by speaking of the "well-orchestrated 
propaganda campaign" and the "misinformation" concerning the "requests" from Governor- 
General Scoon, etc. 
3. Military Value 
Military value, both mission eflectiveness and target value, are dependent upon 
mission success for SR missions. Limited gray area exists where some affect is gained on 
the enemy. Like a hostage rescue mission, either the mission is accomplished or it is not. 
However, in this case, SOF does enjoy an advantage in terms of mission effectiveness. The 
smallest amount of intelligence that SOF could have provided, even if not complete, was 
more significant for most operators than the intelligence provided by airborne assets. SOF 
had a clear advantage in providing the type of information that we are building this 
counterfactual scenario around. In other words, for the type of reconnaissance we are 
advocating, SOF would have been able to provide more useful information to ground combat 
elements than the airborne assets. For this reason, a successful SOF mission was given a 
higher value coding than GPF. GPF success is coded fairly low due to the limited affect the 
intelligence they gathered had on military planning. Additionally, the information gathered 
by SOF could have been passed over secure radio nets instead of having to develop the 
imagery and either disseminate the information or attempt to describe the imagery gathered 
by GPF to appropriate users. 
4. Political Cost 
As eluded to earlier, international political cost was incurred in operation URGENT 
FURY regardless of the force or the success or failure of each phase of the mission. The 
international community was generally outraged at the U.S. military action, calling for a draft 
resolution in the United Nations (U.N.) condemning the armed inter~ention.~'~ As Adkins 
notes: 
Reagan had ordered an invasion of a foreign country, a country that was not 
the object of external attack. He intended, with token assistance, to occupy 
that country with U.S. forces temporarily and to crush any opposition. He 
was well aware of the international furor that would result, with the 
31' Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Revolution and 
Invasion, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 175-176. 
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probability of almost worldwide condemnation, both inside and outside the 
United Nations. He did it in the knowledge that Britain, which had 
constitutional and Commonwealth links with Grenada, was strongly 
opposed ... He did it without the support of Congress or, more important, the 
American people; they would learn about it after the event ... He did it 
realizing that he was flying in the face of international law ... He launched the 
largest U.S. military operation since Vietnam in circumstances that could end 
his presidency and jeopardize U.S. international relations for years to come. 
It was a decision of enormous import and of enormous risk, not from a 
military point of view - the United States could never actually lose the 
shooting war - but from the political  consequence^.^'^ 
SOF would have exacted a slightly higher international political cost for any failures than 
GPF because of the nature of the perceived threat in Grenada, which was minimal. 
Additionally, compromise of SOF on Grenada might have resulted in the seizing of the 
American students as hostages, further repression of the Grenadians, and international action 
prior to the invasion. 
Domestic political cost would have been minimal across the decision tree because of 
the perceived communist threat on Grenada. Any SOF failures, however, would have 
resulted in greater domestic political cost than the same GPF failure. A failure of SOF 
represented the failure of U.S. personnel on the ground in Grenada which would have most 
likely included some casualties, and would seem more personal to most Americans. Highly 
technical failures that included casualties could have been blamed away on sophisticated 
Soviet and Cuban air defenses and would have involved fewer casualties with a less personal 
public appeal. The lives of the American students would seem to have been a major 
domestic political cost to be considered. The literature, however, reflects an almost 
complacent attempt to locate, rescue, and protect the medical students on the island, and 
therefore we have determined that the compromise of SOF or GPF would not have resulted 
in the students being held hostage. This point is obviously refuted by the rhetoric of the time. 
We believe that this consideration, however, was not a factor in the decision to attempt to 
316 Adkins, pp. 1 O6- 107. 
insert SEALs on Sunday night to conduct the reconnaissance mission. Because of the highly 
technical nature of reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, failure of any phase does not 
necessarily indicate a loss of forces whereas failure of any phase for SOF could indicate a 
major difficulty or loss of forces. 
5. Military Cost 
The opportunity cost of using SOF or GPF was relatively low, but slightly higher for 
SOF. Several missions were slated for SOF and subsequently conducted by SOF while more 
SOF remained available for tasking.317 The GPF involved in conducting reconnaissance 
incurred little opportunity cost as there were no other missions for them to perform. The 
SOF used for this mission, however, were in theater aIready and did incur some slight 
opportunity cost because of the nature of the overall Operation and the heavy requirement 
for SOF. The cost of casualties was generally higher for GPF than SOF. The skill and 
experience of both SOF and GPF would have been essentially equal, however, replaceability 
of SOF in the short term would be more difficult than the replacement of aircrews and 
airframes. Additionally, any failures for SOF could be assumed to have a greater probability 
of casualties than a failure of GPF. As mentioned earlier, failure of any phase for GPF does 
not necessarily indicate the loss of an airframe, particularly in the Grenadian environment. 
Failed extraction, however, would result in a loss of aircraft and aircrew, and therefore incurs 
the highest possible cost. Had the environment been different and the failure of any phase 
represented a loss of an airframe and aircrew, the cost of casualties would have been greater 
for GPF than SOF. Because this is a counterfactual case and therefore there was no 
subsequent execution of the mission to describe, we continue with the analysis of this 
case. 
317 While COWS based, these SOF could have been tasked with conducting the 
same type of insertion as the SEALs that failed, and could have easily been introduced in the 
theater. Command relationships would have been slightly ad hoc, however, the capability 
still existed to introduce these forces had they been deemed necessary. 
E. ANALYSIS 
The failure to use more than one SOF unit to conduct a special reconnaissance 
mission prior to Operation URGENT FURY represents an error of omission: We initially 
considered this case a complex error of omission. We assumed that the political and military 
environment prevented GPF from gathering the type of intelligence needed by mission 
planners and that they did not, therefore, hold an absolute advantage. Upon further review 
of the events surrounding the operation, it became clear that GPF did have an absolute 
advantage. However, their limited tactical utility prevented them from gaining the 
comparative advantage. This case, like the Mayaguez case, represents a simple error of 
omission. SOF had both an absolute and comparative advantage but were not used to their 
full extent. We recognize the limitations and concerns involved with using SOF to conduct 
an SR mission. The planning cycle was short, the perceived Grenadian and Cuban 
capabilities discounted the need for detailed intelligence, and there was a danger that 
compromise might end with the seizing of the students. SOF, however, provided the 
capability to gather much needed information, increasing the expected value of the operation 
significantly, at a low expected cost. 
Some of the perceptions voiced by decision makers substantiate the need for a 
systematic framework. The day before the assault, during some heated discussions regarding 
the improvement of intelligence on Grenada, Admiral McDonald interjected: 
I can't believe what I'm hearing around this table. All you're going to face is 
a bunch of Grenadians. They're going to fall apart the minute they see our 
combat power. Why are we making such a big deal of this?318 
3'8 Beck, p. 159. Sholtes advocated a twenty-four hour postponement of the 
invasion to improve intelligence. The vigorous "exchange of views" that followed and 
sparked Admiral McDonald's remark, was put to rest after the State Department 
representative refused to delay the invasion because he was concerned about the stability of 
the OECS coalition. 
While we are confident that the operators did not treat Operation URGENT FURY with the 
disregard exhibited by Admiral McDonald, the mindset shows the exact attitude that would 
precede an error of omission. Decision makers did not understand the capabilities and 
limitations of SOF and devalued the importance of intelligence. Adkins points this out as 
he writes about the decision to bump H-hour from 0200 to 0400 and finally 0500:319 
The conventional planners seemed to have no inkling what this would mean 
for those Special operations Forces who needed darkness on D-day to carry 
out their missions. Navigational aids were deemed more important than the 
achievement of surprise ... Given the planners' lack of information about the 
enemy, this flagrant disregard for the foremost of military principles was a 
professional blunder that came within an ace of wrecking the entire 
operation.320 
Decision makers appear to have been locked in to launching the operation on the date 
originally given by the National Command Authority. They disregarded the importance of 
intelligence. The half-hearted attempt to gather last minute intelligence only resulted in 
jeopardizing the majority of SOF operations that immediately followed. 
The most significant costs associated with the use of SOF were political. Costs that 
appear to have been acceptable to the administration at the time. The value of using SOF to 
gather intelligence, however, was significantly greater than the cost. The military value of 
the information needed to plan the tactical operations that ensued would have been well- 
worth any risks associated with the compromise of friendly forces. The expected value 
outweighed the expected cost of using SOF to conduct reconnaissance missions. 
An interesting aspect of missions of this type is that even when SOF are used to 
conduct special reconnaissance missions, other GPF assets continue to gather the same 
" 9  This compromise occurred as a result to the heated discussions mentioned 
above. Sholtes wanted to delay twenty-four hours and McDonald agreed to move H-hour to 
0400 in order to allow another attempt to gather intelligence. The other SOF forces that had 
D-day missions also required darkness and surprise to accomplish their missions. 
320 Beck, p. 170. 
intelligence they would gather if SOF were not used. In cases when both forces have an 
absolute advantage, the use of both forces increases the expected value of the intelligence 
effort. Obviously the overall expected cost increases also, however, the result is generally 
a greater increase in expected value than expected cost, and a net gain. 
Appendix G provides a completed decision tree for the use of SOF versus the use of 
GPF to conduct reconnaissance missions. Using Equations (7), (8), ( lo ) ,  and ( 1  1 ) ;  the values 
and costs discussed above; and the probabilities discussed above, the resulting expected 
values and expected costs from the decision tree are as follows: 
SOF did hold an absolute advantage and a comparative advantage but were not used while 
GPF did hold an absolute advantage, demonstrating a simple error of omission. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
An analytical definition of the misuse of SOF does not exist. Misuse is both a 
difficult problem to define and a problem that must be avoided. The post-cold war world has 
produced hundreds of relatively minor conflicts, or "operations other than war." These 
conflicts present decision makers with numerous options that are less cut and dried than the 
options in previous conflicts. In those conflicts, the lines between democracy-and- 
communism, good-and-evil, and black-and-white were clearly defined. In today's conflictual 
environment, there seems to be a threshold of media exposure and numbers of casualties that 
drives American foreign policy and the subsequent use of military force. Sixty-six civilians 
killed by mortar fire in the Markale market in Sarajevo appeared to breach the "entrance 
threshold" for U.S. decision makers. Eighteen dead U.S. servicemen on the streets of 
Mogadishu, meanwhile, appeared to violate the "exit threshold" for U.S. decision makers. 
In an environment full of uncertainty, both international and domestic political ramifications, 
and intense media scrutiny, the proper use of SOF is essential. Misuse results in either a 
failed mission or an inordinate price for success. This thesis develops a theory of misuse and 
provides a systematic method of addressing, analyzing, and avoiding this problem. 
Our theory is based on published doctrine and decision making theory and is directed 
to SOF. The elements of probability, political and military value, and political and military 
cost leap from the doctrine. Our theory demonstrates a method of considering these elements 
and assigning probabilities and resulting pay-offs to the decision tree. The decision tree 
allows us to quantify, in an abstract way, the decision to use or not to use SOF instead of 
GPF. Assuming that something must be done by either SOF or GPF, it is our belief that 
misuse occurs at the decision point because decision makers lack understanding of SOF 
limitations and capabilities. We have quantified this decision process and determined that 
misuse occurs when SOF are used while GPF have an absolute and comparative advantage, 
or, misuse occurs when SOF are not used while they have both an absolute and comparative 
advantage over GPF. The concepts of absolute and comparative advantage are crucial to 
our theory of the misuse of SOF. 
If the expected value of SOF conducting a specific mission is greater than the 
expected cost of SOF conducting the mission, then SOF have an absolute advantage. This 
same ratio of expected value-to-expected cost is calculated for GPF, and assuming that both 
forces have an absolute advantage, used to compare the two forces. The force with the 
greatest expected value-to-expected cost ratio is said to have the comparative advantage. 
Absolute and comparative advantage are the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper 
use and allow us to delineate specific types of errors. Errors of commission and errors of 
omission are derived from our definition of misuse. Simple errors involve mistakes of 
comparative advantage while complex errors involve both absolute and comparative 
advantage mistakes. These four types of errors were the focus of our case studies. 
The case studies were chosen to represent four commonly believed cases of misuse 
that illustrate the four different types of errors. The tragic SEAL mission at Paitilla airport 
during Operation JUST CAUSE is commonly referred to as a misuse of SOF because "it 
wasn't a SEAL op," implying a simple error of commission. This was the only case study 
of misuse that we found to be a proper use of SOF. Merrill's Marauders, one of the 
forefathers of today's Rangers, are commonly believed to have been misused as line infantry 
against Japanese Divisions, implying a complex error of commission. We found this to be 
true. Errors of omission are more difficult to apply to a case study, as the argument is 
necessarily counterfactual. Both the Mayaguez incident and Operation URGENT FURY 
received intense criticism for the lack of accurate intelligence provided to the ground forces, 
and have spurred some SOF advocates to question the non-application of SOF. These cases, 
based on their environment of context, were believed to represent simple and complex errors 
of omission respectively. Both case studies, however, resulted as simple errors of omission. 
Every mission is launched with a decision maker calculating the expected value and 
the expected cost. It may be an intuitive, ad hoc determination made in the back of his mind 
or part of a staff briefing that includes the probability of success and the expected casualties. 
Regardless of what it is called, it is a process that weighs expected value and expected cost. 
This thesis provides a systematic theoretical framework that defines the variables that should 
be taken into consideration in such a process and highlights their inter-relationships. If we 
agree that expected value and expected cost exist, and we accept the framework established 
in this thesis as a starting point, then we can begin to have a meaningful disagreement about 
the misuse of SOF. To date, there is no agreed upon systematic way of approaching the 
problem. 
What is the cost of misuse? Two costs are paid, and neither is acceptable. First, 
misuse may result in a failed mission. Either SOF were used and failed, or they were not 
used and the mission failed. Failed missions carry with them limited to zero political and 
military value, as  well as the subsequent political and military costs. These values and costs 
have increased in the post-cold war world and the United States cannot afford to conduct 
operations that do not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for proper use. Proper 
use may not equal mission success, but it certainly creates a conducive environment. 
Second, misuse may result in paying an inordinate price for success. This causes an overall 
political and military inefficiency that may teach decision makers the wrong lessons and may 
result in more inefficiency down the road, fostering a continual cycle of paying a high price 
' for success. An interesting and counter-intuitive point illuminated by this thesis is that 
mission failure does not necessarily signal misuse. Conversely, mission success does not 
imply the proper use of SOF. Just because "it worked the last time" does not mean it will 
work again. 
To avoid misuse, decision makers must think in terms of absolute and comparative 
advantage. The factors affecting the probability of success for each phase must be 
considered, as well as the value and cost associated with each branch of the decision tree. 
The expected value and expected cost must be calculated and the absolute and comparative 
advantage established. These are the necessary and sufficient conditions to avoid the misuse 
of SOF. 
APPENDIX A. PROBABILITY WORKSHEET 

APPENDIX B. OPERATION RICE BOWL 
1. Probability worksheet for SOF used to conduct Operation RICE BOWL. 
2. Explanation: The insertion phase, inspite of extreme difficulty; lack of repetition; 
and necessity of surprise, all things being equal, obtains a relatively high probability of 
success. The actions at the objective phase obtains an even higher probability of success, 
once again, all things being equal. Finally, the extraction phase obtains the same high 
probability of success as the insertion phase, based on the independent analysis of the 
variables, all considered equal. Obviously, all variables are not equal, and the decision 
maker will make value judgements on which variables are most important, or which 
variables affect the mission package the most. In a comparative situation, although an exact 
probability of success cannot be determined, a relative difference can be determined. 
3. The completed decision tree with the subsequent probabilities, values and costs 
associated with each branch of the decision tree is presented below. 
SOF: EV = 237.8 EC = 93.0 EVEC = 2.56 
The analysis was conducted versus the cost of doing nothing. To demonstrate the 
' 
machinations of calculating expected value and cost, we have calculated the expected 
international political value below as an example: 
4. The absolute/comparative advantage graph is presented below with the ratio of SOF 
versus the cost of doing nothing indicated by an X. 
[EVEC] GPF = 1 [EVIEC] SOF = [EVECIGPF 
[EVEC] 
. [EVEC] s OF = 1 
0 1 .o [EVJEC] GPF 
Clearly, the mission to rescue the American hostages in Iran was not a misuse of SOF. 

APPENDIX C. POLITICAL AND MILITARY VALUE AND COST CODING 
1. Political Value: 
International Political Value 
Single objective of United States and Allies and 
Demonstrate/communicate unprecedented resolve and capability 
Demonstratelcommunicate unprecedented resolve and capability 
Single objective of United States and Allies 
One of several (1-3) objectives of United States and Allies and 
Demonstratelcommunicate extreme resolve and capability 
Demonstratelcommunicate extreme resolve and capability 
One of several (1-3) objectives of United States and Allies 
One of many (3-10) objectives of United States and Allies and/or 
Demonstrate/communicate above average resolve and capability 
Demonstrate/communicate above average resolve and capability 
One of many (3-10) objectives of United States and Allies 
One of numerous (> 10) objectives of United States and Allies and/or 
Demonstrate1communicate resolve and capability 
Solely the objective of the United States and minimal deterrent value 
Domestic Political Value 
100 Perceived as single national interest, public willing to pay a high price andlor 
Demonstrates unprecedented leadershiplcapability 
80 Perceived as vital national interest and/or 
Demonstrate outstanding leadershiplcapability 
50 Perceived as an important national interest and/or 
Demonstrate good leadershiplcapability 
20 Perceived as a national interest and/or 
Demonstrate effective leadershiplcapability 
0 Perceived as non-national interest, not worth one American life, demonstrate 
poor leadership 
2. Militarv Value: 
Mission Effectiveness 
100 Mission 100% complete, complete military effect on enemy 
80 Partial mission complete, severe military effect on enemy 
60 Partial mission complete, significant military effect on enemy 
40 Partial mission complete, some military effect on enemy military 
20 Partial mission complete, minor military effect on enemy 
10 Partial mission complete, no significant military effect on enemy 
0 Mission 0% complete, no military effect 
Target Value 
100 Single national strategic target 
80 National strategic target 
60 Theater strategic target 
40 Operational target 
20 Tactical target 
3. Political Costs 
International Political Cost 
100 Complete condemnation of International Community (including Allies) 
80 Perceived as militarily weak, indecisive, or incompetent, Allies distance 
themselves 
60 Perceived as militarily weak, indecisive, or incompetent, Allies speak out 
against US 
40 Perceived as militarily weak, indecisive, or incompetent, loss of credibility 
20 Loss of credibility 
0 None 
Domestic Political Cost 
100 Complete loss of public confidence, Congressional upheaval 
80 Loss of confidence, Congressional hearings 
50 Loss of confidence, media attack 
20 Medialpublic question leadership 
0 None 
4. Military Cost 
Opportunity Cost 
100 One unit, multiple missions 
80 One unit, many missions 
70 One unit, several missions 
60 Several units, multiple missions 
50 Several units, many missions 
40 Several units, several missions 
30 Many units, multiple missions 
20 Many units, many missions 
0 Many units, several missions 
Casualties. Skill. and Ex~erience 
100% casualties, irreplaceable in short term, high dollar cost of equipment 
casualty 
Heavy casualties (50-loo%), irreplaceable in short term 
Heavy casualties (50-loo%), replaceable in short term 
Medium casualties (25-50%), irreplaceable in short term 
Medium casualties (25-50%), replaceable in short term 
Medium dollar cost of equipment casualty 
Light casualties (0-25%), irreplaceable in short term 
Light casualties (0-25%), replaceable in short term 
Minimum casualties, low dollar cost of equipment casualty 
0% casualties 

APPENDIX D. PAITILLA AIRPORT: OPERATION JUST CAUSE 
1. Probability worksheet for SEALS ( indicated by S's) versus Rangers (indicated by R's) and 
Marines (indicated by M's) for the operation at Paitilla airport during Operation JUST 
CAUSE. If two or three forces are coded the same, they are represented by X's. 
2. The completed decision tree is presented below. 
v c 
SEAL: EV = 259.3 EC=49.5 EVEC=5.24 
Ranger: EV = 262.8 EC = 118.9 EVEC = 2.21 
Marine: EV = 264.2 EC=118.9 EV/EC=1.98 
EC-OC = 38.9 
EC-OC = 33.4 
'01) C (Mil) 
3. The absolute/comparative advantage graph is presented below with the absolute 
advantage ratios of SEAL vs. Rangers and versus Marines indicated by R and M respectively. 
[EVEC] GPF = 1 [EVIEC] SOF = [EVEC] 
[EVEC] SOF = 1 
0 1 .o [EVEC] GPF 
APPENDIX E. MERRILL'S MARAUDERS AT MYITKYINA 
1. Probability worksheet for Merrill's ~ a r a u d e r s  (indicated by x's) versus Chinese GPF 
(indicated by 0's) for the seige at Myitkyina. Both forces are represented by *Is. 
2. The completed decision tree is presented below. 
v (Pol) v ( 4il) C (Pol' C (Mil) 
SOF: EV = 142.4 EC = 170.0 EV/EC = 0.84 
GPF: EV = 148.4 EC = 99.6 EV/EC = 1.49 
3. The absolute/comparative advantage graph is presented below with the absolute 
advantage ratio indicated by an X. 
[EVEC] GPF = 1 [EVEC] SOF = [EVEC] 
[EVEC] so 
I 




I 0 1 .o [EVIEC] GPF 
APPENDIX I?. MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT 
1. Probability worksheet for SOF (indicated by x's) versus GPF (indicated by 0's) in 
conducting reconnaissance mission prior to operations on Koh Tang Island. When the 
coding of each is equal. it is represented by *Is. 
2 .  The completed decision tree is presented below. 
V (Pol) V (Mil) C (Pol) C (Mil) 
- n 
SOF: EV = 25 1.3 EC = 45.3 EVEC = 5.55 
GPF: EV = 127.7 EC = 29.9 EVEC = 4.25 
3. The absolute/comparative~ advantage graph is presented below with the advantage 
ratio indicated by an X. 
[EVEC] GPF = 1 [EVEC] SOF = [EV/EC]GPF 
[EVEC] SOF 
1 .O [EVEC] SOF = 1 
0 1 .O [EVIEC] GPF 
APPENDIX G. GRENADA - OPERATION URGENT FURY 
1. Probability worksheet for SOF (indicated by x's) versus GPF (indicated by 0's) in 
conducting reconnaissance mission prior to Operation URGENT FURY. When the coding 
of each is equal, it is represented by *Is. 
2. The completed decision tree is presented below. 
V (Pol) V (Mil) C (Pol) C (Mil) 
SOF: EV = 180.9 EC = 129.1 EVEC = 1.40 
GPF: EV=117.1 EC=98.8 EV/EC=1.18 
3. The absolute/comparative advantage graph is presented below with the advantage 
ratio indicated by an X. 
[EVEC] SOF 
1 .o 
0 1 .o [EV/EC] GPF 
APPENDIX H. MAPS 
1. Paitillia Airport Operation. 
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Map 1. Panama Canal and surrounding area. (Donnelly). 
Map 2. Panama City. (Ibid.). 
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Map 3. Paitilla Airport. (Donnelly). 
2. Merrill's Marauders. 
Map 4. North Burma area of operations. (Military Intelligence Division, 
Menill's Marauders). 
I 
I ... ...I. .*' 
Map 5. Situation in Burma. February 1944. (Ibid). 
Map 6. The battleground of Merrill's Marauders. (Romanus and Sunderland, 
Stillwell's Command Problems). 
Map 7 .  From the Hukawng Valley to Myitkyina. the three missions conducted 
by Merrill's Marauders. (Military Intelligence). 
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Map 8. Advance to Walawbum, 23 February - 4 March 1944. 
(Romanus and Sunderland). 
Map 9. Fight at Walawbum, 4-8 March 1944. (Ibid.). 
Map 10. Plan for second mission, 11 March 1944. (Military Intelligence). 
Map 11.  Shaduzup, 1st Battalion, 12 March - 7 April 1944. (Ibid.). 
Map 12. Approach to Inkangahtawng, 2d and 3d Battalions, 12-20 March 1944. (bid.). 
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Map 14. Nhpum Ga perimeter, 2d and 3d Battalions, 28 March 1944. (bid.). 
Map 15. Progress toward Nhpum Ga, 2d and 3d Battalions, 4-7 April 1944. (bid.). 
Map 16. Advance to Myitkyina, 28 April - 17 May 1944. (Romanus and Sunderland). 
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Map 17. Arrival of forces at Myitkyina, 17-19 May 1944. (Military Intelligence). 
Map 18. Myitkyina. 18 May - end of July 1944. (Romanus and Sunderiand). 
3. Mayaguez Incident. 
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Map 20. Location of the Mayaguez and crew 
(12 - 15 May 1975). (Ibid.). 








A = Landing site (Marine Command Group 129 personnel) 
B = Landing site (60 personnel) 
C = Landing site (20 personnel) 
D l ,  D2, D3 = Downed Helicopters 
Map 21. Koh Tang rescue operation. (Head). 
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Map 22. Mainland Targets. Targets attacked by tactical aircraft from carrier U.S.S. Coral 
Sea are designated with asterisk. (Lamb). 
4. Operation URGENT FURY. 




Map 24. D-day Assault Plan. (Adkins). 
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